Office of the Historian

377. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 10, 19591

Washington, July 10, 1959

SUBJECT

  • Assessment of United States Position on Law of the Sea and Reply to Canadian Proposal

PARTICIPANTS

  • L-Mr. Becker
  • L/SFP-Mr. Yingling
  • U/FW-Mr. Herrington
  • U/FW-Mr. Taylor
  • U/LS-Mr. Richards
  • U/LS-Mr. Wright
  • Defense:
  • Admiral Chester Ward, USN
  • Capt. Leonard R. Hardy, USN
  • LCDR Harold L. Hoag, USN
  • RAdm. R. C. Benítez, USN (ret.)
  • Interior:
  • Mr. William M. Terry
  • Mr. Donald L. McKernan

At a meeting to assess and take stock of the US position with respect to the Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, following completed consultations with some 35 countries, and to decide what course of action the United States should take with regard to a secret proposal of the Canadian Government,2 the following conclusions were reached:

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1) A careful tabulation of probable conference voting on the US-UK revised formula3 indicated prospects that the proposal would achieve a two-thirds conference majority were remote. A tabulation prepared by U/LS, substantially identical with one recently prepared by the United Kingdom, indicated of some 14 countries whose votes were most in doubt, the proposal to win would need to receive affirmative support from 12 of these countries, the other 2 abstaining; if any one of the 14 voted against the US-UK proposal it appeared a two-thirds majority for it would be impossible.

2) Agreement between the US, UK and Canada on a formula would not ipso facto assure its adoption at the Conference. However without agreement between the three on a proposal there would be little practical chance that agreement would be achieved at the Conference.

3) The recent Canadian overture should be followed up on a high priority basis therefore. Effort should be directed both at clarifying the meaning of the Canadian secret proposal and at exploring the limits of Canadian flexibility. While every effort should be made to bring about desirable changes in the Canadian position, the US should enter the discussions realizing that the price of failure to reach agreement would be very high in terms of over-all US interests.

4) The US should first however concert with the UK, if possible to arrive at a common understanding and common approach, before entering talks with Canada. Whether it would be preferable for the talks with Canada to be bi-lateral or tri-lateral would be decided later, in consultation with the UK.

5) The agreement with Canada should preferably be one the Canadians would be willing to reveal and publicly support prior to the Conference, though this admittedly would be difficult to obtain. A secret agreement to be invoked tactically at the Conference might only repeat the unfortunate career of the secret agreement at the last Conference; further, during the Second Conference, which would be of relatively short duration, it would be particularly difficult to obtain effectively changes in delegation instructions.

6) While the US was attempting to reach agreement with Canada it would remain fully committed to the present US-UK proposal.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/7–1059. Secret. Drafted by Wright on July 13. A similar memorandum of this conversation drafted by Yingling is ibid.↩
  2. This proposal called for a territorial sea of 6 miles with an exclusive 6-mile zone subject to the exercise of historic rights for 5 years. (Telegram 3417 to Athens, June 27; ibid., 399.731/6–2759)↩
  3. The U.S.-U.K. revised formula, agreed in talks at London in December 1958, called for a 6-mile territorial sea with foreign fishing in the next 6-mile zone restricted to past levels. (Ibid., Office of the Historian, Research Project No. 1031–A, June 1973, p. 17)↩