Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

420. Memorandum From the Special Representative to the Philippines (Bendetsen) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, December 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

• The Philippine Military Bases Negotiations of 1956

On the termination of my mission and resignation effective this date as Special United States Representative to the Republic of the Philippines and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Philippine Affairs, I am submitting herewith my report based upon my association with these negotiations since 10 July, last.

This memorandum summarizes my conclusions and recommendations. In the attachments will be found: a summary of the negotiations; a suggested timetable of implementing actions; a transcript of an oral report (made to the representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, the three military services, the United States Information Agency, ICA and … ); a detailed report of the negotiations (with supporting enclosures).²

My first general conclusion is that these negotiations, which were undertaken with a Philippine panel and which embraced a number of issues beyond the scope of a land settlement, having been recessed at Manila on 5 December 1956 by mutual agreement of the two Governments should not be resumed on the same basis. The issues raised can be generally categorized into two groups: tangibles and intangibles. For the purpose of this report, I have regarded land settlement problems as tangible issues, and problems involving such matters as criminal jurisdiction, retaliation against armed attack and the like, as intangible. An effort should be made to deal with the tangible problems step-by-step through normal diplomatic and military channels. If such an effort proves successful during the forthcoming months, then an attempt should be made to compose the intangible issues on a President-to-President level during the recommended visit of President Magsaysay to the United States in late spring of 1957, following his likely renomination.

My second general conclusion is that we cannot afford to fail in the Philippines. A diligent effort should be made not only to maintain, but to improve relations between the two governments. To my way of Winking this is not only feasible, but essential to United States interests. Failure is wholly unnecessary and would be hard to justify. From an external political point of view, the ramifications of failure would be unacceptably prejudicial. Because we do have military bases in the Philippines, failure to maintain good relations could well bring serious repercussions on the stability of U.S. military bases and forces in other countries. The Philippines share in common with us language, institutions, a system of government and a Christian society. Degeneration of the Philippine economy and political stability or a serious deterioration of our relationships would be interpreted as a failure of our own institutions in a country where we had nearly fifty years of opportunity to develop them.

My third general conclusion is that whereas Magsaysay failed during these negotiations to exercise effective political action to intervene despite oral assurances that he would do so, he may well have been in no position at this time to fulfill such assurances. It seems to me that when he assumed the Presidency in 1954, he did so under conditions which did not, in fact, place in his hands the effective means for exercising political power. His nomination by the Nacionalista Party was in a significant sense the result of a coalition of Manila politicians who felt that they could capitalize on his popularity with the people. These politicos (such as Recto and Lopez) would ordinarily have been opposed to him, but they felt they could control him as a front man who would bring the Nacionalistas to power. They, rather than Magsaysay, controlled the selection of the Congressional candidates on the Nacionalista ticket and as a result Magsaysay did not emerge from the nomination in control of either the party or the governmental machinery. In the subsequent bi-elections of 1955 he was not effectively advised and did not take the stump until a few days before the balloting. Thus, for example, Recto was reelected when Magsaysay possibly could have prevented it. The forthcoming year however affords a clear opportunity both for him and for us. We should make the most of it. While it is by no means certain, he has an excellent chance of obtaining renomination. If he is renominated by the Nacionalistas it will be over the opposition of those who controlled the party last time and Magsaysay could well emerge with the party machinery in his own hands. If renominated, it is my feeling that Magsaysay will be reelected by a substantial majority. … If the intangible issues discussed below are composed in the late spring following his renomination, his subsequent reelection should substantially improve the foundation upon which our mutual defense arrangements rest. This should follow, as I see it, not only because the people would have supported his policies once again, but also because, as distinguished from the current situation, Magsaysay would then be able to translate this support into effective action on the domestic scene—something he now hesitates to try because his actual power is more apparent than real.

It is my fourth general conclusion that hereafter, the U.S. should avoid being drawn into major negotiations of any kind in Manila, and irrespective of the site of the talks, should not enter negotiations with a panel consisting of both executive and congressional membership. Also, where possible, we should avoid giving the appearance of being under any pressure of time and be fully prepared for protracted talks.

