Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

458. Memorandum From Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)¹

Washington, February 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Possibilities of Salvaging Cuba

This memorandum is a hasty response to your request of yesterday for my “long-range plan for Cuba”. I am no authority on Cuba and have no long-range plan for its salvation. Nor, insofar as I can detect, does ARA. The general view within ARA is one of defeatism, that nothing can be done until a new Administration takes a fresh look at our Latin American policy with a view to making departures from existing attitudes and policies.

The views and approach suggested herein are my own and have not been discussed within ARA or elsewhere.

General Observations

I think all of us must approach Cuba with great humility. We have never in our national history experienced anything quite like it in magnitudes of anti-US venom, claims for expropriation, or Soviet threats to the hemisphere. Communications between our governments have broken down. There is not a clear enough realization among our own people that pre-Castro Cuba will not return, or that, if we are to reestablish influence within Cuba, it must be in a context different from that which obtained in the past.

Ambassador Bonsal has characterized the Cuban revolutionary reaction to the pattern of US investment in Cuba, and to the US in general, as comparable to Main Street’s reaction to Wall Street in the 1890’s and the heyday of Populism. I think he is correct. The moral is that if influence and communication between these poles is to be reestablished, the basis must be comparable to what occurred in this country: Wall Street must move nearer to Main Street and make it clearer that its activities are conducted with Main Street’s interests in mind.

ARA appears to view Cuba and Castroism as more localized phenomena than I believe they are. I think Castros could come to power in countries which would vitally affect our interests—Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Peru and Guatemala, to name the most likely candidates. ARA does fear that the Dominican Republic and Haiti can be engulfed in Castroism. It is my opinion that Castroism is more likely to be resolved within the hemispheric macrocosm than within the Cuban or strictly Caribbean microcosm.

The Department has in general exercised commendable moderation in dealing with Castro but lack of communication with him has reduced us to a state of semi-paralysis. We have been too prepossessed, I think, with this problem of communication and its breakdown. We perhaps overemphasize “what might have been” (or what might still be accomplished) had Ambassador Bonsal been given greater opportunities of maintaining contact with Castro and had he (Bonsal) been accorded the time and courtesy to explain fully the American position and our equity in the Cuban economy.

I think we fail to realize that Castro does not speak our language and does not want to listen to it. The most recent Cuban response to our most recent note on expropriations makes this clear. However much or little attention Castro and his lieutenants have devoted in the past to the philosophy and economics of the US system is largely immaterial. They do not speak our language and do not aspire to speak it. As a result, we are not likely to influence them by continuing to insist on addressing them in the language of private enterprise, the sanctity of private property, the equities of just compensation, etc.

A continuation of the present impasse is dangerous. There is an observable slippage in Cuba toward Soviet influence and Afro-Asian neutralist orientation. The global struggle for influence within the developmental revolution, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The longer the present impasse continues, the more likely it is that Congress and antagonistic business elements may goad the Department into intemperate or punitive action, and the more likely it is that public opinion may coalesce in a belief that Castro and his henchmen are communists and should be dealt with accordingly. Both these eventualities could further separate us from Cuba and isolate Cuba within the Inter-American system.

I am inclined to believe that Castro is probably an anarcho-syndicalist of the Spanish mold, rather than a communist, though there are undoubtedly communist influences at work on him and within Cuba. The internal evidence of the revolution and the general subordination of the Government to INRA point tentatively at least in the direction of anarcho-syndicalism. I think it would be wise at this stage to build from this probability. Among other things, to do so would allow us more maneuverability and confer on Castro more avenues of retreat.

We cannot take too much satisfaction from the fact that Castro and his immediate entourage may not be bona fide or crypto-communists. From the standpoint of our business interests, it would appear to make little difference from the record now unfolding whether they are communists or anarchists.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of foreign policy and capacity to influence, the difference could be considerable. If the leftism of the Castro revolution is an indigenous variety of traditional Latin American leftism (cf. certain resemblances between Castroism and the Bolivian revolution of 1952), the possibilities of keeping Cuba out of the Soviet orbit of influence are obviously better than they would be were Cuba governed by outright communists. It is therefore important that we not drive Cuba further toward Communism by perpetuating the present vacuum in US-Cuban relations.

Partly because Castro has a psychopathic antipathy to being criticized as a communist, partly because doing so may take our eye off the ball, and largely because Castroism is an explainable phenomenon with which we shall probably have to contend on a larger scale in the decade ahead unless we learn how to contain and influence it, I think we must combat the excesses of Castroism in terms other than Communism.

