Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

126. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, November 22, 1960.

PARTICIPANTS

• Jean Monnet
• Senator Lyndon B. Johnson¹
• Senator William Fulbright²
• John W. Tuthill

SUBJECT

• Europe, NATO, OECD, etc.

On Tuesday afternoon, November 22, I escorted Senators Johnson and Fulbright to Monnet’s apartment for a conversation (Monnet is still laid up as a result of a knee operation).

(En route to Monnet’s apartment, Senator Johnson quoted from a letter from a personal friend in which the comment was made that Senator Johnson was “too much of a Texas cowboy” to be talking things over with “an intellectual like Monnet”. Senator Johnson had never previously met Monnet and asked Senator Fulbright and me for our comments. Quite aside from the point as to whether the Senator should be addressed as a “Texas cowboy”, we were both of the opinion that Monnet approaches world problems in an uncomplicated and straightforward manner. We both suggested to Senator Johnson that he should not expect any brilliant display of intellectual prowess but rather a clear and understandable approach to the essential problems. We both also emphasized the question of reliability. I recounted the story of the time when Monnet was criticizing a certain position taken by De Gaulle. He interrupted his story to say “I can say this to you because I say the same thing to De Gaulle”. I gave as my view that this was typical of the man.

I told Senators Johnson and Fulbright that Monnet was anxious to establish closer relations with key members of the American Congress. Senator Fulbright stated that this meant closer contact with the new administration. I replied that while this was correct it was also correct that Monnet felt it desirable to maintain close contact with both Republicans and Democrats. I pointed out Monnet’s Action Committee for a United States of Europe was based upon contact with the major political parties in the six countries plus the labor unions. It is bipartisan in this sense and Monnet wishes contacts of the Action Committee with the US to develop free from partisan political implications.)

The conversation with Monnet opened with Fulbright’s query about the NATO nuclear problem.³ Monnet had no simple solution to offer but emphasized that a formula must be reached which would not discriminate against Germany. He stated that in his view it was unrealistic any longer to seek formulas which would satisfy the French and certain other countries if in so doing this would arouse serious opposition or even concern in Germany.

Senator Fulbright asked about the Six and the Seven. Monnet pointed out that the Six had political as well as economic objectives. The Seven, on the other hand, represents simply a commercial arrangement. The two are therefore not comparable. Monnet feels that the talk of a split in Europe has been greatly exaggerated, especially by Macmillan. At the same time, he pointed out that, in his view, the British are much more serious today in seeking ways and means to find an accommodation or association with the Six than previously. He feels that this is altogether to the good and that some effective means of association must be found. He thinks it essential that the British remain convinced that the Six will continue to develop and at the same time to seek ways and means of an effective association. He stressed his view that such an association must be found not only with the British but with the United States as well. (In making this presentation he ignored the other countries of the EFTA. This reflects his own view that it is important to seek an agreement with the British but that this can be better done with the British individually rather than through the search for a “bridge” between the Six and Seven. He would prefer to ignore the others in the Seven for the time and concentrate on Britain and the problems in the fields of commonwealth relations and agriculture.)

Senator Fulbright asked whether there was any inconsistency between the OECD (which had been enthusiastically supported by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange at the opening meeting the day before of the NATO Parliamentarians) and the Six. Monnet stated that on the contrary, in his view the OECD and the Common Market “complement” each other. He repeated his theory that the Europe of the Six is the “ferment of change”. Its unifying influence must extend beyond its own geographical limits to the rest of Western Europe (especially the UK) and North America. He stated that the two main organizations that are essential in this connection are NATO and the OECD. The OECD will be particularly important because it will offer an organizational arrangement for seeking the association of the Common Market with Britain and the United States in a forum with full British and US participation.

After Senator Johnson left, Monnet discussed Algeria. He expressed his usual optimism. He feels that De Gaulle will have overwhelming support in the referendum⁴ and that in the light of this overwhelming support, the Army will not dare move against him. He feels that De Gaulle is a man of decision but not normally of action. Now, however, the time for action has arrived and he feels that De Gaulle will be forced to move. Thus he is optimistic that over the next year or two this matter will be resolved.

(Immediately after the meeting, Senator Johnson held a press conference. While the reporting officer was not present in that conference, he has been told that after referring to his visit at NATO and with De Gaulle, Debré, etc., Senator Johnson turned to his meeting with Jean Monnet. He described Monnet as a “great man” who had given him (Senator Johnson) an inspiring insight into the problems of the present time. He apparently developed this at some length and with considerable feeling.)

0. Source: Department of State, EUR/RPE Files: Lot 65 D 265, Monnet Action Committee. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tuthill on November 30.
1. Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate.
2. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
3. At a November 21 meeting in Paris, NATO parliamentarians discussed proposals for a separate NATO nuclear force. These proposals were in response to French demands for a greater say in nuclear policy and De Gaulle’s plan for a French-U.S.-British committee to coordinate NATO strategy.
4. On November 5, De Gaulle announced he would promote a referendum in Algeria on the question of self-determination. On November 16, he announced a national referendum to ensure the support of the French people for his policy.