Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

216. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 5, 1959, 8:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position in Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary of State, Mr. Herter
• Mr. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Mr. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
• Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
• Dr. Killian, Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology
• Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Gen. Goodpaster
• Mr. Farley, S/AE

The Secretary of State read the statement of the issue before the President, as set forth in the attached memorandum (Tab A).

Mr. McCone said that AEC had approached the present negotiations on the premise that the United States was prepared to ban tests under an agreement which provided reasonable safeguards. The experts had agreed at Geneva on a control system which would monitor underground tests of 5 kt with a 90% degree of assurance. Experience at Hardtack as assessed by the Berkner Panel had shown that the system would actually not have this capability, although certain improvements would permit regaining most of the originally estimated capability. Initial results of the studies of Hardtack experience were tabled in Geneva on January 5, but the Soviet Union has so far refused to discuss these data or their implications.

Mr. McCone said further that continued study had identified the possibility of concealing underground explosions through detonation in specially designed chambers or holes which would cause decoupling by a factor of 10 to several hundred times. A report to this effect has been provided to the United Kingdom and to interested Congressional committees but has not been made public. Recent calculations by Dr. Teller indicate that a 1.7 kt explosion could be detonated in a hole of 120 feet diameter with virtually no detectable signal, and a 200 kt explosion might be detonated in a hole of 360 feet diameter with a resultant yield equivalent to a 1 kt explosion. Dr. Killian said that the decoupling report referred to by Mr. McCone was a theoretical study and that the agreed study itself indicated a requirement for much larger holes than those reported as calculated by Dr. Teller.

Mr. McCone continued that AEC believes a dependable detection system for underground shots cannot be installed without extensive further study and experimentation. Thus AEC believes that the U.S. policy at this time should be to adopt the phased approach which was the second alternative of the President’s letter to Khrushchev and Ambassador Wadsworth’s statement, both on April 13.¹ The other alternative—a complete monitored cessation of tests—would give the Soviet Union a serious opportunity for clandestine testing in view of the limited capabilities of detecting underground shots.

Mr. Quarles said that he did not disagree with Mr. McCone’s point of view. If there were a choice, the Department of Defense would prefer the phased approach. However, in his judgment the United States was now in a position where it was very difficult to back up to this approach. It is in his opinion acceptable for the United States to take the chances involved in pursuing the Macmillan proposal provided that the on-site inspections are unobstructed and are in sufficient number to protect us. Pursuing the present line of negotiation would be likely to cause the Soviet Union to back out on the veto questions or on the question of a proper number of inspections, and thus enable the United States to avoid such a retreat. The President’s April 13 letter to Khrushchev and the presently proposed reply to Khrushchev’s latest letter² played this tactical game about as well as was possible in present circumstances.

The President referred to recent increases in fall-out levels in the United States, partly due to increased Soviet testing in the past two years. He said that we were going to be forced by public opinion in the United States to stop tests unilaterally. We must find a reasonable and decent way to do this by agreement if possible, even if the arrangement is not necessarily a perfect one.

There was a good deal of discussion of the number of earthquakes of various sizes which might require inspection, of the relationship between a number of earthquakes and the threshold for inspection, and of the advantages of conducting inspections by choice rather than on a random basis.

The President said that an arrangement for a reasonable number of inspections was important, and that otherwise we would be faced either with the need for unilateral stopping of tests or by a renewed testing race in which we might break ourselves by over-insurance. He remarked that, if we agreed to a limited rather than unlimited number of inspections, we might then ask that the number of manned or unmanned stations be increased to compensate. Mr. Herter said that he did not think it was desirable to broach discussion of the acceptable number of inspections yet.

Dr. Killian referred to some of the other considerations in deciding whether a test suspension would be desirable. These included piercing the Iron Curtain, both for its revolutionary political significance and for its intelligence advantage to us. No inspection system could be 100% sure, but it might bring with it other advantages in addition to its actual detection capabilities.

In response to a question from the President, the Secretary of State said that the issue was whether we would go ahead probing the Soviets on the veto and on relevant technical questions, prepared to enter into an agreement if they met our demands on those points.

The President said that, if we can break down the veto and get reliable people into the Soviet Union for control posts and inspections, an agreement to this end would be worthwhile. We would be in a terrible position to change now to an agreement limited to atmospheric tests. He agreed with Mr. Quarles that this would be the simplest and most logical approach, but you could not expect to get Soviet agreement to that. Thus we should go ahead on present lines, prepared, if they call our hand, to play as long as there is no veto and a reasonable control system.

Mr. Herter said that, if we probe, they will probably not meet us on the many outstanding issues. We would then be able to come back to the atmospheric ban with a reasonable posture before world opinion. Mr. McCone said that he thought we would not be able to test again in the atmosphere anyway. The President and the Secretary of State, while agreeing with this remark, said that we should not show our hand on this too soon.