To do so will require us to develop techniques of communication which we do not now possess or have permitted to atrophy. To develop (or redevelop) these techniques of communication will require departures from existing attitudes and policies and the exercising of the capability of identifying ourselves—of communicating—with the mass aspirations of our southern neighbors, whether they be Cubans, Panamanians, Colombians or Venezuelans.

Our objective should be to reach the underprivileged masses of the hemisphere in somewhat the same fashion that Milo Perkins has attributed to the US image projected by F.D.R. in the Good Neighbor days. If the Latin American masses can again identify the US as having a true concern for their welfare, certain of the mainsprings of existing anti-US sentiment can be abated and we can begin to talk with the Castros from a position of greater strength. At a minimum, we could deny Castro considerable of his present audience and discredit some of his anti-US demagoguery.

US Objectives

Our more important objectives (purposes) vis-à-vis Cuba and Castroism should be to (1) minimize Sino-Soviet influence within Cuba by developing helpful hemispheric and US influences within the Cuban revolution which will temper it and maintain it within an inter-American context, (2) check the spread of Castroism to other Latin American nations, (3) persuade Cuba and, by example, other Latin American countries with heavy US or foreign investments that private capital and productivity serve a social purpose and represent necessary contributions to the developmental aims of the society, (4) salvage what we can of the American investment and economic structure in Cuba, and (5) accomplish these purposes without overt US intervention and within a hemispheric framework.

I think our point of departure must be that keeping Cuba out of the Sino-Soviet orbit, and returning it to the Inter-American system, is more important than the salvaging of the US investment in Cuba to the complete satisfaction of the US business community. This is a bitter pill to swallow but its medicinal value would be considerable if it induces us to make a start toward curing the symptoms of Castroism in other countries where the American investment is even heavier than in Cuba.

Steps in the Right Direction

The immediate hurdle in US-Cuban relations is the pending Congressional legislation on the sugar quota. It is my understanding that the Executive Branch will ask that the existing legislation be extended for one year and that the Executive be given authority to make adjustments in existing quotas. I hope and assume that this legislation will pass. It would permit us to buy necessary time and give the Executive the flexibility required to maneuver with Cuba on quotas and prices. This would open an area of communication which might be helpful.

In the longer-range, I believe we should utilize the meeting of the Committee of Twenty-One (scheduled for Bogota in July) to announce a liberal US policy in favor of a hemispheric development plan of rationalized industrialization and agrarian reform, in which Cuba would be invited and expected to participate. Although Cuba is a member of the Committee, it is possible she may boycott the meeting. ARA’s best judgment, however, is that Cuba will attend.

The Committee of Twenty-One is an outgrowth of Operation Pan-America and is intended (1) as a stop-gap to the postponed Quito Conference and (2) as a forum further to discuss hemispheric collaboration in Operation Pan-America. Regardless of the tortured past history of Operation Pan-America, it appears that a principal purpose of the Brazilian initiative in this respect is to conduct a hemispheric survey of the underdeveloped nations and their developmental problems toward the end of developing a rationalized plan for industrial and agricultural advancement. Surveys under contracts let by the OAS are now being conducted in 11 countries.

I would suggest that our general strategy and position at the Bogota meeting should be to:

1. Assure that all members of the Committee, including Cuba, attend, by letting it be known well in advance that we support the general concept of a hemispheric development survey and invite all countries to permit surveys.

2. Invite individual countries, including Cuba, to discuss their developmental problems and objectives toward the end of ascertaining what common denominators exist.

3. State, in turn, the problem confronting US interests if the developmental process engulfs productive US investment and enterprise.

4. Announce a US policy in respect of land reform.

5. Reinvite Cuba to join the Inter-American Development Bank, which would be designated as the executive agency to implement the hemispheric development plan.

6. Utilize the meeting for purposes of launching a massive infusion of the Rostow Doctrine into Latin American developmental thinking.

7. Discuss in general terms at least the main lines of the S/P hemispheric defense and development concept and the relationship of military to developmental expenditures.

8. Be prepared to discuss the financing of social welfare and housing projects, as suggested by Senator Aiken and others.

The overall US purposes should be (a) to lay a liberal framework for hemispheric development (including land reform) in which Cuba would be expected to play a role but the direction of which would be a hemispheric enterprise through the agency of the Inter-American Development Bank (which Cuba should be reinvited to join), and (b) to discuss candidly and within the general ideological framework of the Rostow Doctrine the problem of the US’s supporting Latin American development programs if the expropriation of US properties is entailed in the developmental process.

