Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

207. Memorandum of a Conversation, Argentine Foreign Office, Buenos Aires, February 27, 1960, 11 a.m.¹

US/MC/30

Buenos Aires, February 27, 1960, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Khrushchev’s Visit to the U.S.;² Forthcoming Conferences

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Secretary Herter
  • Mr. Rubottom
  • Mr. Bernbaum, Minister Counselor of Embassy
  • Mr. Nugent, Counselor of Embassy
• Argentina
  • Minister for Foreign Affairs Taboada
  • Dr. D’Hers, Under Sec. for Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Ruda, Minister Counselor of Foreign Office

Minister Taboada: We are interested in Mr. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, despite the fact that Mr. Khrushchev spoke for two hours before the United Nations Assembly telling it why disarmament was needed without saying anything as to how it could be achieved.³ When Mr. Hammarskjold introduced me to Mr. Khrushchev, the latter asked where I came from and, when told from Argentina, said that was very interesting. Undoubtedly Argentina was interesting to Mr. Khrushchev, since the Soviet designs in this area are well known.

Secretary Herter: There were no conclusive substantive conversations at Camp David.⁴ It had been made quite clear to Mr. Khrushchev that it would be impossible to discuss any matters with him until after the ultimatum concerning Berlin had been lifted.⁵ Mr. Khrushchev was very annoyed by this stipulation but remained stubborn in his refusal to clarify the Berlin situation. On his last day in the United States he visited President Eisenhower’s farm in the afternoon. There his attitude began to change. Five minutes before he was scheduled to leave, he told President Eisenhower that there was no Berlin ultimatum and no fixed time limit attached to it. President Eisenhower could announce this point during a press conference and he (Khrushchev) would confirm it in Moscow. It was impossible, however, to agree on any wording for a joint declaration.

Despite the foregoing, two main points did emerge from his visit:

1. President Eisenhower became convinced that Mr. Khrushchev does want some form of disarmament and that he realizes that a full nuclear war with the United States, even though the Soviet Union might have the advantage of surprise, would result in the Soviet Union’s annihilation. On the other hand, it is thought that Mr. Khrushchev does want the distinction of winning the contest between “Communism” and “Capitalism” without a resort to arms. He hopes to convince uncommitted nations that this is so and draw them toward the Soviet Union.

2. Although Mr. Khrushchev gave no outward indication of any changing viewpoint toward Communist China, comments made to him in the United States may have had some effect. When President Eisenhower asked Mr. Khrushchev how the Communist Chinese could justify their desire to recover Formosa by force of arms, the latter replied that Formosa was a domestic matter and that only United States interference made it a question of international concern. President Eisenhower, nevertheless, emphasized that Soviet support of the Communist Chinese against Formosa, in defiance of a security treaty between Formosa and the United States, was a cause of serious tension. Mr. Khrushchev held firmly to his position. There is every indication, however, that he later tried to persuade the Communist Chinese to alter their insistence on obtaining Formosa by force of arms.

Minister Taboada: All this shows the importance of the United States as a guarantee for free-word security. If it were not for the United States, many countries would be under Soviet influence today.

Forthcoming Negotiations in Geneva⁶

Secretary Herter: We are now working hard with other countries to establish a common position for the talks in Geneva. There is a need to find simple formulas that serve as immediate tests of good faith. Inspection is one of these. Acceptance of a valid inspection system by the Soviets in connection with nuclear control would be an important proof of sincerity, because inspection might be disadvantageous to the Soviets from a military viewpoint.

Minister Taboada: This will be a worthwhile test. We fear that the Soviets will never accept inspection, however, because it might reveal too much concerning the real state of their nuclear power and possibly show that the Soviet Union is weaker than she pretends to be, thereby destroying the myth of Soviet prowess.

Secretary Herter: What you say is a very real consideration. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has accepted a system of inspection to some extent. They have agreed to the establishment of control stations in Russia manned by foreigners. The difficulty is that they have not agreed to allow unrestricted travel between control stations in the process of checking data.

Minister Taboada: We are happy to have these panoramic views from you. This is the way to avoid the misunderstandings which can arise from knowing only those facts which are reported in the press.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1596. Confidential. Drafted by Nugent. See also Documents 206 and 208.
2. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, arrived in the United States for a 13-day visit on September 15.
3. Khrushchev addressed the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly on September 18.
4. Between September 25 and 27, Eisenhower and Khrushchev held talks at Camp David.
5. In its note to the U.S. Government of January 10, the Soviet Union indicated that it would sign a separate peace agreement with the German Democratic Republic if the situation in Berlin were not resolved. For text of the note and the U.S. response, see Department of State Bulletin, March 9, 1959, pp. 333–343.
6. On March 15, a 10-nation conference on disarmament opened in Geneva.