Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, September 9, 1959—5 p.m.

402. Pass Air, AFCIN, Army, Navy. Armed revolt led by Toranzo Montero was sparked by and largely owed its origin to refusal of Secretary of War Anaya to approve major changes in command proposed by Toranzo Montero as Commander in Chief of the Army and President Frondizi to support Anaya.² Support for Montero by Army commands was prompt and almost unanimous. Montero’s haste in proposing command changes probably related to circumstance Army promotion boards will be appointed soon.

As background it should be recalled that provisional (military) government favored election of Balbin to Presidency. Frondizi frustrated provisional government’s desire by obtaining Peronist votes. Provisional government’s resentment at this development naturally shared by persons placed in command of Armed Forces by provisional government. In presence of this resentment Frondizi when he became President tried to select military leaders who at least were complacent concerning the electoral support he obtained from the Peronists and who shared or at least did not oppose his efforts to “integrate” Peronist masses. These persons were minority group whose interests political and personal were furthered by Frondizi’s favor. Frondizi named three of this group as Armed Forces Secretaries and simultaneously gave them direct command of Armed Forces. Toranzo Montero revolt is culmination of effort made consecutively within Air Force, Navy, Army to remove commanders imposed by Frondizi and restore the kind of commands that existed under provisional government.

Changes proposed by Montero involved removal of persons loyal to deposed War Secretary Solanas Pacheco and to his Under Secretary Colonel Reimundez. Latter officers and their followers “tagged” as nationalist whereas Montero is tagged as “democratic”. Whether or not so called nationalist forces wished to control Army with political purposes in mind, there is widespread conviction within Army that this is the case. There is also suspicion of course that Montero and his followers have political purposes in mind although he has been categoric in stating from beginning that movement not aimed at overturning government and so far as is known he made no effort to overturn government although it is possible that at the height of the revolt he had the power to do so.

In the politico-military situation which exists and which is product of many years of military participation in politics it seems clear that on the one hand individual officers and groups within the military aspire to use their positions for political ends. At the same time it is clear also that persons in political life who in theory are opposed to military intervention in politics are trying to use the military or groups within the military for their own political ends.

At present juncture it would appear that for time being Army, Navy and Air Force are more nearly united politically behind their commanders than they have been since Frondizi became President. With the very limited popular support that Frondizi enjoys with the demoralization that still characterizes political life in Argentina and in particular the acts and attitudes of the political opposition in the absence of an institutional tradition and in the light of the strong political role the military has played in recent years it is obvious that the military today has the power if it is willing to assume the consequences to the country and to the military institutions themselves to replace Frondizi. However, they have probably had this power from the beginning although divisions within the Armed Forces greatly limited that power in the past.

It is difficult to allege that Frondizi has come out of the crisis with his position improved. The extent to which he is subject to control by military is clearer than ever. At the same time it would be wrong to assume that any effective majority of the military intends to use power it has in order to remove Frondizi. What is more likely to occur is that military will continue to exert its influence on Frondizi and that Frondizi will continue to resist that influence in fields where he feels he can. There is in other words an uneasy balance not greatly different from that that has existed since beginning of Frondizi’s term.

Beaulac

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/9–959. Confidential.
2. In telegram 378 from Buenos Aires, September 4, the Embassy reported that General Montero had barricaded himself in the army mechanics school in Buenos Aires on the evening of September 3, notifying the army commands that he had reassumed command of the army. That afternoon it had been announced that General Pedro Castineiras had been installed as Commander in Chief of the Army. Shortly after 5 a.m. on September 4, Montero left the mechanics school to meet with Frondizi. After the conversation, General Montero announced a truce and stated that he was not heading a movement against the government. (ibid., 735.00/9–459)