Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

185. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Augusta, Georgia, April 23, 1957¹

Georgia, April 23, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

• Governor Stassen
• Mr. Hagerty
• General Goodpaster

In responding to a question by the President, Governor Stassen said that all delegations at the Disarmament Subcommittee Conference in London seemed to be making a much more serious approach to the problem this time than heretofore. This seriousness was shown beginning with the setting up of the agenda, which was done in a businesslike way. It was further shown in the Subcommittee’s handling of suggestions received from four countries not on the Subcommittee. Governor Stassen interjected that his own setup, in which he is working under the Secretary of State’s supervision, is proving successful.

Governor Stassen said that he himself had gone quickly to the substance of the problem in his own discussions in the Subcommittee, and that he had spoken quite frankly on two or three key issues. In response to this approach, Zorin (the Soviet delegate) had indicated he was prepared to consider making the Soviet proposal for complete elimination of nuclear weapons “separable” from other elements in the disarmament proposals. Governor Stassen said he had also told Zorin that we are not going to agree to their proposal that foreign bases be abolished, and Zorin had expressed agreement to lay aside this question. Further, whereas the Soviets had called for an agreement which would establish from the outset all the stages and steps incident to control of armaments, Zorin had indicated some readiness to consider our approach through successive stages, in which performance on one stage could be observed as a basis for deciding what further steps might next be taken.

Governor Stassen said that the discussions are not yet at the point of developing specific language: to date the whole matter have been one of probing.

Governor Stassen reported that Secretary Dulles gives very high priority in any agreement to provisions which would prevent the spread of atomic weapons to fourth countries, and high priority also to provisions which would save us from surprise attack. He stresses the importance for many reasons of the “opening up” of the Soviet Union which the inspection operation would accomplish. (The President commented that the Soviets would seem to have more to gain from preventing the spread of atomic weapons to fourth countries than do we, and that this might prove a valuable bargaining point.)

Governor Stassen said the British and French initially had expected only a short, fruitless meeting. Then they began to get quite optimistic, and it has been necessary to hold them down a bit. He said that some British and French opinion now indicates reservations concerning German reunification. It fears a furthering of present tendency for the Germans to best them in commercial competition. Governor Stassen said he has pointed out the importance of the common market in this regard. The President added that a reunified Germany will have to carry its own defense burden in larger measures than at present; a lessening of their present competitive advantage should result.

The President asked as to indications of any Soviet readiness to accept inspection. Governor Stassen said they have indicated willingness to give a good deal on this issue, but seem genuinely worried as to whether they could sustain their regime under such circumstances. They show signs of wanting a first step agreement, coupled with worry over its effect on internal stability of their system. He said he had indicated to them that if they lay aside the unacceptable proposals mentioned earlier, we might be prepared to agree initially on less than complete air inspection throughout their entire country, so long as there is an undertaking to expand progressively the geographical area to be inspected. He said that he had shown the Soviet delegation as an illustrative possibility the two zones for an initial inspection program that had been discussed here, and they had shown immediate and vivid interest.

Governor Stassen, referring to the provision for the stopping of atomic materials production for weapons purposes, said the Soviets had probed as to whether we have a stockpile of fissionable material not yet fabricated into weapons (which could be used to continue to make weapons, or put in the hands of our allies for them to make weapons). He said the Departments are studying in Washington as to whether we might be able to let them know that the stockpile is in weapons. He said the French are less than two years from the point of being ready to test a weapon (I believe he used the figure eighteen months). If they are to stop this development, they should stop soon. If the French were to conduct a test, it is hard to see how the Germans could be stopped from carrying out this development. The President again commented that he thinks Russia has more to fear than we from fourth nation development of nuclear arms. Governor Stassen said he thought this was particularly true in their minds with regard to Germany and Japan. He quoted Zorin to the effect that the Soviets recognize the U.S. tries to take a responsible attitude in world affairs. They are fearful, however, that an irresponsible country might do something which would draw the U.S. into conflict with them.

The President asked whether, in Governor Stassen’s talks with State, Defense, and AEC in Washington, these representatives had indicated they saw anything sinister or dangerous in the Soviet attitude. Governor Stassen said that he believed Admiral Strauss felt that if testing were discontinued it would be practically impossible for him to hold his scientific forces together. The President said this would seem to mean that any first agreement must be so strong and effective as almost certainly to lead to further steps. Governor Stassen said he felt the Joint Chiefs were concerned that we would not hold the Soviets to the full requirements of the first agreement, or take all action in our power should they depart from these provisions. The President said he saw real reasons for concern on this and other scores in the Defense field. If the agreement were obtained, public support of adequate defense might well drop markedly, and we might fall to too low a strength in defensive forces. Governor Stassen stressed the need to make clear that a first agreement is not itself the millenium.

