Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

497. Memorandum From Richard G. Cushing of the Office of the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn)¹

Washington, April 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Reactions on visit to Habana²

A five-day visit to Habana leaves the informed visitor with the definite impression that Cuba has been transformed from a dictatorship of the right to a dictatorship of the left, complete with slow suffocation of human rights. These main points stand out:

1. There still is no organized opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba although the Catholic Church and other anti-Communist organizations and individuals (i.e., Luis Conte Aguero) have expressed, directly or indirectly, their displeasure over the Communist trend.

2. Anti-Castro Cubans and most Americans there want the United States to take a “harder line” toward the present GOC in order to show official displeasure with the course of events and indicate support for the more democratic elements in Cuba.

3. The Communists are making strong headway, encouraged by the official line that to be anti-Communist is to be anti-revolution (one man received a three-year prison term for writing an anti-Communist slogan on a wall), but at the same time anti-Communist elements are coming to the surface and are seeking encouragement of any kind from the U.S.

4. Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, widely considered a Marxist, is the real power in Cuba, although Fidel still is the mystic symbol, the front man to sway the masses.

5. The economy is deteriorating steadily but not at an alarming rate now that sugar revenues are coming in and dollar reserves are being conserved by severe import restrictions; new tax measures seen likely, and without doubt will be blamed on the U.S.

6. Numerous Cubans and Americans favor no cut of the sugar quota per se, but instead, abolition or reduction of the two-cent premium.

7. Cuba has become a police state, with anywhere between 4,000 and 8,000 political prisoners held in various jails, many without charge and in some cases under deplorable conditions, and with an informer system more highly developed than under Batista.

8. The end of any semblance of independent press, including radio and television, is imminent; the four remaining Cuban newspapers considered independent are expected to come under Government control in a matter of weeks at best, and the same fate is seen for the few remaining radio and television stations.

9. American businessmen are finding they cannot do business in Cuba and slowly are pulling out, in some cases (i.e., Esso Standard) quietly so as not to precipitate GOC intervention; one estimate, widely quoted, is that 3,000 Americans have left Cuba in the past six months, out of a total of around 8,000.

10. Anti-United States propaganda is not entirely effective but because of the force of repetition has been swallowed in whole or part by a dangerous number of Cubans, even those who should know better.

11. Any invasion of Cuba by whatever opposition group very likely would be blamed on the United States, and could be blown up by the GOC into a situation endangering American lives; the Cubans are volatile people susceptible to any such spark.

12. Government take-over is accomplished with finesse; it is done by degrees, and always with explanations accepted by a good number of the Cuban people as in the national interest.

13. Castro’s popular support has diminished; responsible informants, even some close to the Government, concede that he now has about 50 per cent of the Cuban people behind him as against 95 per cent or better when he took over.

14. Anti-Castro Cubans and a good number of Americans feel Ambassador Bonsal’s return without a real show of the GOC’s willingness to negotiate reflected U.S. weakness if not outright capitulation, and point to the four Cuban notes³ which greeted the Ambassador on his return as an indication of GOC hostility and propensity to needle the United States.

15. There are increasing shortages of certain luxury food items such as butter and imported canned goods but, from all indications, the poor still are eating fairly well because of ceiling prices on the basic popular food items such as meat, rice and beans. Shortages of import items such as spare machine parts, pharmaceutical supplies, and electrical appliances are beginning to plague the upper and middle classes.

16. Much good has been accomplished; for example, recreation areas for children and “the masses” have sprung up where military or police centers once stood and are extremely popular; clinics for the poor have been established; personal graft is at an all-time low, etc.

17. While Habana seems to lack the gay, carefree air of a year ago, the Cubans have not lost their sense of humor, and anti-revolutionary jokes abound. Miami is referred to as “West Berlin”. INRA spelled backwards is “A Russia Nos Iremos” (We’re heading toward Russia). A child asks his father how far it is from Habana to Miami; the reply: “Never mind, son—keep on swimming!”

18. Cubans opposing the regime hope for a strong, no-holds barred, information campaign on medium wave radio beamed into Cuba in Spanish. Station WKWF in Key West, although only one-half kilowatt in power, is heard clearly in the greater Habana area in the morning and at night. Several anti-Castro figures prominent in Cuban radio and television, including Amadeo Barletta, are interested in buying the station or taking air time in order to broadcast the type of program the U.S. Government could not engage in, but which, they feel, would have a profound impact on the Cuban people.

