Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

261. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State¹

Budapest, July 25, 1957—8 a.m.

69. Department pouch NATO posts, EE posts, Vienna and USUN. Intel July 10.² Legation considers U.S. and Western objectives for treatment Hungary report at U.N. Assembly and thereafter should be so drawn up as to take advantage of either alternative:

A. In which some possibility may exist for U.N. to play directly constructive role here in future; or

B. In which such possibility apparently does not exist. In latter case, aim would be to maximize pressure of world public opinion against U.S.S.R.

Under A, if present committee members (or, if that impossible, similar group or even one suitable individual) could be persuaded to continue work, Legation believes that U.N. request to committee to explore possibilities for solution which both satisfactory to Hungarian people and takes into consideration proper Soviet strategic interests provides best means take advantage any possible Soviet conciliatory mood in coming months, of keeping issue alive and of placing West in best propaganda position should all efforts fail.

Committee approach, we believe, should at this stage attempt to be constructive not recriminatory. (This does not mean debate on report in U.N. should not be sharply critical of U.S.S.R.) It should aim at present solution which would meet following conditions:

1. Would not be all-or-nothing proposal, but would present solution as series of steps, at least some of which Soviets might permit, even if not all, and even if committee’s work were publicly denounced by them.

2. Would not necessarily require formal acceptance by Soviets or Hungarians for implementation.

3. Would appeal to neutralist and non-Western areas.

4. Could be implemented (at least in initial phase) within present Hungarian legal and constitutional framework.

5. Would carry with it some positive gains for Soviets and would not, we would hope, be complete anathema to all elements in Soviet hierarchy.

In brief, Legation (viewing problem from Budapest and not from world-wide vantage point) sees little value in proposing a solution of Hungarian problem which patently unacceptable to Soviets. Such course of action could be of use only for internal domestic reasons in U.S. and Western European countries, but could hardly contribute to solution and might even hinder it. Furthermore, we doubt that they would receive wide popular support outside U.S. and Western Europe.

Type of proposal visualized by Legation might run along following lines (visualized as steps, of which following are examples, which could be taken over period of time):

1. Start toward Hungarian freedom from terror by cancellation existing legislation establishing or permitting summary prosecution, detention without trial, deportation, etc; amnesty for insurgents; abolition of reconstituted secret police.

2. Increased Hungarian sovereignty through renegotiation Status Forces Agreement to provide effective Hungarian control over movement of Warsaw Pact forces outside garrisons.

3. Increased cultural freedom through (a) reopening banned cultural institutions (this might be coupled with plea by committee for broadened cultural contacts with other U.N. members) and (b) relaxation party pressure in schools.

4. Increased local democracy through strengthening Workers Councils.

5. Some broadening of government.

For steps beyond this point, committee could either propose new electoral procedures or could end suggestions at this point, stating above considered as first step, and further proposals would have to await later review of situation by committee. Legation undecided at moment what type new electoral procedures or “further proposals” would be appropriate; several possibilities suggest themselves, such as Bibo’s idea of parties committed to Socialism (Legation despatch 513)³ or attempt to reproduce Polish electoral system. Problem would be to avoid both extremes of demanding too little and of making unacceptable demands.

Defense against charges that above suggestions constitute interference in internal affairs would have to be prepared, but we do not believe this would be difficult and mere existence of committee would be sufficient to bring out such charges any event.

Question might be considered whether at this point committee should propose some type Western declaration of intent vis-à-vis Hungary, i.e., disavowal of intention establish military bases or restore old regime.

Under b above, for committee to make proposals along above lines would probably somewhat increase already existing pressure on Soviets to take such steps, but in our judgment would probably not bring this pressure to point where satisfactory compliance would be very probable.

Therefore, unless additional incentive or pressure can be applied to situation, and if best guess is Soviets intend continue repressive policy here regardless, question is whether West gains more propaganda-wise in Hungary and in world in general by demand for complete Soviet capitulation in Hungary or by proposal along lines suggested above. While this is not question for Legation properly to judge, our feeling is latter choice preferable.⁴

Comment on credentials follows separately.⁵

Ackerson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5764/7–2557. Confidential.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. In despatch 513, April 19, the Legation forwarded a summary with extended extracts of a study by Istvan Bibo, Hungarian Peasant Party leader and former Minister of State in the Nagy government. Bibo suggested a compromise to the Hungarian problem based on a multiparty system to preserve socialism and allow for the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces. Hungary, in Bibo’s view, would be a test of the West’s ability to relax tensions, and the Soviet Union’s ability to rid itself of Stalinism. (Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/4–1957)
4. In an unattributed memorandum of August 6, the CIA provided Walmsley with comments on the proposals in telegram 69. The CIA believed them to be constructive, but did not think they should be considered in such “black and white” terms. The U.S. Government should seriously consider retention of the Special Committee on Hungary or a successor committee to continue to investigate the Hungarian situation since it could present recommendations which would have real possibilities for negotiated action. Even if the Soviet Union refused to accept any of the committee’s recommendations, the political and propaganda impact of its refusal would be considerable, particularly among neutral nations. The CIA also recommended that the United States not take the lead in proposing new terms of reference for the special committee. (Ibid., 329/8–657)
5. In telegram 70 from Budapest, July 25, the Legation stated that if the U.S. plan was to call for Soviet withdrawal and free elections, then acceptance of the credentials of representatives of the Kádár government would be inconsistent and unrealistic. On the other hand, if the United States favored an approach similar to the one outlined by the Legation in telegram 69, then rejection of Hungary’s credentials would be a mistake. (Ibid., 320.57/7–2557)