Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

246. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m.

3595. Paris for USRO; Rome for McSweeney. Department’s 3836.² During talk with Makarios I did not mention subject of his return to Cyprus and he did not bring it up. I did press him earnestly, however, to bring about end of terrorist threat on island as most important next step towards solution. I pointed out that neither British nor Turks would be ready to negotiate as long as he had armed organization in being which could be called into action at any time. I thought he could justify taking bold measures against terrorism on the grounds that his release from exile was beginning of new phase of Cyprus question, and urged him to present himself to world as man of peace, which befitted his clerical garb.

Makarios seemed impressed. He agreed that from international aspect, he should do so. Intense emotion of Greeks in Cyprus and Greece presented difficulties for him internally but he declared he would do everything he could.

I asked whether Grivas could be persuaded to leave Cyprus. He said Grivas would not leave while many of his followers were in prison under long sentences. I said British would probably grant amnesty in natural course of events when they were convinced by experience that return to terrorism was unlikely. He agreed, but said he would not persuade Grivas to leave unless Grivas had fairly definite assurance regarding amnesty, since otherwise his followers would feel betrayed. I said I would try to find out whether there were any possibilities regarding amnesty.

Comment: Makarios did not add condition which Averoff had mentioned, regarding his own return to Cyprus. If British are able to say anything re amnesty which would give Makarios basis for acting, I believe he would try to persuade Grivas to leave.³

Allen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2657. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, Rome, and Paris Topol.
2. In telegram 3836, April 25, the Department of State noted that the United States should not take steps to facilitate the return of Makarios to Cyprus in view of “extreme Turk sensibilities.” The Department added that it believed that the Archbishop would arrive in Cyprus via London soon enough, and meanwhile the Turks “needed time to cool”. The Department instructed the Embassy that when it was appropriate it might wish to indicate to Makarios that he should travel to London to “establish contact there.” The Department added, for the information of the Embassy, that the U.S. position was that both partition and enosis seemed impractical. (Ibid., 747C.00/4–2457)
3. On May 3, in reply to this telegram, the Department informed the Embassy that it agreed with Allen’s suggestion that Makarios should present himself as a “man of peace”. The Department added that it believed that a renunciation of violence was an “essential prerequisite” to further progress on the Cyprus issue. The Department suggested to the Embassy that it might wish to inform the Greek Government that prospects for progress on self-government for Cyprus might depend on Grivas’ departure from the island. (Telegram 3941 to Athens, May 3; ibid.,747C.00/4–2657)