Mr. Herter distributed a list of unresolved issues (Tab B). The President observed that the negotiations clearly had a long way to go. It looked as though we would end up with a unilateral declaration that we would no longer conduct tests which pollute the atmosphere. Mr. Quarles said that he hoped this decision would not be taken. If the Soviet Union tests in the atmosphere, we will want to conduct a few tests carefully circumscribed to limit fall-out.

The President said that the implication of this approach was a continued arms development competition. Dr. Killian said that the judgment of many technical experts was that we would gain in relative military posture if the Soviet and U.S. tests could be stopped and the respective weapons development programs of the two countries frozen at their present status.

The President said that we should go ahead with the prepared letter to Khrushchev and the present negotiating course. He referred to the importance of this positive approach for U.S. posture before world opinion and the eyes of our allies.

Mr. McCone referred to the problem of China. The Secretary of State said that we had a provision on extension of the treaty to China and other key areas which would be introduced in due course. It was undesirable to raise this matter prematurely, however. He referred to the duration clause accepted by the Soviet Union as one protection to us. The President said that China was a problem but a second stage and almost separate problem. He repeated that the United States must not show an intransigent attitude in the negotiations. He referred to his interest in data on the effects on life in the northern hemisphere from use of either the U.S. or Soviet nuclear stockpile. Dr. Killian said that he thought this matter deserved careful study. Mr. McCone said that some work had been done on this and referred to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. The President said that he thought this group had taken too many disqualifying assumptions and that he was not satisfied with the answers he had received so far.

The meeting adjourned at 9:20 a.m.

Tab A

³

U.S. POSITION ON CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

Problem:

The basic policy issue is whether the United States is still prepared, in the light of current technical data including information on possibilities of concealment of underground tests, to enter into an agreement for complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The latest Khrushchev letter and the statements of the Soviet representative at Geneva indicate that the Soviet Union may be prepared to shift its position on key issues which have barred agreement. While further U.S.–U.K. probing is necessary to ascertain whether the Soviets will indeed abandon the veto and accept the Geneva control system with a limited number of on-site inspections, if we continue this probing we will become further committed to a complete cessation if the Soviets meet our demands.

The President may wish to hear the views of his advisers as to whether, in the light of current technical data, the detection of underground tests is a manageable problem and a treaty banning underground as well as other tests could be adequately monitored.

Recommended U.S. Position:

Assuming an affirmative answer to the above question, the U.S. position should be:

1. Provided the Soviets will abandon the veto throughout operation of the control system and permit a reasonable number (not “a few”) of unhampered inspections, we should be prepared to conclude promptly an agreement for controlled cessation of nuclear weapons tests along lines presently pursued by Ambassador Wadsworth at Geneva.

2. Such an agreement, to be acceptable to the U.S., would have to provide that:

a. Not only the veto on dispatch of inspection teams, but other vetoes and opportunities for obstruction be abandoned by the Soviets (see list of unresolved issues).

b. The extent of on-site inspection would have to be consistent with scientific facts regarding possible suspicious events and with the detection capabilities of the control system if there is to be an adequate deterrent.

3. U.S. tactics should be to probe the Soviet position on a and b above before entering into discussion on a possible quota of inspections.

4. The U.S. approach at present should be along lines stated in the proposed reply to Premier Khrushchev and in the draft treaty articles which have been tabled by the Western powers at Geneva.

5. The U.S. should continue to hold in reserve the alternative of an atmospheric ban if the Soviets will not abandon the veto or accept a reasonable level of inspection.

Tab B

⁴

SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS

Comprehensive Veto: While the Soviets have said that if a quota of inspections were adopted they would drop their veto in the Commission on the dispatch of the inspection teams, they continue to demand a veto on:

a. All matters relating to violation of the treaty including decisions on the basis of results of on-site investigations;

b. Recruitment and dismissal of all personnel including those of inspection groups;

c. Location of control posts, routes of aircraft flights, and new methods of observation and apparatus in the control system;

d. Budgetary, financial, administrative and economic matters.

On-site Inspection Arrangements: Questions remain as to (a) Approval of routes for inspection groups; (b) Will there be access to the closed areas of the Soviet Union; (c) Composition of inspection teams; and (d) Whether permanent inspection groups could be set up in the USSR.

Criteria for Inspection: The Soviets have not stated on what technical criteria inspection would be based and who would apply these criteria.

Staffing: The Soviets still insist on host country nationals as heads of control posts and on their holding all but 4 or 5 of the 30 technical positions in the post.

High Altitude: The Soviets still refuse to discuss methods of high altitude detection.

New Seismic Data: The Soviets still refuse to discuss the implications of the new seismic data on capabilities of the system or means of improving it.

Experimentation: The Soviets have not responded to our proposals for a joint program of experimentation, including nuclear tests, to improve and check detection capabilities.

Phasing of Control System: Arrangements for bringing other areas of the world into the control system must still be worked out.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Farley.
1. See footnote 4, Document 213.
2. For text of Khrushchev’s April 23 letter to Eisenhower, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1396–1398. For Eisenhower’s reply to Khrushchev as sent on May 5, see ibid., pp. 1403–1405.
3. Secret; Limit Distribution.
4. Confidential; Limit Distribution.