Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

61. Letter From the Representative at the Technical Atomic Energy Talks (Rabi) to the Secretary of State¹

Geneva, August 27, 1955.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I herewith report completion of my assignment to represent the United States in meetings held August 22–27 with representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, USSR, UK, and U.S., for the purpose of mutual consideration of the problem of preventing diversion of fissionable material from installations devoted to the peaceful application of atomic energy.²

Full reports on this meeting have been transmitted during the course of the discussion by telegraph to the Department of State and the verbatim records of the meetings have been forwarded to the Department of State.³ Recordings of all statements have been made and will be forwarded to the Department of State. The United Nations will bill the United States for the common costs.

Attached as appendices to this document are the following:⁴

• Tab “A”—Agreed-upon agenda
• Tab “B”—Representatives of participating governments
• Tab “C”—Department of State Instructions to the United States Delegation
• Tab “D”—Meeting Procedures and Arrangements

The meetings were held in the Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations on August 22, 23, 25, 26 and 27.

The text of the press releases issued in connection with meetings have been fully reported separately to the Department of State and are included in the verbatim records. The verbatim records which, as noted above, were forwarded to the Department of State, are provisional in character only and will be replaced by the final corrected verbatim records within the next ten days. These records reflect the attitudes expressed in the meetings. It may, however, be useful to add certain tentative impressions which developed from the meetings and which may not be fully reflected in the verbatim record:

1. The attitudes of the Soviet Delegation reflected the post-Geneva desire of the Soviet Government for apparent free and sympathetic relationships with the U.S., with the exception of a single meeting on Wednesday. The Soviet Representative and his advisors were careful to avoid any direct conflict of views with the U.S., leaving the door open to later agreement without however committing themselves to any of our proposals.

2. There was a continuation of the general atmosphere which was present at the atomic energy conference and in the Advisory Committee meetings which preceded the conference. A minimum of political overtones were introduced by the Soviet Delegation. When their attention was drawn to their transgression of the Terms of Reference of the meeting, they quickly withdrew or minimized such statements.

3. The Soviet Delegate reiterated at several meetings his desire for additional meetings for technical explorations of these and related problems.

4. At no point in the discussion was there any indication that the Soviet Union would not join the International Atomic Energy Agency, although no special enthusiasm was shown for the idea of an Agency. Neither was the possibility of inspection and control denied, although there was no affirmative enthusiasm for such inspection and control. There were indications that the Soviet Union might prefer an Agency whose functions were restricted to the policing of bilateral agreements.

5. The Soviet Delegates purposely or not established the impression that they were not well prepared and that their instructions were not adequate. Similarly, I gained the impression that there was a lack of coordination between the positions of Czechoslovakian and Soviet Delegations. I would make the following recommendations to the Department and the Atomic Energy Commission:

1. It would be desirable, if the Soviets requested one, to agree to another meeting.

2. If another meeting is held, it should be closely tied in with other discussions on the Agency statute with the Soviet Union. Consideration should be given to whether it would not be desirable to tie the technical discussions into the Agency negotiations.

3. In the intervening period before any such meeting, the United States Government should undertake more adequate technical preparations than had been undertaken for the current meeting. As specified in my memorandum to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated August 25, 1955,⁵ it is recommended that an engineering study be authorized to develop in greater detail the U.S. technical suggestions outlined in this series, of meetings.

4. Any future meetings in this field should be closely coordinated with the discussions on disarmament and the U.S. position in the Disarmament Commission.

5. Copies of the Verbatim Records of this meeting should be made available to the individuals currently developing the disarmament policy of the United States and determining the nature of the participation of the U.S. in an International Atomic Energy Agency. I have appreciated this opportunity to serve the United States as Representative in these discussions. If I can provide additional information or elaboration of these tentative judgments, I shall be pleased to provide it.

Sincerely yours,

I.I. Rabi

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901–GE/8–2755. Confidential.
2. For the U.S. position at this conference, see Document 58.
3. No verbatim records have been found in Department of State files.
4. All tabs listed were attached to the source text, but are not printed.
5. Not found in Department of State files.