Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

388. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, December 31, 1959.

CA–5340

REFERENCE

• CA–9156, April 22, 1959; CA–4756, December 8, 1959²

SUMMARY

This Circular requests the Embassy to begin discussions immediately with the host country to sound out its probable position concerning the issues to be considered at the Conference, to set forth, and seek support for, U.S. views, and to report promptly by telegram whether special efforts may be needed to secure support for positions acceptable to the U.S.

1. The following guidance should be followed by the Embassy when discussing orally the US position vis-à-vis various proposals likely to be put forward at the 1960 Conference.

2. The overriding US objective at the 1960 Conference is to achieve Conference agreement on a narrow (6-mile) territorial sea. Failure to achieve such agreement at the Conference would have serious adverse effects on US and non-Communist world security. A number of proposals are likely to be pressed vigorously at the Conference. These are summarized and evaluated in the following paragraphs:

Proposals providing for or permitting a 12-mile territorial sea:

(a) A straight 12-mile territorial sea: This formula would be contrary to the security as well as the fishery interests of the non-Communist world. It will be strongly opposed by the US and others which favor a narrow territorial sea for reasons given in CA–9156 and CA–4756. US estimate is that is will not receive two-thirds majority.

(b) A 3- to 12-mile territorial sea at the option of the coastal states: This is an insidious formula which is being energetically pressed by Mexico. It is superficially attractive to many uncommitted states. It would be as damaging as a straight 12-mile rule and should therefore be as vigorously opposed for reasons given in CA–9156 and CA–4756. US estimate is that it is unlikely to receive two-thirds majority, but it is dangerous since uninformed delegates might vote for it under mistaken impression that it represents a genuine compromise.

Proposals preserving a narrow territorial sea: (All will be opposed by the Communist Bloc and by all or most of the Arab states):

(c) 6 plus 6 (unqualified): (See CA–4756.) This formula which is being actively sponsored by Canada has considerable appeal to states wishing to end foreign fishing near their shores, particularly the Afro-Asians and some Latin American states. Is favored by Iceland and Norway. Has merit of preserving 6-mile territorial sea, but would offer no protection to traditional fishing near foreign shores. US estimate is that it is unlikely to receive two-thirds majority because it is firmly opposed by the US and by Western European and other “fishing” states.

(d) 6 plus 6 with continuation of limited “historic” fishing rights: This is the present UK formula and is a substantial modification of the final US proposal at the 1958 Conference. Described in Paragraph III., A., 4. of CA–4756. A reasonable and equitable formula which would preserve both narrow (6-mile) territorial sea and traditional fisheries at same level in perpetuity. Strongly favored by the US and UK, by “fishing” states of Western Europe, and by a number of other states. FYI: Support for this formula by foreign states should be encouraged. US estimate is, however, that it is likely to be opposed by enough states to prevent its adoption at the Conference. Because of this US may ultimately support proposal set forth in Paragraph (e), which follows. End FYI.

(e) 6 plus 6 with cut-off of traditional fishing after an agreed period of years: Described in Paragraph III., B. of CA–4756. An ultimate compromise fall-back formula which, though preserving a 6-mile territorial sea, would be damaging to traditional fisheries and thus would not be favored by the US or other “fishing” states. It would be attractive to Afro-Asians, some South Americans, and others who seek end to foreign fishing rights within 12 miles of shore. The US believes that this ultimate compromise formula may prove to have the best (and possibly only) chance of two-thirds approval at the Conference. There-fore, in the end it would be supported by the US, probably by the UK and most of the Western Europeans, and possibly even by Canada, as last-ditch position to prevent Conference failure.