My fifth general conclusion is that U.S. interests would be better served if we were, quietly, to release the Philippines from the implied commitment in the joint Nixon–Magsaysay statement of 3 July 1956 to contribute private lands free of cost, if indeed such a commitment was implied. There are several reasons for this. First, the contribution of private land free of cost requires approval of the Philippine Congress. This means a debate which in the present atmosphere of Manila politics would not be favorable to United States interests. Second, based on past experience it is doubtful that the Philippine Congress would appropriate the necessary funds. Third, if it is indeed regarded as a commitment, it would be tantamount to an implied revision of the present clauses in the Military Bases Agreement which provide otherwise in certain cases. Fourth, the requirements for additional private lands, now in the program, are relatively modest in quantity as well as dollar-wise and payment for these lands would enhance our chances for a step-by-step solution. I should add also that in my opinion our general relationships would be better served if we did not request the Philippine Government to make lands available, whether public or private, prior to the time we have adopted firm Department of Defense programs for base development. The unnecessary dislocation of occupants or taking the lands out of cultivation long before they are actually needed inevitably leads to irritation and misunderstanding.

In order both to increase the possibility of the successful resolution of the tangible problems and at the same time to pave the way for composing the intangible issues, we should exert continuing pressure on Magsaysay to discharge the Philippine Panel. This is necessary because the existence of the Philippine Panel may interfere with or prevent the step-by-step settlement of the military base land problems specifically outlined below and might greatly diminish the chances of composing the intangible issues during the recommended visit of President Magsaysay to the United States late next spring. We should avoid dealing with the Panel and if the Panel intervenes, cease our efforts until the Panel is discharged.

While the specific timing of the step-by-step settlement of base land problems naturally will need to be subjected to continuing evaluation and reappraisal in the light of developments and results, we should initiate such a phased program without delay. (The suggested timing and sequence of these steps is indicated below and recapitulated in a time-table included as in Section Two of the attachments.) The specific actions aimed at securing the additional lands needed for bases development and at making the land settlement contemplated both by the Military Bases Agreement and the Nixon–Magsaysay statement of 3 July 1956, should, wherever possible, entail the concurrent and correlative actions of coupling relinquishment with acquisition.

[Here follows a list of 16 specific recommendations for the resolution of “the tangible problems,” including suggestions that the Philippine flag be raised over all United States bases in the Philippines in the position of honor on January 1, 1957, that the administration of the town of Olongapo be transferred to the Philippine Government as soon as possible, and that the proposed United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Board be established in the near future.]

My comments and recommendations respecting the intangible issues are:

1. Criminal Jurisdiction. It is strongly recommended that the solution to this problem be found through implementation of Article XIII. This is because revision of Article XIII by substituting a NATO formula would necessarily pose the need for insisting on a Netherlands-type waiver commitment. There are two reasons why this presents us with great difficulty. From a domestic political point of view in the Philippines, the absence of a published waiver agreement with Japan puts Magsaysay in a vulnerable position whenever the jurisdiction issue is raised. Moreover, a revision of the MBA, as distinguished from a suitable implementation formula which would settle the issue, would have the added disadvantage of requiring Senate ratification in the Philippines. To bring about a solution, it is recommended that with respect to off-duty offenses committed within the bases against Filipino nationals, if the Senior U.S. Military Commander and the Philippine Secretary of Justice cannot agree as to how best handle the case (i.e. which country should prosecute) in the best interest of the two governments in their common defense, the President of the Philippines personally would make the decision. This would be expressed in terms of implementing paragraph 3 of Article XIII. As a practical matter, the number of cases involved is minimal and upon transfer of Olongapo to Philippine administration the number of such cases should be further reduced. It is strongly recommended that the United States be prepared to agree to this solution with President Magsaysay.

2. Retaliation in the Event of Armed Attack. President Magsaysay has taken a strong personal interest in revision of the Mutual Defense Treaty to bring the United States defense commitment into alignment with that of the North Atlantic Treaty. In my opinion, this is a reasonable request which we should be prepared to grant. In any event it is an issue which will definitely arise and if Magsaysay visits the U.S., he will undoubtedly raise it himself.

