230. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretaries Herter, Dillon, Murphy, Merchant, Mr. Davis, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster
The group came in to discuss with the President matters expected to come up during his meeting with Mr. Khrushchev.1 The President commented that it will be very difficult to adhere to an agenda. He added that some say that Khrushchev is a master debater. In fact, he seems to be a skillful evader of tough questions.
[Here follows discussion of Berlin and Germany and whether Eisenhower should make a return trip to the Soviet Union.]
The President asked what State’s evaluation was of Khrushchev’s disarmament speech.2 Mr. Herter said it has obviously had substantial impact around the world. The small nations fear that the big powers might start a war, drawing them in. They were also attracted by his suggestion to use the funds freed from armaments for economic development around the world. He recalled that the President had put forward [Page 775] this suggestion six weeks ago. Mr. Khrushchev called for a step by step approach, extending controls as disarmament is extended.
Mr. Dillon suggested that the President consider making a speech on disarmament in the United Nations within the next few weeks. The President thought this might be a pretty good idea, providing him an opportunity to set out our plan.
The President thought that really the most promising line suggested so far is to try to get Khrushchev committed to negotiation as a principle in the conduct of our relations. If he does this, we should be ready to tell him what we are prepared to do. Secretary Herter brought out that Khrushchev had omitted any consideration of any central or UN military force once national forces were reduced. The President said he has been trying to think of concrete examples for a possible step by step approach. We might for example abolish naval units having more than a certain operating range. Mr. Herter said that the Soviets had offered to reduce their conventional forces initially, cutting down to 1.7 million, but offer no way to verify these reductions. One idea his people have been examining is for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to send out a questionnaire for information to every nation asking what forces they require for their own internal security and what armament. Mr. Murphy commented that the existing forces are testimony to our lack of confidence in Soviet behavior, that we increased our forces greatly as the cold war became more severe. The President asked me to find out what was the strength of our armed forces at the end of December 1949. (I did so. The total was approximately 1.5 million.)
Regarding the exchange of atomic reactor information, the President said he viewed the project favorably so long as the whole thing was done through the IAEA.
The President next asked how the Chinese problem could be taken into consideration. If we are talking about disarmament and such subjects, he wondered how we could negotiate on controls in light of our rigid policy against any recognition of Red China. Mr. Herter said we do not wish to change our stand on Red China. They will not renounce the use of force in Taiwan nor will they release our prisoners. The President said he realized this but wondered how we can talk about general disarmament with them. Mr. Merchant said we have the same problem regarding the Federal Republic of Germany. It is realized, however, that such countries must come under the purview of a disarmament agreement even though they are not UN members. The President repeated that he wished we had a really fine first step in disarmament to offer—one not involving our allies. Mr. Herter said that each type of weapon is so interwoven with others that it is hard to visualize what the President is seeking. Nuclear weapons now are so intimately mixed in with others that they could no longer be banned as a class.
[Page 776]The President said that there were reasons not to single out the nuclear weapon back in 1948, when we had a monopoly, but times have changed and if we could now really eliminate all atomic weapons we would not be too badly off. However, we cannot do this without the most extreme and comprehensive inspection system. There is one possibility, however. Bombers and large missiles are discoverable because they are of substantial size.
The President thought Mr. Herter should talk to our Defense people. Where we once said our great strength advantage is nuclear, this is no longer true. If we could put down the sequence of steps we favor, some pattern might emerge. Mr. Murphy thought we could dust off the main lines of our 1957 proposals.
The President next noted that the Russians seemed to want a non-aggression pact. Mr. Herter referred to this as a political treaty. The President thought it was undesirable since it would cover the same ground as our UN commitment and thus detract from it. Also, it would imply some kind of special relationship between the United States and the USSR, and thus alarm our allies.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 26.↩
- Khrushchev arrived in the United States on September 15 and left on September 27, after discussions with President Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland, September 25–27. See Document 231.↩
- For an extract of Khrushchev’s speech to the General Assembly, September 18, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1452–1460.↩