3. Editorial Note

In telegram CINCFE 71040 from Tokyo, January 7, General Hull transmitted his Command’s views to the Department of the Army. Subsequently the message was retyped and circulated to the Operations Coordinating Board as a memorandum on February 10. The summary section of CINCFE 71040 as circulated to the OCB reads as follows:

“Summary. CINCFE views regarding US policy toward Japan are summarized below.

[Page 4]
  • “A. US objectives in Japan. The US should seek to build a Japan which is politically, economically and militarily strong, which is allied closely with the US and which is capable of exerting dynamic anti-Communist leadership in Asia. Military strength is an essential and integral part of total Japanese strength since no nation confronted with a constant and serious threat of aggression can be a great nation if it is incapable of defending itself. Moreover, the political and economic objectives can and should be achieved without retarding the rate of development of the military forces of Japan.
  • “B. Obstacles to the accomplishment of US objectives. There is a growing tendency among the Japanese to participate in flights from reality which lead them to entertain hopes of neutralism and of prosperous coexistence with both the East and the West. These obstacles serve to increase the challenge placed on US policy and, for the best interests of the US, should be overcome.
  • “C. Usefulness of Japan to the US. Japan is still as vital to the US now as it has ever been in the past. Japan is still capable of serving as a strong outpost [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of defense [2½ lines of source text not declassified], Japan is capable of being a formidable ally of the US and of assisting in the development of means by which Communism can be stopped and defeated in Asia. The loss of Japan to the Communist world would shift a major segment of economic and military strength to the Communist side, would breach the offshore island chain and would in all probability be followed by the loss of Korea, Okinawa and Formosa as well.
  • “D. Requirements of US policy toward Japan. The US policy toward Japan must encourage and reward the Japanese people in their development of inherent Japanese strengths. These strengths must include political and economic as well as military strength with no one element of strength being advanced at the expense of the others. US policy must, as a principal measure, assist in the generation of a strong Japanese society based on freedom and oriented toward the United States. These strengths in the Japanese society must be derived from substantial Japanese accomplishments in endeavors looking toward improving the will and capacity of the Japanese to resist Communist aggression, to increase their standard of living, and to increase their political cohesion to a degree that will produce and sustain a strong government.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/2–1055; full text of CINCFE 71040 as sent is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 092 Japan (12–12–50))