Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

286. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 26, 1955—noon.

460. Department pass Defense. Reference Deptel 351, March 17 (second section received Vientiane evening March 23) sent Paris 326, London 4746, repeated information Saigon 4037, Phnom Penh 455, Bangkok 2578 from Department.² We are repeating to Talbot and Dufour pertinent points indicated reference telegram with which they are in substantial agreement and on which they have been acting to best their ability. USARMA and I feel, however that certain premises on which reference telegrams based require further clarification, which we have perhaps so far failed adequately to provide.

French training mission is deficient in three respects: (1) its morale is low because of loss war and sudden switch from command to advisory position, (2) there has been too rapid rotation out of key technicians without prompt replacement, (3) standards of discipline and training are considerable lower than ours. French are aware first two deficiencies and are beginning take some steps to correct them; third deficiency is ingrained and could be corrected only over period of years. We should continue steady pressure on French to improve in all three respects. We requested General Collins discuss question with Ely (Deptel 342³) and he agreed to do so.

However, it would be unrealistic to expect improvements to occur in French Mission to be reflected in substantially improved performance Lao armed forces before many months have passed. Long before that time two northern provinces will probably have been either won or lost. In considering whether or not force should be applied in two provinces, we should base our estimates on Lao forces substantially as they now stand and not as they might conceivably be galvanized by some time next year.

As to present capabilities Lao forces, while we would be last to rate them high, we continue to believe Royal Army could at present reoccupy bulk of two provinces, (1) if French directed operation and (2) if Viets did not intervene substantially. We are puzzled by latest G–2 estimate⁴ and wonder if it may not reflect British estimate é We doubt British sources (they have no military attaché in Laos) are as good as ours and we suspect their estimate reflects unduly (1) their opposition to military operations in Laos and (2) their own not wholly comparable Malaya experience.

We certainly would not expect government forces to “overwhelm” Pathet nor wholly to suppress guerrilla activities. What we would expect would be that government would, if Viets did not intervene in force, be able supplant Pathets in occupation major part of two provinces and latter be confined to scattered outposts and guerrilla formations, as government now is. Such formations could, as in Malaya, be maintained indefinitely if Communists so desire. Their capacity, however, to use provinces as seat of Lao Communist government and as base of operation against rest of country would be very substantially reduced. In our judgment this is the key point, since our interest is not primarily in two provinces but in country as a whole.

In this connection we may add following. First, in our view there has been no recent deterioration of relations between French military mission and Lao forces. Relations are fairly good, having improved since low point at time of command transfer. Brake on action is French Government policy, not lethargy of mission. Second, while number of Pathet units identified have recently increased, it remains our estimate, as well as that of French and Laotians, that only two battalions are well trained and organized and that, while political indoctrination has been proceeding rapidly, there has so far been little improvement in military training and equipment. We would expect Viets henceforth increasingly to emphasize these factors with result that six months hence situation likely to be much less favorable.

In light these factors we believe US advice to British, French and Laotians should be along following lines and in following sequence:

1. Continue urge Katay to break off negotiations in near future. In order do so convincingly, however, we shall probably be obliged offer more promising alternative than appeal to ICC and Geneva signatories, in which neither Katay nor his colleagues have slightest faith.

2. Nevertheless, urge Lao Government to appeal to ICC and Canadian and Indian members to seek clear decision on authority Royal Government to administer two provinces. While such decision is in our view completely out of the question, effort to obtain it should be educational experience for all concerned.

3. Urge Lao Government to publicize its case, particularly its appeals to ICC and to do so especially at Bandung.

4. Urge French and Laotians to prepare for eventual military action if other means have not brought about significant progress by end April. Such military action might take form, rather than any direct attack on Pathets, of overt reenforcement government units in two provinces with view, first, to occupying areas not at present held by either side, second, to constricting and ultimately squeezing out Pathet forces in same manner they have been constricting above units and third, to installing government functionaries. Government use this tactic might be more effective than opponents since government has much larger forces and since local population believed to be for most part loyal to crown. Moreover, aside from what seems to us tortured interpretation Article 19,⁵ there is nothing in Geneva Accord which would forbid, at this stage, free movement of Royal Forces throughout royal territories.

As indicated in previous telegrams, French cooperation and at least British neutrality would be required for implementation all four of these steps. So far we have French and British cooperation on one, two and three, which in our opinion will by themselves be wholly abortive, and on step four British hostility and French indecision.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2655, Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Supra.
3. Dated March 16, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1551 G/3–1355)
4. Presumably a reference to the G–2 estimate of March 17; see footnote 3, Document 283, and footnote 5, supra.

5. Article 19 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954, reads as follows:

   “The present Agreement shall apply to all those armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and engage in no hostile act against the other party.”