409. Editorial Note
In the continuing military base negotiations, the issue of criminal jurisdiction emerged as a major obstacle to a successful settlement. Under Article XIII of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, the United States had jurisdiction over offenses committed by any person within the bases “except where the offenders and the offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines.” The Philippine panel strongly opposed [Page 684] this clause which it believed was a derogation of Philippine sovereignty. The panel, moreover, believed that the United States had concluded status of forces agreements with Japan and the NATO countries which were considerably more favorable to those host nations on the issue of criminal jurisdiction.
In telegram 596 from Manila, August 31, Bendetsen stated that it was “now clear that criminal jurisdiction presently looms as make-or-break issue in these negotiations.” He laid out the crux of the dispute as follows: “To put it as clearly as we can, it is precisely the fact that Article XIII accords U.S. ‘first right to exercise jurisdiction’ on base when Phil citizen is injured party that is offensive to them. They not only regard it as offensive but discriminatory when compared with NATO, Iceland and Japan SOF.” The Iceland reference was apparently to the Defense Agreement pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Reykjavik on May 5, 1951, and entered into force on that same date (TIAS 2266), and the annex on the status of United States personnel and property, signed in Reykjavik on May 5, 1951, and entered into force on that same date. (TIAS 2295) Bendetsen concluded that he foresaw no “insurmountable difficulties” in reaching a base agreement with the Philippines, but emphasized that a settlement would necessarily be contingent on a solution to the criminal jurisdiction issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–3156)
In response to this and several other telegrams from Bendetsen and Nufer on the same subject (telegrams 601, September 3, 697, September 11, and 698, September 11, from Manila; ibid., 711.56396/9–356, 711.56396/9–1156, 711.56396/9–1156, respectively), the Departments of State and Defense authorized certain revisions in the Military Bases Agreement but did not give Bendetsen the authorization he believed necessary to conclude a satisfactory settlement of this extremely technical question. In telegram 900 to Manila, September 18, the Departments of State and Defense summarized their position: “If, to meet what may only be transitory Philippine attitudes on this subject,” they explained, “we accept limitations which are quite out of line with what has been and is being worked out with other allies. We are obviously both opening door wide to demands for revision of prior agreements and undercutting our negotiators in other areas. Result could be serious deterioration of our over-all position.” (Ibid., 711.56396/9–1256)
With the negotiations stalemated on the criminal jurisdiction issue as well as several other matters, Bendetsen had earlier determined that the only hope for a settlement lay in presenting the Philippine panel with an American “package” proposal for an overall agreement. Accordingly, on September 12 he drafted a proposed package plan and cabled it to the Departments of State and Defense [Page 685] for consideration. (Telegram from COMPHILCOM to the Department of State; ibid., Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 66 D 487, Philippines) When State and Defense informed him that his plan could not be approved without considerable study, Bendetsen advised that the negotiations be temporarily recessed so that he could return to Washington for consultation. He was convinced that any further sessions with the Philippine panel, without reference to an approved United States package plan, would be fruitless since they would likely only heighten areas of difference between the two sides. (Telegrams 770 from Manila, September 17, and 515 from Hong Kong, September 20; ibid, Central Files, 711.56396/9–1756 and 711.56396/9–2056, respectively; and telegrams 843, September 13, and 889, September 17, to Manila, 711.56396/9–1356 and 711.56396/9–1456, respectively)