3. In any discussions Embassy should emphasize strong US preference for proposal in Paragraph (d) and should seek support for it. FYI: US estimate that this proposal is unlikely to attract required support should not be revealed at this time. To do so would encourage immediate move to formula in Paragraph (e), thus destroying its character of an ultimate fall-back position and increasing danger Conference would turn to formulas even less favorable on fishing issue. Embassy is cautioned against discussing the foregoing tactical considerations with foreign official. End FYI. Embassy should say that US does not favor proposal in Paragraph (e). However, US is prepared to give it serious consideration only because the formula in Paragraph (d) is not certain to succeed. Embassy should urge that Conference delegates be given instructions sufficiently broad and flexible to permit support of both proposals (Paragraphs (d) and (e)).

4. Whether the proposal in (d) or in (e) is adopted, the US recognizes that some special arrangement will probably have to be made with regard to Iceland and a few other areas which are uniquely dependent on fishing.

5. Action Requested: The Embassy is requested:

(a) unless serious objection is perceived, to start discussions immediately on the basis of the foregoing to sound out the probable position of the country to which accredited and report by telegram;

(b) to advise the Department promptly by telegram what manner or method of persuasion, specific tactics, or concession the Department might undertake or authorize to assist it, if needed, in securing support from the host country to positions acceptable to US. Such importance is attached to this matter in the US Government as to warrant full consideration of any suggestions made;

(c) to advise the Department promptly by telegram whether the Embassy desires the assistance of representatives from Washington in this regard.

6. As need be, the Embassy may expect final instructions aimed at securing the requisite support from the host country to be issued in the near future following receipt of Embassy telegraphic reports requested in 5. above.

7. Embassies in NATO Countries will recall that the Secretary made a brief statement in the NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 17 stressing the security aspect of the territorial sea issue and the related fisheries issue. It is planned to discuss these issues in the North Atlantic Council in January and Embassies in NATO countries may wish to delay any approach until after report from USRO that subject was raised in NAC.

8. Embassies in Countries Which Attended the London Meetings (DepCirTel 627, Nov. 6, 1959 to certain posts³) should in any discussions emphasize that US, as a “fishing” state, is most sympathetic to their problem and is no less eager than they are to retain traditional fishing rights within 12 miles of foreign shores. However, the US has reluctantly reached the conclusions outlined in Paragraphs (d) and (e) above. Countries which attended London meetings should be impressed with necessity to be prepared ultimately to go to some compromise formula such as that outlined in (e) if necessary to prevent Conference failure.

9. Soviet and Eastern European Capitals: The Department transmits this message to most missions in this area for information only. However, the voting record of both Poland and Yugoslavia at the 1958 Conference diverged sufficiently from the straight bloc line to raise the question whether one or both might not in the end vote for, or at least abstain on, moderate 6 plus 6 proposals such as (d) and (e) above. If the Embassy in Warsaw and in Belgrade share this view, they may in their discretion raise the issue with the respective Foreign Offices and seek a sufficiently flexible attitude to permit support for, or abstention on, the proposals outlined in Paragraphs (d) and (e).

10. ARA Posts: The Department would appreciate receiving comments and suggestions or counter-proposals from those Embassies which have as yet not replied to CG–371.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12–3159. Confidential. Drafted by Richards and Arneson; cleared in draft with Herrington, Pender, Terry, Hager, Dreier, AF, EUR, FE, NEA, and Defense. Sent also to Florence and Nice, but not to Addis Ababa, Amman, Beirut, Colombo, Conakry, Djakarta, Kabul, Katmandu, Khartoum, Phnom Penh, Rabat, or Tunis. Repeated to Hong King, Singapore, Baghdad, CINCNELM, CINCPAC, USRO, and USUN.
2. CA–9156 transmitted the text of the revised background memorandum, Document 375 (ibid., 399.731/4–2259); CA–4756 transmitted a summary of the main issues at the upcoming conference on the Law of the Sea, the proposals of the participants, and the position of the United States. (Ibid., 399.731/12–859)
3. See footnote 3, Document 382.
4. CG–371, December 11, sent to all posts in the American Republics, asked for proposals that would enhance the likelihood of a favorable attitude by Latin American countries at the second Law of the Sea Conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12–459)