369. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State1
1209. Law of Sea. Conference clearly reveals work of well planned, well organized, well disciplined blocs of USSR and its satellites led by Professor Tunkin of USSR working with Afro-Asian bloc led by Sen of India and following collapse of Sen’s leadership because of his sponsorship of Canada, Mexico and Indian proposal (our 11652) which shocked the conscience of the conference, by Loutfi of UAR and Shukairi of Saudi Arabia and with Latin American bloc led by Garcia Robles of Mexico. [2 sentences (11 lines of source text) not declassified] Cambodia in abstaining also indicated each member Afro-Asian group in caucus had been forced publicly to state they would vote with bloc and would not change vote even though they had previously indicated they were favorable to US. Even Barnes of Liberia who abstained on our proposal appeared badly intimidated by group tactics.
Bhutto of Pakistan who stood staunchly with US indicated group was trying to cause trouble for him at home.
Garcia Robles in asking for a roll call on our motion for priority (our 12073) said he did so in order that opinion in Latin American countries might know where to place Latin American Delegates voting with US in asking for priority over Indian-Mexican Resolution.
Our support of Israel and situation in Gulf of Aqaba of course unites entire Arab bloc against US on twelve-mile limit.
This hardening of disciplined blocs who vote as unit on all questions without regard to merits particular issue raises most serious questions for United States policy. For even in countries where we have extended extensive aid and have long record of friendship with US apparently deem themselves bound as newly emancipated nations to vote solidly with their brethren against their former masters and those associated with them.
Speeches by French and UK Delegates were for most part received in sullen silence.
Even though differing from US and not supporting US because of bloc voting or because new nations without experience or little or no realization of the actual meaning of the three-mile breadth of territorial [Page 701] sea or the duties involved in adopting and policing a wider breadth of territorial sea, such newer nations favor the Indian-Mexican three to twelve-mile proposal supported by the Soviet and Arabs as a bloc because it gives such newer nations freedom to choose own breadth and regulation up to twelve miles of customs immigration and fishing without restraint in respect historic fishing rights and because seemed more consonant with their dignity and sovereignty as new nations.
Time and again the three-mile breadth was attacked and ridiculed not because it was inherently wrong but because the particular state was not in existence when it was adopted and they must have change labelled as progress.
Even though the unilateral extension to twelve miles and the closing of bays by the Soviet deprived millions of the right to free navigation and fishing it was regarded nevertheless as progress because it cut down the area formerly freely available to the large maritime powers who are deemed to be wholly selfish in wanting to come within three miles of any coast or to fish up to that distance and overfly high seas within that distance without express permission.
The ingenuity, ability, capital and markets of the older powers is resented and the use of large mother ships off coastal waters is frequently denounced as taking the bread out of the mouths of local coastal fishermen operating out of port on a small ship—on one day basis.
Freedom of the high seas instead of a common heritage is regarded as a legal fiction invented by the maritime powers or their lawyers in order to rob the populations of the newly created nations who, since there is no more land, wish to annex the high seas as their lawful right and who is to say to them nay except the greedy maritime powers.
It is readily apparent that a new social revolution is bursting forth and burgeoning among the peoples of the newly created states who will insist on re-examining all laws, customs and mores adopted by older civilizations before their birth as a nation and who now proclaim whatever is new is better than the old.
In other words—move over pleasantly or else.
In my judgment the implication of this moving social revolution of new nationalities must be studied with the utmost seriousness and concern and every effort made to understand it. For with bloc voting, constructive and imaginative proposals, supposedly persuasive speeches and ideas and the sacrifice of positions vital to US may not essentially change the voting results. Indeed the very positions may be ridiculed and lampooned.
Indeed in this conference quite apart from the ability of individual experts all positions are alloted on a bloc basis or five major power basis which puts US into the category of “has beens” since certain [Page 702] positions in addition are allotted to the Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans, Afro-Asians and Latin Americans but none to North Americans.
It is, I think, clear that if the Greek proposal for three-mile territorial limit had come to a vote it would not have received over eight votes and the Swedish proposal for a straight six-mile territorial sea while not entirely conclusive received a maximum of sixteen votes.
Although our proposal with its reservation of historic fishing rights was not satisfactory to new nations who wanted at least 12 miles for an unrestricted territorial sea for security, fiscal, immigration, fishing and other reasons it was praised by many countries who, even though not favoring it, recognized it as a creative, bold and imaginative attempt to reach a solution.
