Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

34. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 20–58

July 29, 1958.

THE OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN EUROPE

The Problem

To estimate the outlook for Western Europe, with special emphasis upon its principal problems and role in world affairs.

Conclusions

1. Our ability to foresee the course of events in Western Europe over the next ten years is obviously restricted by many uncertainties and imponderables. The development of the current Middle East crisis and of the French situation could have a profound and immediate effect. More generally, the extent to which the USSR is willing, or appears to be willing, to negotiate will influence Western European thinking. Finally, the diplomatic and military posture of the US and the skill with which it adjusts its policies toward Western Europe to changes in that area will greatly affect both its own position in Europe and the strength of the free world as a whole. (Para. 62)

2. Western Europe is generally prosperous, and the outlook is favorable for continued economic growth, barring loss of Middle East oil or prolonged adverse economic conditions in the US. Moderate leaders will probably continue to dominate political life in most European countries. Extremist groups will probably continue to be held in check, although Communists will be able to exercise significant influence over voters in France, Italy, and Iceland and, because of their position in organized labor, will retain a disruptive potential in these and other countries. (Paras. 10, 13–17)

3. France is a major exception to the general political picture. Under the leadership of De Gaulle, France is now engaged in a profound reorganization of its political institutions and is attempting to resolve the Algerian problem.¹ We rate his chances as somewhat better than even of surmounting the present crisis in France and thus preserving a republican form of government. If de Gaulle should fail, his most probable successor would be an authoritarian regime of the right, and there would be a prolonged period of serious unrest and possible civil strife with far-reaching consequences for France’s position in Europe and NATO. (Paras. 19–24)

4. One of Western Europe’s most difficult problems is its adjustment to the decline of its authority and influence in less developed areas. This process, in addition to creating serious economic problems, confronts Europe with difficult political decisions concerning the remaining colonies. Many European leaders are seeking to develop new relationships with remaining colonial territories and other less developed areas in order to save some of their political and cultural influence and to secure sources of raw materials and export markets. However, the European colonial powers will make every effort to retain political control of certain overseas territories, a course which will almost certainly have adverse effects on their relations with the Afro-Asian world and will probably produce strains within the Western alliance. (Paras. 23–25)

5. In the past decade, Europe has made marked progress toward greater unity, especially among the “Six”—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—which ratified the Common Market and EURATOM treaties in 1957. Although we believe that Europe will continue to advance cautiously toward wider use of integrated institutions, there are difficult problems that must be overcome, including those of coordinating economic policy among countries that have relaxed restrictions on trade and of establishing satisfactory relations between the “Six” and the other eleven OEEC countries. The negotiations for a Free Trade Area pose a difficult immediate problem. We believe that the momentum toward integration will be sufficient eventually to overcome these problems and to avert any danger of a serious split in Europe. However, the next few years will probably see a period of consolidation rather than the creation of new major supra-national institutions. (Paras. 27–31)

6. Many European leaders, while not questioning the need for NATO and for continued close relations with the US, have become concerned about their dependence on the US. To many the national or regional development of advanced weapons systems appears the only practicable way to achieve a greater degree of independent military power. The UK, with its thermonuclear weapons, is well along this path; we believe France will start by testing its first fission weapon by late 1958 or early 1959 and that unless a substantial disarmament agreement is reached West Germany and other NATO powers will in due course follow suit, either on a concerted basis or unilaterally.² US transfer of nuclear weapons to integrated NATO control might for some time avert the initiation of separate European nuclear weapons programs other than that of the UK and a limited French program. (Paras. 33, 37, 38, 43, 46, 47)

7. Western European leaders remain convinced of Soviet hostility to the West and are therefore determined to maintain collective military power adequate to restrain the USSR from aggression. Nevertheless they believe that their best hope of survival is to explore fully every opportunity for relaxing tensions. Thus Western European security policies will be tied to the progress of East-West negotiations, even though none of the European governments expect that negotiations will in the short run arrive at any acceptable basis for disengagement or general disarmament. The German problem remains crucial to any long range settlement in Europe. (Paras. 49, 50, 55, 56)

8. We believe that over the next ten years the general trend of Western European efforts will be toward the further reduction of national barriers to collective action and toward a more independent role in world politics. A trend toward a stronger, more self-reliant Europe will tend to alter the relationships within the North Atlantic Alliance. Increased European unity would strengthen the overall position of the West. At the same time it would encourage the development of a political “third force” which would seek more energetically than either of the great powers to establish the means and modes of coexistence. Nevertheless, we believe that the essential concept of an Atlantic Community based on close ties between the US and Western Europe will probably remain unimpaired. (Paras. 63, 64)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that NIE 20–58 was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on July 29. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Representative to the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. Not printed are the cover sheet, the table of contents, and a 12-page “Discussion” section.
1. See SNIE 71–58, “France and North Africa,” dated 29 July 1958, for a discussion of the Algerian problem. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. See NIE 100–2–58: “Development of Nuclear Capabilities for Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences,” dated 1 July 1958, for a further discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]