209. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Prime Minister Macmillan, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Ambassador Caccia, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Mr. Dean, Sir Norman Brook, Mr. Bishop, Secretary Herter, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Reinhardt, Ambassador Whitney, General Goodpaster
[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
Mr. Macmillan next brought up the fact that we have only until April 13th to decide on the course we will follow with regard to resumption of negotiations on nuclear test suspension.1 He thought we had only three choices—to try to force the Soviets to accept an agreement; to break off the negotiations; or to substitute another plan, perhaps the one restricted to banning atmospheric tests.
The President thought the best course would be to break off the negotiations on the issue of the veto. We would then unilaterally renounce the conduct of atmospheric tests unless other nations were to conduct such tests.
Mr. Herter suggested a two-stage procedure in which we offer agreement on the banning of atmospheric tests. If the Soviets refuse, we [Page 726] would then make our self-denying statement regarding atmospheric tests.
Mr. Macmillan said that the Soviets have agreed on many provisions. He saw no use in pressing them to agree on controls if the controls are in fact going to be ineffective. He said he understood that the experts believe that the detection method will improve. Mr. Herter said he thought they had indicated only that they hoped these measures would improve.
Mr. Macmillan said that what disturbed him most was that if the Soviets test and we do not, they will gain in relation to us militarily. He did not think that the refinements that are in prospect for our weapons are worth too much.
The President said that some of the weapons development is very important, since it reduces the weights of weapons, increases their yield, etc. Also, we have in mind certain peaceful uses of atomic explosions which are very important to us.
Mr. Lloyd thought that the Soviets would make concessions in order to keep the negotiations going. He thought it would be a great mistake to let the conference break down. Failure would have a bad public effect around the world. A better formula would be to recess while reporting to the Heads of Government. Mr. Herter added that if we were to break off entirely, it is likely that the Indians and others would raise the issue for action in the United Nations. The President said he was inclined to agree that it would be better to recess to report back to Governments.
Mr. Lloyd asked whether the U.S. Government would agree on the approach involving an agreed maximum number of inspections per year—which might be not more than once a week or once a fortnight. As a practical matter he thought we would be thus limited by the fact that very senior personnel will be needed to make the inspections. Mr. Herter said that the Soviets have indicated they want to have ad hoc inspection teams, to be organized, subject to the veto, after the fact. Mr. Lloyd thought it would be necessary to have the administrative organization of the teams constantly in existence. The President said that the “numbers” proposal seems to contemplate as few as twenty-five inspections per year as against 2000 earthquakes indistinguishable by seismographic means from atomic weapons tests. He had a great deal of doubt accordingly concerning this approach.
Mr. Macmillan raised for consideration the idea of keeping the negotiations going from April until May. Mr. Herter said we have already strung them out a great deal and have had nothing new from the Soviets in the last month. The significance of the veto is becoming blurred as a result.
Mr. Lloyd said he thought we should keep the negotiations going if we can. He thought there was need for a technical examination of the [Page 727] new findings on underground tests and concealment to be carried out by U.S. and U.K. scientists and would like to send Mr. Penney over for this purpose. The President said it would be good to have him come over quickly. Mr. Lloyd recalled that the Soviets have refused to examine the technical data which we have submitted.
Mr. Herter said that we have a Congressional problem, since the Congress is unlikely to accept any agreements that are unenforceable and unverifiable.
Mr. Macmillan thought that the Summit may prove to be the only way forward in these negotiations. Mr. Herter commented that with regard to atmospheric tests, if we were to make an offer we could then go forward on that phase. At the same time we could offer to put the question of ground tests before the United Nations Disarmament group for consideration. Mr. Macmillan asked that Sir Patrick Dean and Mr. O’Neill talk this out with U.S. representatives, spelling out the major possibilities that are before us as conceivable lines of action with respect to the Geneva negotiations.
Mr. Allen Dulles commented, with respect to Khrushchev’s statement that the Soviets are not interested in small atomic weapons, that the intelligence communities of both the United Kingdom and the United States feel that the Soviets are still very much interested in nuclear weapons for air defense. Sir Patrick Dean added that the intelligence communities do not believe that the Soviets are cutting down on the production of “fissile” material.
Mr. Herter then told the group that three “minutes”2 are being prepared on actions that have been agreed upon during the conference. He hoped that they could be ready for a meeting of the President with the Prime Minister in Washington late the following day. The President asked me to review the main features of the discussion and the minutes to see that the United States and the British are fully agreed as to what has been agreed upon during the conference. He asked Mr. Macmillan to meet with him at 4 PM on Monday3 to check these out finally.
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 28.↩
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At a meeting at 9 a.m. on March 22, with a similar group, Macmillan raised the issue of negotiations on test suspension. The brief exchange went as follows:
“Mr. Macmillan next referred to the negotiations on test suspension and said he is interested in discussing that question. Mr. Lloyd said we have a tremendous investment in the Geneva Conference in terms of world opinion and must not let it fail. The President suggested that world concern on this matter is heightened by the attention given to scientific developments. He recalled that our people were more upset about Sputnik than were any other people in the world. Our scientists have gotten our people to think that this is a race of some kind.” (Memorandum of conversation, March 22; ibid.)
↩ - Not found.↩
- March 23.↩