23. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
5121. In view of recently increased contacts by various political figures here with De Gaulle we have felt it desirable to obtain his views at first hand. We have felt that call upon him by Ambassador might lead to publicity which would embarrass our relations with present Government and therefore Achilles called on him today. Following are principal points made by De Gaulle:
Internal: Deterioration of regime had progressed to point where it was impossible for any French Government to follow any coherent policy about anything. He saw no possibility in short-term future of remedying this situation and he had no personal intention of trying. France was fundamentally “tired”. Short of some unforeseeable dramatic situation comparable to what happened to France in World War II he saw no possibility of national rejuvenation until new generation born of war-time and post-war increased birth rate made its influence felt in another 10 to 20 years.
Algeria: He repeated several times that events in Algeria would “drag along”. Asked whether he thought military solution possible he said that 45 million French could obviously defeat 8 million Moslems if they had will to do so but that neither present Government nor any foreseeable successor would have sufficient will to inspire necessary national sacrifices. It was already too late for any solution based on assimilation or integration. Only practicable long-term solution would [Page 50] be establishment of an Algerian state federally associated with France. He did not seem worried over possibility of safeguarding interests of French in Algeria under such a solution.
Moslem World: He thought it a mistake for anyone to count on any real Moslem contribution to an orderly modem world. Nowhere in Moslem world had a railway or important dam been built except by outsiders. Moslems were really interested in national independence only as means of embracing opportunities for their individual political or financial advancement.
“Europe”: European idea was dead. Effort to establish “fusion ruled by technicians” had failed. It might have been possible to establish a “union of nations” rather than a fusion if there had been reason to believe that it would be a “European rather than an American Europe”. He thought this now unlikely.
“Atlantic Community”: He did not think either Germany or UK, least of all France, and perhaps not even US had any real interest in this idea. This would leave Spain and other little impecunious countries.
East-West Relations: He did not think new Soviet tactics had fooled very many Frenchmen, who were incurably realistic and cynical but he very much feared they had fooled a good many Germans, British and particularly Americans. The principal reason for his pessimism as to either European or Atlantic development was belief which he appeared to hold and which he said was gaining ground publicly that US was becoming more and more inclined to seek in effect bilateral solutions with USSR of all major problems. (One of his associates recently told us that while French had previously felt they were at least playing on team, they were increasingly feeling like spectators at tennis match.)
Comment: He seemed in much better health than last year.2 In contrast to his black pessimism on occasions when we saw him then, his present mood seemed more one of unhappy but philosophical resignation that neither he nor anyone else could in near future do anything to restore greatness of France. We are told he is now more or less regularly spending two days a week in Paris.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/5–256. Confidential. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Cairo, Moscow, and Algiers.↩
- See Document 6.↩