In the latter connection, we might lay the groundwork for some broad inter-American doctrine that the US, either bilaterally or multilaterally, will make certain developmental funds available in exchange for undertakings by the recipients that certain modalities will be observed in their relations with their hemispheric neighbors, including the maintenance of peace and the postponement of expropriation of foreign-owned properties for X years or until the country was safely into the take-off of development and could afford adequate compensation.

The Advantages of Some Such Approach

I can see many advantages vis-à-vis the hemisphere and Cuba alike in some such approach:

1. It would repair our somewhat strained relations with Brazil regarding Operation Pan-America and launch something which must be done in time, i.e., the placing of the development problem in a hemispheric and multilateral context. This would permit Brazil to exert moderating influences on Cuba. I cannot help but think that facing the development problem on a multilateral hemispheric basis would be a great fillip and that it would activate some sort of developmental Monroe Doctrine against Sino-Soviet penetration and influence.

2. It could lead Cuba into the Inter-American Development Bank.

3. It would tend to head-off or contain the present Cuban initiative in calling for a conference of underdeveloped nations to study development problems, now scheduled for September, in which Afro-Asian neutralist nations have shown more interest than Cuba’s Latin American neighbors.

4. There could be solid advantages in our discussing our problem in Cuba against the larger problem and general background of US private capital’s past and prospective contribution to Latin American development.

5. It might widen the lines of communication to Castro and even widen his horizons to the long-haul entailed in socio-economic development.

6. It would give us an excellent opening to drive home the tenets of the Rostow Doctrine and the thesis that existing sources of production should not be disrupted (though they might be reformed or converted to greater social consciousness) during the critical developmental process.

7. It could acquaint Castro more fully with hemispheric problems and certain of our own. It could thus serve to narrow the differences between the languages we now speak, or would speak to each other.

8. Difficult as it will be, the formulation of a US position favoring land reform would confer great advantages in liberalizing the US image among the masses and of easing the impact of future Latin American social revolutions on the landowning oligarchies. Land reform has been effected in only handful of countries and always as a result of a bloodbath. It is the spark which can set off social revolutions in other countries and light the way for Castroism’s spreading. We should therefore associate ourselves with it—notwithstanding that it would open certain rifts between ourselves and the oligarchies—as a reinsurance for US private investment against further Cubas.

Conclusion

Having taken such steps in the context of hemispheric development, having stated our policy to be one of orderly hemispheric development through agrarian reform and industrialization, and having argued our case for the preservation of existing productive enterprise regardless of how mixed the ultimate indigenous system may become as the revolution progresses, I believe we would be in a better position than we now are to weather the Cuban storm, to influence Castro toward moderation, and to counsel him to move more cautiously in impeding the productive capacity of American investment in Cuba. But we cannot be certain.

It may be too late to attempt to moderate or influence Castro through furnishing financial and technical assistance in connection with his land reform program. In any event, such would now probably be impossible because of Congressional attitudes and the opposition of US business interests. Yet it is a tactic which might be held in reserve and one which should be perfected for other countries which will one day effect land reform either peacefully or by revolution.

Some such tactic might conceivably be used in the future to influence Castro to place his priorities on the distribution of state and unused, rather than productive US, land. Had we had a land reform program when Castro took power, we might have invoked some such strategem—since land reform requires financing and technical assistance in large doses for some period of time—to divert Castro from US properties. That time has passed and with it, very probably, lost opportunities to salvage more than we are likely to salvage of US-owned lands. My fear is that the Soviets will step into the financial and technical breach only after havoc has been raised with the US-owned plantations.

I believe something along the above lines promises more than the continuance for another year of what I conceive to be our present policies and tactics. We have gone downhill progressively throughout the past year and Mikoyan’s visit should awaken us to how far downhill we now are.²

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Signed by Ramsey who indicated that the memorandum should not be distributed outside S/P. He sent a copy to Morgan and another copy for circulation within S/P.

2. In another memorandum of February 18 to Smith, Ramsey offered an addendum regarding the Guantanamo base problem, “which can blow any long-longe Cuban policy we devise sky-high if we take a hardnosed attitude.”

   Ramsey continued: “I can think of no way to handle the troublesome problem of Guantanamo other than to move toward the ‘hemispherization’ of US bases (other than those leased from the UK) in the Caribbean area”. He concluded: “The rationale would be that certain of our allies furnish ‘position support’ in implementation of the hemispheric defense concept”. (Ibid.)