Regarding plans for the reduction of forces, Governor Stassen said that three months after a treaty became effective blueprints would be exchanged. Nine months later, each country would put ten percent of its military equipment into moth balls, within its own country but under international inspection. Following this twelve-month period the question of the next step would arise. The Russians show great suspicion on this matter, indicating that it is simply a way to get intelligence about them. We are saying that world opinion would decide whether the first stage was being carried out in good faith, and would create great pressure for a next stage. Governor Stassen said that the next stage might, according to the JCS, be fifteen percent additional reduction. The President said that if a ten percent reduction were really carried out, the logic of the development would carry the process on. Governor Stassen said that the first treaty would cover the initial activity, and the initial organizational setup. A new treaty would then be in order to carry the matter further.

The President then discussed briefly with Governor Stassen the program of meetings that he is conducting, and Governor Stassen described the daily meetings of our own delegation, a noon meeting of the Western countries, an afternoon meeting three or four times a week with the full delegation, and private bilateral meetings from time to time as seems appropriate. He said that he has established liaison with the delegations of some seventeen countries in London to keep them in the picture constantly.

Responding to a question by the President concerning nuclear tests, Governor Stassen said that the position as developed in his “precept” prior to the London meeting is being put forward—if agreement were reached to discontinue production for weapons purposes, and to start to make transfers over to peaceful use from existing stocks, and a start were made on such transfers, and fourth countries accepted abstinence from production, we would then be prepared to stop or limit our tests. He said that the French and some other delegations are pressing for a greater degree of commitment. He said that we are now studying within the U.S. Government, whether we might propose a twelve-month moratorium on testing conditioned on agreement to cut off production for weapons purposes and to make transfer to peaceful use. He said that the intricate interrelationship of stopping weapons production and stopping tests is being very carefully studied by U.S. agencies, without, of course, raising it with foreign delegations.

The President said he thought the U.S. might be the hardest to convince on the limiting of tests. Our scientists are fascinated by the research they are enabled to carry out through this means—research which has a very large nonmilitary as well as military significance. Other countries tend to view the testing as simply military in purpose. In further discussion, the President said that he sometimes thinks that unlimited right of inspection may be almost an essential to any disarmament agreement.

Governor Stassen brought up the question of the limit of reduction of military forces. He did not think that a plan to go down to purely internal forces would be sound. Some forces patterned for defense against external attack must be retained for the foreseeable future. The President said that the tendency, once a limited disarmament has been initiated, could be to keep going on down in strength. Governor Stassen referred to the experience at the time of Hitler, in which other nations were so weak that someone willing to break agreements was able to place himself quickly in a relatively very strong position. After further discussions, the President and Governor Stassen agreed that the first step in disarmament is likely to be the hardest.

Governor Stassen indicated that Zorin had said on April 12th that the U.S. proposals were being very carefully reconsidered in Moscow and that he would go back to receive the results of this study. Secretary Dulles had then thought that this was a good time for Governor Stassen to come back. Governor Stassen said that there is evidence of a minority in the Soviet Union who say simply that the U.S. is preparing for a day when it will move to smash Russia. In the early days of the negotiations Zorin was watching carefully to see if the U.S. was serious. As both sides avoided propaganda activity over the initial negotiations, the impression of seriousness grew. Zorin, for example, asked if the Senate would ratify the agreement once reached. Governor Stassen told him that if the President and Secretary Dulles considered that the agreement was sound, and approved it, they would be able to gain the necessary support of the people and of the Senate. The President confirmed that he felt support could be rallied on a disarmament agreement evaluated as sound.

Governor Stassen said the next step will be to complete the discussion of the inspection organization, and then take up the question of missiles and rockets. Zorin may be expected to have a reaction to indicate when he comes back. If he takes an obstinate stand on any collateral issue, this will be evidence of Soviet rejection of the idea of trying to reach agreement. If he continues with serious discussion, this will tend to indicate that the Soviets see some possibility of achieving progress in disarmament.

Governor Stassen and Mr. Hagerty then drafted a statement for the press, and checked it with Secretary Dulles by phone. The President approved it, and Mr. Hagerty released it to the press.²

G
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 24. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Dulles, Wilson, and Strauss under cover of an April 27 memorandum from Cutler. (Ibid., Dulles Papers, General Memcons)
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1957, p. 772.