209. Memorandum of a Conversation, Soviet Embassy, London, May 28, 1957, 2:45 p.m.1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Messrs. Zorin, Roshchin, Shakhov, Temirhaey, Pisarev, and Romanov—USSR Delegation
  • Messrs. Stassen, Peaslee, Goodby, Weiler, Akalovsky (Interpreter) and Cdr. Higgins—U.S. Delegation
1.
Governor Stassen indicated that, as he had said on the previous day, he wished to consult with other nations that might be involved in an agreement. Therefore, at this juncture, he wanted to advise the Soviet Delegation that, if it was agreeable to them, he would like to have no session on Wednesday2 so that he could go to Paris and consult with the NATO Council. He further stated that he might wish [Page 561] to ask the Soviet Delegation to meet with the U.S. Delegation on Friday for some bilateral discussions and that it might be helpful to the U.S. Delegation to have no Sub-Committee meetings until Monday. Governor Stassen stated that he was not certain at this point how much he could present to the Soviet Delegation on Friday, but that he thought that some discussion might be valuable. He said that if he should be prepared for extensive discussion by Friday, two bilateral meetings might be necessary on Friday—one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Governor Stassen emphasized that this statement did not mean that he intended to table the new U.S. decisions in the Sub-Committee’s session on Monday. He personally preferred to have more time for U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks before tabling the U.S. position officially. At this time he only wanted to advise the Soviet Delegation of this situation and would appreciate it if Mr. Zorin could agree today not to meet tomorrow. It would be helpful to the U.S. Delegation if the Sub-Committee did not meet until Monday, but Governor Stassen said that he did not expect Mr. Zorin to give an immediate reply on this point. He said this question could be decided upon later at the option of Mr. Zorin.
2.
Mr. Zorin said that the Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that everything that can be useful for the preparation of a reasonable agreement should be done; however, it was another question whether the NATO consultations mentioned by Governor Stassen were useful. He realized that Governor Stassen was in a better position to judge, but he feared that if too many countries are involved into our Five-Power negotiations this would make our deliberations more complicated and even may make the achievement of an agreement more difficult, especially since among the nations Governor Stassen wanted to consult there were enemies of a disarmament agreement. As far as tomorrow’s session is concerned, it was up to Governor Stassen to decide what he would like to do on that day, and if it was inconvenient for him to meet on Wednesday, the Soviet Delegation would have no objection to not meeting on that day. As to the other meetings, Mr. Zorin thought that it would be advisable to postpone the decision on this until later. He had no objection to a bilateral meeting with the U.S. Delegation on Friday if Governor Stassen should have something concrete to say.
3.
Governor Stassen made an interjection at this point and said that he did not intend to ask in the Sub-Committee for a recess for the purpose of consulting NATO. He would simply say that there was some work to be done by the U.S. Delegation and that therefore it was desirable to USDEL not to have a meeting on Wednesday. He did not want to put Mr. Zorin in a position where he would have to agree to some consultations to be conducted on the part of USDEL. He did want, however, to advise Mr. Zorin personally of the purpose of this [Page 562] recess as a matter of personal courtesy. Governor Stassen appreciated Mr. Zorin’s agreeing to not having a meeting on Wednesday and said that he would not meet with the Soviet Delegation on Friday unless he had something concrete to say.
4.
Mr. Zorin said that he wished to express another consideration which he thought Governor Stassen might wish to take into account during the further work of the Sub-Committee. He said that the Soviet Delegation would like to see the Sub-Committee, which had been instructed by the General Assembly to accomplish a definite mission, proceed with its deliberations without making them more complicated. If they should become more complicated, this might make the achievement of an agreement more difficult. He repeated his view that among the nations Governor Stassen wanted to consult, there were open enemies of an agreement. He said he did not wish to enter into the motives for this attitude on the part of some countries, but he did want to express his fear that the situation might become more complex and make our negotiations more difficult. This, he said, would not be in the interest of peace, nor would it be in the interest of the United States or any other member of the Sub-Committee. Mr. Zorin stated that, as he understood the U.S. position from statements made in the Sub-Committee, the U.S. wanted to have an agreement reached first among the members of the Sub-Committee and then have other states associate themselves with it.
5.
Governor Stassen said that he appreciated the comments made by Mr. Zorin and said that he did not agree that any of the states he wished to consult was an enemy of disarmament. He thought that a reasonable agreement would have the support of all the states concerned. He continued by saying that it was his impression that the Soviet Union places much importance on the inclusion of the European area in an agreement. If a partial agreement affecting other countries was to be achieved, and if we expected these countries to sign such an agreement, then it would be wiser to consult these countries in advance. Governor Stassen said that by consulting he meant only an exchange of views rather than a subordination of the U.S. policy to the views of these countries. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union was of the opinion that a more limited agreement, not involving European territory, is preferable, then the U.S. Delegation was prepared to reexamine the situation and reconsider the extent to which other countries would be brought in.
6.
Mr. Zorin stated that as far as consultations with other states involved are concerned, Governor Stassen would of course understand that the Soviet Union, when other countries and especially those allied to the Soviet Union are involved, also conducts consultations with those countries. The Soviet Union had submitted proposals that involved other countries, in particular countries belonging to the War-saw [Page 563] Pact. However, it was up to the members of the Sub-Committee to introduce such proposals as would be acceptable to other countries and thus not to delay the negotiations in the Sub-Committee by carrying out consultations interfering with this work. The Soviet Delegation had no right to say whom the U.S. should consult; he only thought that from the standpoint of the Sub-Committee, there was danger that any agreement may be blocked by enemies of such an agreement, who in his opinion existed in Europe. This was especially true with regard to an agreement that might be reached in the near future. Mr. Zorin stated that he was not inclined to exclude Europe from an agreement. He indicated that the Soviet Union had submitted a broader and a more limited proposal, both of them including European areas. Consultations were an internal matter of each of the Delegations, and the Sub-Committee should not be dependent in its work on steps necessary to be taken by individual Delegations. He understood the difficulties involved and emphasized that the Sub-Committee’s work is at the center or world attention. If he were to go for consultations to Warsaw, Berlin, or Prague, this would protract the negotiations in the Sub-Committee. This would not be desirable since, in his opinion, the Sub-Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible. The problem of how to combine the Sub-Committee proceedings with consultations conducted by individual Delegations was an internal matter of each of the Delegations.
7.
Governor Stassen appreciated Mr. Zorin’s statement that consultations were an internal affair of each Delegation. He then stated that in the meeting which was to take place that afternoon he intended to make a broad statement on the export and import of arms as well as on international movement of troops. He mentioned that he had made a similar statement on a previous occasion but that he thought it advisable to restate these ideas once again after his trip to Washington. This was a non-controversial subject and he did not expect any disagreement on this point.

The meeting ended at 3:20 p.m.

A. Akalovsky
  1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chron File. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.
  2. May 29.