382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State at Geneva0

Tocah 93. Following message for the Secretary from the President.

“June 10, 1959

Dear Chris:

Yesterday was one of my busiest days, starting at seven and, without respite, ending at 11:30 as I arrived back at the White House from Atlantic City. Because of my preoccupations I could not personally answer your cable asking for certain decisions,1 and I suggested to Dillon, after a personal conference with him, that he do so on my behalf. I am sure that he reflected my views accurately.

Of course we stand firm on the conclusion that I cannot attend any so-called Summit meeting unless there is sufficient progress in your present meeting to give some hope of accomplishment at the projected later meeting. I continue to believe that it would be not only a mistake but a great disservice to the world to go to a Summit meeting that would be barren of promise.

In this connection I suggested to Dillon that you might find it useful to remind your colleagues at the Conference that the United States does not send her Secretary of State to an international conference to act as an errand boy. Consequently, from our viewpoint, there is no validity to any argument that a Summit meeting would be certain to bring about some beneficial results, while a Foreign Ministers meeting would be certain to show complete failure. Within the limits of policy approved by the President, the Secretary of State has considerable latitude as to tactics and substantive detail. Incidentally, this demand for so-called Summit talks is a rather modern development. The history of the meetings that have been held does not impress me as presenting a record of brilliant accomplishments.

With respect to the matter of assurances on our rights and responsibilities in Berlin, I have little concern as to the manner of its accomplishment so long as there can be no possible mistake of our common understanding, including the understanding of all other governments.

I rather concur in the thought that a recess might be a better tactical move than complete cessation of the meeting. If, of course, there were some unexpected break and some clear and definite progress should be [Page 877] accomplished, then the entire situation would be changed. The present outlook for such accomplishment seems to be indeed dim.

I cannot tell you how pleased I am with the obvious skill with which you have conducted these difficult negotiations on the part of our government. Your combination of firmness and correct deportment and conciliatory attitude is commanding the respect of all thoughtful readers.

With warm regard,

Sincerely, DE”

Henderson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–1059. Secret. Drafted at the White House.
  2. See Document 378.