Office of the Historian

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1

Phnom Penh, January 29, 1955—noon.

551. I called this morning on Prince Sirik Matak, new Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff Cambodian Armed Forces. I left with him copies of my note of January 27 and of proposed secret declaration re training. Minister thanked me warmly for US interest in providing direct aid Cambodian Armed Forces and accepted my thesis that in order to administer such aid, we needed prompt establishment [Page 421] of a small MAAG/Phnom Penh. He is seeing King at noon today and will discuss over-all principles Re MAAG bilateral and proposed secret declaration. Minister did not hide fact he feared French reaction would be sharp and unfavorable.

I stressed we had no desire at once to oust French instructors and my personal view that any abrupt shift in present set-up would be disastrous. We wished loyally to cooperate with French and to continue use of French instructors so far as this was practicable. However, Prince could readily see it would be chaotic to attempt to train Cambodian Army through two lines of command. It was not possible to have two principals running one school, and in consequence, insistence of our defense authorities on unity of responsibility was reasonable and sound.

Re first paragraph Department’s telegram 322,2 Minister and I agreed talks on technical level would continue between my officers and officers of ARK in effort to refine views on 1955 “plan de campagne” and military budget. However, on both sides these talks would be purely exploratory and without commitment.

I said I needed a MAAG here soon as possible if I were to be able to fulfill my responsibilities both to Cambodia and to US Government for proper administration of direct aid. I could not for example, determine what amounts of war matériels would be handed over to ARK without a MAAG to counsel me on this highly technical matter. As for budgetary assistance, I should be glad to recommend to my government a one-month advance payment in order that ARK should not be without financial support, but this would be without commitment as to over-all budget for 1955 and final amount which US would contribute to that budget.

Re final paragraph Department’s telegram 3223 and without prejudice to JCS determination force levels recommended my 352, 367, 512 to Saigon4 and Saigon telegram 2636,5 after consultation with MAAG officers and army attaché, I believe FOA should authorize me to hand check for 1.5 million dollars to Cambodian Minister of Defense as of 1 February to cover fiscal needs of Cambodian [Page 422] Armed Forces for that month. This figure takes into account 1955 Cambodian military budget and is arrived at on a forces basis of 35,353 men because this is number of troops now under arms, and they cannot be instantly demobilized, irrespective of what final decision JCS reaches Re force levels. We have deducted from over-all dollar figure of 2.5 million as net US contribution.

I believe it psychologically of first importance that we provide Cambodian Government with direct financial support for February. This will be tangible evidence of our intentions and will be conclusive so far as Cambodian Government is concerned as indicating US can be relied upon as effective friend. Speed in authorizing this payment is of essence as French here can be expected to place immense pressure on Cambodian Government following revelations recently made to them of our intentions.

McClintock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/1–2955. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon and Paris.↩
  2. In the first paragraph of telegram 322 to Phnom Penh, January 27, the Embassy was urged to keep the talks with Cambodian officials on force levels on an “exploratory” basis in view of the fact that no decision was expected from the JCS on the matter within the month. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/1–2455)↩
  3. In the final paragraph of telegram 322, the Department authorized the Embassy to submit the initial request for funds required for Cambodian direct forces support to FOA if the Embassy anticipated the necessity to begin such support in the near future.↩
  4. The force level recommended in telegram 352 from Phnom Penh, repeated to Saigon as 367 and Paris as 185, December 13, 1954, was 34,000. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/12–1354) The reference to telegrams 367 and 512 to Saigon is apparently in error as neither deals with Cambodian force levels. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/12–1554 and 751G.5622/1–2555)↩
  5. Dated January 8, vol. I, p. 25.↩