Even though our proposal failed to receive a majority due to the defection of the Philippines, Korea and Liberia, El Salvador and Costa Rica, the failure to be present of San Marino and Laos, and abstention of Sweden we were praised for making it and practically every speaker praised the United States for its constructive, helpful and conciliatory attitude in trying to make the conference a success.
This illustrates, I believe, the need for US not to be too negative or stand pat in our approaches but to be thinking constantly of new and challenging ways to meet what will become an increasingly difficult problem.
The Soviet Union made no concessions here whatsoever. They operated almost entirely behind the scenes in blocs or through their very effective associates [16 words not declassified].
But they certainly can’t claim any moral leadership in the public conference and so far the conference certainly has not enhanced their prestige.
The Indians and Mexicans will certainly press in plenary for a two-thirds vote for their 3- to 12-mile flexible territorial sea and the Canadians will press hard for six miles territorial sea and six unrestricted fishing zone or twelve miles unrestricted fishing zone overall. The proposal has its attractions. Our historic rights has its liabilities.
We have clearly stated we are for three miles and have made a forward looking, imaginative proposal for six and six restricted for which leadership we have been commended but now we are asked to go further.
Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon asked today for our further or new position and I stated we had already gone very far. I recommend we listen but continue to press for our proposal and that we make no further offers of compromise and that we do not accept the Canadian proposal of six and six unrestricted. The UK Delegation agrees.
[Page 703]The Canadian proposal means a tremendous loss to our fishermen and constitutes a great detriment to our merchant fleet and commercial aircraft as well as to defense and I doubt if public opinion would sustain it or further concessions. The Canadian attitude will undoubtedly hurt the extension of the reciprocal trade act or lead to tariff imposition on Canadian products which should be pointed out in Ottawa.
So I recommend we continue to press for our reasonable position and continue to appear patient and constructive but that we not yield further in order to get agreement at this conference unless you believe even further concessions are in order.
At present, the failure of the conference cannot be laid at our door. We have united our NATO allies and aside from effect of our proposal on Japan and Iceland, which is not remediable and the completely selfish attitude of Canada which is unfortunate in our over-all relations we have been able to accomplish a great deal of constructive work on fisheries and the Continental Shelf with Latin Americans and others.
We might, of course, have picked up certain Latin American votes by eliminating all reference to arbitration; or we might have attracted the vote of some of the newer nations if we had provided for the establishment of a base period on the percentage of fish caught by pounds or dollars; but the disruption of fishing fleets and gear during World War II and the multiplication of new nations not in existence in 1946–1950 and the difficulty of putting a ceiling on future development of larger ships, scientific development of fisheries, greater investment of capital and ideas, particular geographical zones, types of fish, exclusion of the products of the Continental Shelf, etc. Identifying the particular nations to whom the right accrued, etc. by a too rigid base period expressed in either tons, dollars or percentages might also have lost the votes of other nations and is too complicated to work out in remaining time.
Ecuador, for example, wanted historic rights to terminate after five years and Argentina wanted them established only by a prescriptive period under civil law which might have given the Japanese rights existing before World War II and would be difficult to prove.
The Swedes have been excluded from fishing in the Baltic by the Soviet and so were the Japanese by the establishment of the MacArthur line by SCAP but if we modify “regularly” by force majeure we open Pandora’s box.
In future conference believe to maximum extent possible we should attempt iron out all differences of maritime powers in advance and not permit foreign office to advise abstention or negative votes on really important issues because of much less important matters pending between Department. We are only participant here who is not a [Page 704] member of a bloc having group information on meetings. Time and time again our closest friends vote against us or fail to support us. As bloc voting increases we must do everything possible to avoid this.
If conference postponed for only short period believe issues may harden and blocs may well gain votes if time is not used to straighten out difficult issues. On many of them we don’t appear to have reliable and up to date information and trade association information often appears exaggerated or possible losses stated at maximum.
Will continue explore situation most sympathetically but am saying we have put forward our very best proposition and we have no intention of bettering it and ball is now in field of twelve-mile extremists.
Expect continued tough in fighting on Articles 3 and 66 and strong attack our position in plenary.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–2158. Confidential; Niact. A retyped copy of this telegram was transmitted to President Eisenhower by Dulles on April 24. (Ibid., 399.731/4–2458)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 367.↩
- Telegram 1207, April 20, transmitted brief summaries of the three meetings of the First Committee on April 19 in which all four proposals on the width of the territorial sea lost. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–2058)↩