3. Correlation of the Three Defense Agreements. We once had the impression that the Philippine Government seriously proposed that the Military Bases Agreement expire concurrently with the Mutual Defense Treaty or the Military Assistance Agreement,³ should either of the latter be terminated. We now have found that the actual Philippine position differs from this impression. The Philippine Government appears to be aiming its efforts toward obtaining an agreement whereby the Mutual Defense Treaty would endure so long as the Military Bases Agreement exists. An amendment to the Mutual Defense Treaty designed to accomplish this is what the Philippine Government seeks. I would suggest that earnest consideration be given to finding a satisfactory answer to this very live issue. The Mutual Defense Treaty presently provides that it may be terminated by either party on one year’s notice. In my opinion it would be reasonable to consider a more enduring commitment. So far as the Military Assistance Agreement is concerned, my informal talks with Magsaysay lead me to the conclusion that he will not insist upon tying the duration of this Agreement to either of the other two agreements. I believe, therefore, that talks on the presidential level could well dispose successfully of this particular aspect of the “correlation” issue. In addition, correlation of the three agreements, apart from their duration, is contemplated by the Terms of Reference of the proposed U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board.

4. Wartime Use of Bases. If the United States, as a matter of policy, is able to agree to a strengthening of the defense commitment in the Mutual Defense Treaty to conform with the North Atlantic Treaty, it is my belief that Magsaysay could be persuaded, during his talks with President Eisenhower, to drop the Panel’s proposal that wartime use and development of the bases be subject to prior Philippine agreement, and accept merely “consultation in peace and war” as provided in the proposed Terms of Reference for the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board. It is my view, therefore, that the more serious of the two issues (automatic retaliation and wartime use) relates to a desire on their part for a strengthening of the defense commitment, now contained in the present Mutual Defense Treaty.

5. Duration. In my opinion, the issue regarding duration of the Military Bases Agreement, apart from the duration of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Military Assistance Pact, is one which can be composed in talks at the presidential level on the basis of the present U.S. proposal. It is my view that our proposal will prove acceptable.

6. There are a number of other so-called “intangible issues” which arose during the negotiations. These have to do with such matters as taxation, immigration, customs, the sale or resale of duty free items, and with fishing and navigation in the waters adjacent to base areas. It is my recommendation that if satisfactory progress can be made through the step-by-step approach recommended for settlement of the tangible problems, we undertake to deal with these other intangible issues in two ways. First, by unilateral action aimed at tightening our own controls over the importation and sale of duty-free items to non-exempt persons, to include a firm limitation on the sale of motor vehicles, and second, through mutually acceptable administrative arrangements developed by the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.

In conclusion I should add as my opinion that it was necessary for us to go through the experience of the past few months although we did not arrive at a general settlement. My delegation and I over a period of five months have been able to form a clearer understanding of general Philippine sensibilities, aspirations and their specific feelings toward the existence of U.S. bases and the modernization of our mutual defense arrangements. With perseverance, patience and a more sympathetic understanding of the problems, hopes and goals of the young Republic, we have, I believe, a good chance to compose most of the immediate problems we aim to solve. On the other hand, we continually face problems of one kind or another with all other nations. It is rare that we arrive at a general settlement with any nation at any given time. It would not be realistic to expect that there is any more chance for a general settlement of problems with the Philippines than there is with any other country. The past five months seem to me to have been a necessary condition precedent to further progress which I am inclined to believe we can achieve if we proceed imaginatively. We now know much more about the problems than we did last July and I believe we have laid the foundation for the steps now recommended for action.

Respectfully submitted,

Karl R. Bendetsen
Special United States Representative
And Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Philippine Affairs

1. Source: Department of State, Manila Embassy Files: Lot 76 F 161, 430.3, Military Bases—General. Secret. This memorandum was included in the “Report of the Bendetsen Mission: “Philippine Military Bases Negotiations of 1956,” December 19, 1956, volume I. Further information regarding the Bendetsen mission is in the “Report of the Philippine Military Bases Negotiations of 1956,” prepared by Admiral Thomas L. Sprague, Deputy Department of Defense Representative for Philippine Military Bases Negotiations. Included in this lengthy report are Sprague’s comments on Bendetsen’s final recommendations. (January 23, 1957; ibid.,SPA Files: Lot 63 D 51, Negotiating Mission File Number 5)
2. None of the attachments is printed.
3. Signed at Manila on March 21, 1947. (TIAS 1662)