19. There is little confidence that VOA short wave broadcasting has any real impact or listenership.

20. The American business colony is extremely reluctant to support any kind of information program but hopes the Embassy can do something or encourage others along this line. The U.S. business community clearly does not want to irritate the GOC in any way.

21. Ambassador Bonsal is willing to accept, if the time seems right, an invitation to appear on “Ante la Prensa” or some other CMQ network show if he is allowed leeway in framing up his own replies; he knows that CMQ may be intervened at any time and realizes that time is running out on getting the American viewpoint across to the Cuban people in this most effective way.

22. USIS/Habana is finding the walls closing in insofar as informational programs are concerned in view of the steady takeover of newspapers, radio stations and television outlets; however, films, books, pamphlets and exhibits still are circulated with varying degrees of success and cultural programs are, if anything, more extensive than before. Some Embassy officers foresee the eventual closing down, by degree, of USIS informational programs but heightened cultural activity, particularly in the exchange of persons field.

23. The most productive target audiences for USIS at present seem to be students, labor, and church groups.

24. The more democratic Cuban teachers are alarmed over increasing Marxist materials being injected into the public and private school systems starting with the first grade.

25. Advertisements from an “American Friends of Cuba” group of prestige names, if constructively friendly in tone, would be accepted by most Cuban newspapers, even possibly by Revolución, since the official line has been that the Cuban people have no argument with the people of the U.S.

26. A University of Habana professor says the GOC plans next to convert the institution into a “People’s University” and transform the plush Riviera Hotel, now under Government control, into a huge dormitory. He adds the incredible rumor, heard from other sources, that Ché Guevara will replace the retiring Dr. Clemente Inclan as Rector.

27. The Communists in Cuba have been able to identify themselves completely with the revolution. Juan Marinello, a Cuban Communist leader, told Robert Berrellez of AP last month that PSP strength has reached 130,000. Communism is evidenced by trade pacts with the USSR, East Germany and Poland, the constant travel between Cuba and the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, the Communist flavor of the anti-U.S. propaganda, the use of Communist goon squads (with the Communist newspaper Hoy brazenly in their pockets), the replacement of anti-Communists in the labor movement, the displays of Communist literature on bookstands, punishment of those voicing anti-Communist thoughts (i.e., Urrutia, Matos), Communist-line textbooks for the school system, and in many other ways.

28. Anti-Castro Cubans still are firm in their rejection of anyone even remotely connected with the hated Batista and Trujillo.

29. The GOC, according to a reliable source connected for many years with Cuban radio and television, has obtained a Swiss 100 kilowatt radio transmitter equipped with a directional scoop antenna and a single control knob which enables the operator to switch from 2 megacycles to 30 megacycles in a matter of seconds; this equipment, ideal for jamming, also can be used to broadcast on any frequency desired. This same source said the GOC is planning the installation of a 10-kilowatt television transmitter at Barasoa, at the eastern tip of Cuba, with the idea of beaming television across the strait to Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

30. It would be unproductive at this time to criticize Fidel Castro, who still wears the halo of honesty and social progress. More vulnerable, however, are Ché Guevara (an Argentine) and Raul Castro, neither of whom has broad public support.

31. As the Cuban people lose their access to unbiased information, and USIS assets diminish, it appears evident that the full story must be delivered to the Cuban people in order to inspire the pro-democratic elements still existing and cause those bent on a pro-Castro course to doubt the wisdom of their own leaders. To do this, the use of Ambassador Bonsal on CMQ might well be one of the few high-impact projects available to us. Another could be clandestine leaflet and pamphlet activities, including the cartooning of Castro as Ché Guevara’s puppet, showing simply that an Argentine is running Cuba. Outside the island, medium-wave broadcasting by responsible and well-known Cubans (such as those ousted from CMQ or the Telemundo operations) as well as by the U.S. Government, with its necessarily softer but official approach, would seem highly useful. At the same time, because the GOC is sensitive to hemisphere attitudes, increased efforts might be made to build understanding and support in other countries of Latin America for the U.S. position vis-à-vis Cuba.

1. Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960. Confidential. Also addressed to John P. McKnight (USIA/IAL).
2. The dates of Cushing’s visit have not been determined.
3. See Document 494.