Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

129. Memorandum From the First Secretary of the Mission at the European Communities (Meyers) to Ambassador Butterworth⁰

Brussels, December 14, 1960.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Euratom Relations: Recent Conversations with Euratom President Hirsch and other officials

1. I saw Euratom President Hirsch at a reception the evening of December 9. Our conversation, while necessarily brief, materially supplemented hints earlier made by Consolo, Vogelear et al. regarding Euratom’s reactions to U.S. revisions suggested to the proposed invitation to the 1965 phase of the Joint Program.

a. Hirsch indicated clearly that no decisions would be made by his Commission on major questions affecting the Joint Program until the new U.S. Administration was in office, when the Euratom Commission would wish to review the whole status of the Joint Program in the light of the attitudes of the U.S. Administration. It seemed clear this remark applied to the issuance of the invitation for the 1965 phase of the Joint Reactor Program.

b. He said the terms of the Joint Program were obviously not consistent with the facts of present atomic energy development in Europe. He even wondered whether it might not be more sensible for both sides to renounce the Agreement¹ and start over on the basis of a more realistic Agreement which recognizes the positions of both sides and the atomic facts of life in Europe. He observed that the recent changes to the 1965 invitation, suggested in Busec 120,² were not likely to be helpful in persuading European industry to come forward with power reactor proposals under the Joint Program. In this connection he noted that there really did not even appear to be a Joint Power program, since the SENN contract, although worked out in detail, had never been signed.

c. I urged Hirsch to realize that it would be highly doubtful that the new U.S. Administration could review the complicated Joint Program within the first few months and come to agreement upon any extensive changes that U.S.-Euratom relations were, after all, only part of a broader picture and probably the gamut of U.S. atomic energy foreign policy would need to be reviewed by Administration, with Euratom elements only part of the picture. Thus, I said it would seem realistic to consider the Joint Program as at least an insurance policy which at minimum made available fuel, offered plutonium buy-back possibilities at guaranteed prices, and made available chemical reprocessing facilities at prices probably not capable of being matched elsewhere during a similar period. Hirsch replied that, in any event, the Commission was not going to take precipitate action, that it was considering the whole range of U.S.-Euratom relations. He indicated the Euratom Commission would wish to explore these questions with the Mission later, well after the commencement of the new year.

2. I subsequently saw Kohnstamm at the same reception and, having ascertained Kohnstamm was generally aware of the foregoing lines of Commission thinking, repeated essentially the line taken with Hirsch described para 1. c., and hoped Kohnstamm could exercise his influence in persuading Hirsch or other Commissioners along similar lines. Kohnstamm replied the Commission was unlikely to act hastily, but concurred with Hirsch in saying that it was obvious U.S.-Euratom relations need to be reconsidered in the light of existing circumstances. He noted that this was not a one-sided issue; that the U.S. might well wish to change aspects of the Agreement, particularly those relating to financing.

3. With regard to Hirsch’s hint that the Joint Program Agreement might need to be radically renegotiated (para 1. b.), from conversations which I have had recently with various Euratom officials, I gather that this possibility has been discussed at senior levels in the Commission and between senior officials and the Commissioners; that no final decisions have been reached; but that it was agreed that these matters could not usefully be raised in Washington at this time and would have to be deferred until the new year. There is wide recognition in the Commission of the benefits obtained from practical contacts with AEC staff in Washington and the National Laboratories, wide appreciation of the helpfulness and friendliness towards Euratom demonstrated by AEC working-level officials and scientists, and a desire to maximize this kind of contact and this kind of relationship in the research and development field. This leads, naturally, to the belief on the part of some influential officials that what is most important, rather than radically revising the Joint Program Agreement, is to push through the enabling legislation for the Additional Agreement,³ signed last June, and then expand materially this Additional Agreement, or perhaps to expand the Agreement first and delay the implementing legislation until this can be done if there is a reasonable indication that Washington will be willing to act relatively rapidly. On the other hand, some officials would rather keep separate the Joint Program and the Additional Agreement; change the former to fit today’s situation, particularly to obtain fuel more easily for ship propulsion, AGR, and other reactors not proven U.S. types; and make other necessary extensions to the Additional Agreement.

0. Source: Department of State, EUR/RPE Files: Lot 70 D 315, EURATOM Project. Limited Official Use. Sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to a letter from Butterworth to Schaetzel, December 13.
1. For texts of U.S.-EURATOM agreements signed on May 29 and November 11, 1958, in Brussels, see 9 UST 1116 and 10 UST 75.
2. Dated November 21, Busec 120 reported that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had approved invitations for proposals and fact sheets under the U.S.-EURATOM agreement for nuclear plant development. (Department of State, Central Files, 375.81901/11–2160)
3. Signed in Washington on June 11, for text, see 11 UST 2589.