296. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Proposed Withdrawal of Army Forces from Iceland
PARTICIPANTS
- Department of State
- Hon. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Hon. John Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to Iceland
- Ivan White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, European Affairs
- Robert Brandin, Officer in Charge, Northern European Affairs
- Theodore Long, Special Assistant to Secretary Merchant
- Department of Defense
- Hon. John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA
- General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- Rear Admiral H.A. Renken, Director, Logistics Plans Division, OPNAV
- Colonel Robert Tuttle, Office of Plans, USAF
- Captain H.C. Steele, U.S. Army
- Jonathan D. Stoddart, European Region, ISA
Secretary Irwin opened the conversation with the observation that all participants were thoroughly acquainted with the background on the Department of Defense’s efforts to redeploy Army forces from Iceland. [Page 658] He hoped, therefore, that State and Defense could proceed without undue delay on the current Defense recommendation for the withdrawal of the 1300 Army Battalion Combat Team. Secretary Merchant then set forth the State position on this question. It was expected that the process of Cabinet formation in Iceland would be completed late in November with the creation of a Conservative-Social Democratic coalition Government. On the assumption that such a coalition were formed, the Department of State was, in principle, amenable to the proposed Army withdrawal. Mr. Merchant emphasized, however, that the decision to withdraw should involve a number of carefully coordinated U.S. actions before, during, and subsequent to the initiation of the troop redeployment. Specifically, the U.S. should plan for the closest advance consultation with Iceland, SACLANT, and NATO. Mr. Merchant suggested the establishment of an ad hoc State–Defense Working Group, with USIA participation, to coordinate a program of future U.S. actions which would minimize the impact of the troop withdrawal. In this context the Working Group should consider such questions as dependent housing and other U.S. construction projects, the possible introduction of other defense units, to include anti-aircraft batteries and/or added Air Police. Secretary Merchant reiterated that if the withdrawal were handled improperly the political repercussions in Iceland would be inimical to U.S. interests. He then inquired of General Lemnitzer if there had been any change in the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the strategic importance of Iceland.
In response General Lemnitzer stated that the Army was reluctant to withdraw its forces from any area abroad. Iceland was obviously of strategic importance and the Army’s position was not based on a downgrading of Iceland’s strategic value. However, the Army was up against the hard fact of budget and personnel limitations, particularly the latter. General Lemnitzer emphasized that the spaces saved in Iceland would be applied to increased Army requirements within NATO, [8–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
Ambassador Muccio expressed his concern at the apparent critical attitude of the military toward Icelanders. In his judgment there was no violent anti-U.S. sentiment, barring the Communists, in Iceland. The Ambassador agreed that withdrawal of Army forces, if properly presented, could be accomplished without adverse effect on the U.S. position in Iceland. He suggested that the decision to withdraw be communicated to only a few individuals in the Government. To dispel any impression that the U.S. was abandoning Iceland these individuals should also he apprised of future U.S. programs in Iceland. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary Irwin indicated that the Air Force and Navy had tentative plans to increase personnel in Iceland to a level which would generally [Page 659] compensate for the Army reduction. He also pointed out that prompt action on the withdrawal would permit savings in the Military Construction Program as the Navy could suspend some programmed construction activity by taking over facilities vacated by the Army. At Secretary Irwin’s request, Mr. Stoddart pointed out that the Navy was prepared to suspend construction on a Navy enlisted barracks, programmed in FY 59, and one of three BOQ’s programmed in FY 60, at a savings of approximately $3 million. Admiral Renken amplified on the savings that could accrue from suspending construction for a power plant and warehouse storage facilities. He added that as a planning figure only, the Navy had a current requirement for 1000 added personnel in Iceland by 1 July 1961.
In response to a question by Secretary Merchant on the timing of the Army withdrawal General Lemnitzer stated that the Army would prefer to initiate action as soon as possible. However, he would not insist on a crash decision on the removal and proposed the phase out be effected in the period between 1 January and 30 June 1960.
Secretary Merchant again emphasized the need to work out a coordinated withdrawal schedule and referred again to the creation of an inter-Departmental Working Group for this purpose. Secretary Irwin stated that Mr. Stoddart and a representative from the Army would be prepared to represent Defense on the Working Group. Mr. White designated Mr. Brandin as State’s representative and indicated that someone from USIA would be subsequently added to the group.
Secretary Merchant added that State would request another look at the proposed Army withdrawal if Progressives and/or Communists participated in the new Icelandic Government. This position was based on the possibility that the Army withdrawal might provide the rationale to either of these parties to demand a termination of the Base Agreement.
Secretary Irwin pointed out the possibility of a reduction of Air personnel in Iceland at some later date. He also stated that Icelandic acceptance of NATO’s proposed infrastructure program in Iceland, particularly POL and ammunition storage facilities, would be of mutual benefit to Iceland and the United States. This point generated some discussion on the current status of infrastructure in Iceland. The meeting concluded with Secretary Irwin’s suggestion that the Working Group, in developing its recommended actions to minimize the effects of the Army withdrawal, consider means to expedite the infrastructure program.
Assistant, Northern and Western Europe
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files, Country Files, Iceland. Secret. Drafted by Stoddart. The meeting was held at the Department of State.↩