200. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests to the Department of State0
Supnu 283. For Herter from Wadsworth. I have been giving careful thought to the basic question of whether or not it is in our interest to go further with these negotiations. One thing is clear. We have to make up our minds right away. We have been focusing on the central issues of control for just about a month. We have talked at great length about the key issues of veto, staffing, and inspection. I think that as of this moment we are in a good position on all these points and that the differences between us and the Soviets are clearly registered. But we cannot expect to go on talking about these points alone without running real risk that these major issues will get blurred. The Soviets obviously have every interest in trying to make themselves look less bad and they are trying hard to fuzz up the differences between us. The British have acted very well so far but it is evident that because of their domestic public opinion they are itching to start compromising on staff, inspection, and even the veto in a way which could help the Russians to confuse and undermine our public position. I think therefore that we must now decide whether we are going to wind up these negotiations at least temporarily or whether we should start talking about other things, and begin the kind of compromises and negotiations which would be necessary if there were to be any possibility of making an agreement with the Soviets.
Know that this is an important decision and that if we choose to arrange a recess of these talks it must be done in a way which does not seem to close doors upon further negotiations with regard to stopping tests or other fields of disarmament. And of course the U.K. would have to be consulted. I know that there are many important considerations, aside from those involved in these particular negotiations, which you must take into account in reaching a decision. I think though that it will be helpful to you to have my thinking about our position here.
As you know, I have been cautiously optimistic from the start of the negotiations until after the Christmas recess. I have a tremendous emotional desire to make a success of these talks. However, I have reluctantly come to believe that it would be wiser for us to find some way of stopping these negotiations now for some time at least. Two things have led me to this belief.
In the first place it does not seem at all likely that the Soviets are willing or ready to make basic changes in their position and allow the degree [Page 707] of control that would be necessary for a treaty. If we go on with the negotiations we will get into problems such as threshold and phasing which can involve us in very real difficulties. I am not confident that the possibilities of securing Soviet agreement are sufficient to warrant our moving into these tricky and complicated issues where our position from the point of view of public opinion is bound to be less favorable.
Secondly, although I naturally cannot judge what the thinking is at home I am afraid that the general effect of the new seismic data has been such that any control arrangements that the Soviets might possibly agree to would certainly not be considered “fool-proof” by our own people and might well not be considered even an adequate deterrent by the Senate.
We began these negotiations on the basis of the agreed conclusions of the experts. Our own people had the idea that this system would give adequate protection. But in the middle of the conference we found that the system had been overrated, or is at least suspect. The net result is that even in the unlikely case the Soviets should agree to a treaty, the arrangement, whatever its provisions, would not in many quarters meet the expectations which have been created. We would, I am afraid, have real trouble with our own public opinion and might well fail to get Senate consent to ratification. This, in my opinion, would be far worse for the U.S. than failure to agree here.
Accordingly, I believe that it is the wisest thing now to arrange a recess for these negotiations. I will give you my ideas in later messages on how this might be done with least damage and the things I think should be done by us here before a recess. But I believe you should know that I think it best for us to wind up this phase of the negotiations as soon as possible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2–1659. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.↩