4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0
2585. Eyes only Bruce from Secretary. Eyes only Houghton and Murphy. Embtel 2988.1 I have read with interest and considerable concern contents above tel transmitting views which Chancellor made point of passing to you on his discussion with Pineau re North Africa. As it not clear Chancellor has given full consideration to serious implications of direction in which North African developments seem inevitably leading I hope you may find early convenient opportunity to talk personally and confidentially to him along following lines:
Chancellor should know this problem greatly preoccupies President and me. Present French policies particularly in Algeria give no indication of bringing about solution in North Africa and seem destined to lead to spreading fighting throughout that area with Arab world from Morocco to the Persian Gulf supporting anti-French position and accepting moral, economic and military assistance from the Soviet Bloc.
Military means have not succeeded in bringing about solution and it seems most unlikely that they will succeed given the likely spreading and intensification of the conflict. The Loi-Cadre2 has not, so far as we can judge, gained any considerable support from Moslem population nor is it capable of being implemented so long as hostilities continue. There is in short no French military solution in sight after three and a half years of very considerable French effort in men and resources.
Eventually, and perhaps at a not distant date, the French will become so exhausted and wearied that they will give up the struggle, as they did in Indochina. The recent financial support3 largely given by our two countries cannot, as far as the United States is concerned, be [Page 5] repeated. Indeed, if the bombing attack on Sikiet Sidi Youssef had occurred a few days before, instead of a few days after, our financial arrangement was finalized, the attitude of the American people and the Congress would have made that step politically impracticable.
If the French exhaustion occurs, there may be a government in France which depends upon Communist support and it may be disposed not only to allow North Africa to come under Communist domination but to be negative toward NATO and the organizations for Western European unity which have been so significant a part of the Chancellor’s policies for the Federal Republic and for Western Europe. All of his great conceptions and statesmanship in these respects will, we fear, be put in jeopardy. Recall that EDC received its death blow from the left wing government that liquidated the Indo China war.
Quite apart from whether such a government would continue in NATO, the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, EURATOM, etc., it is not easy to see how Western Europe can grow more strong and vigorous over a long term without close and friendly association with Africa and the great actual and potential natural resources of this developing continent.
What to do is a difficult and delicate problem. Any concerted pressure from without would be resented. Also, unhappily, the French Constitution and fragmentation of political parties are such that it is difficult for any government to stay in power unless it adopts rather nationalistic foreign policies.
I would be interested in knowing if the Chancellor shares our concern as outlined above and would be glad to receive on a confidential basis an expression of his views. We fear that the time which remains for constructive action is rather short, and the “good offices” mission may be unable to tide over the immediate crisis between France and Tunisia.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.51S/4–258. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jandrey and approved by Dulles. Repeated to Paris.↩
- In telegram 2988 from Bonn, March 29, Bruce summarized what Albert H. van Scherpenberg, State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, told him, at Adenauer’s instruction, about Pineau’s talks with German officials in Bonn on March 29. Bruce stated that Adenauer was convinced that North Africa had to be held at all costs against Communist designs upon it, and that further patience was necessary on the part of France’s allies. Bruce concluded that veiled remarks by van Scherpenberg, not included in Adenauer’s message, indicated that Germans thought any American intervention in the Algerian affair would be dangerous and unproductive. (Ibid., 651.62A/3–2958)↩
- The loi-cadre was the draft law that reorganized Algeria into eight new departments and aimed at a political solution to Algeria’s relationship with France that was a mixture of federalism and partition. It was passed by the French legislature on January 31, 1958, but never implemented.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 1.↩