Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

124. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/25

Washington, April 13, 1960, 3 p.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

SUBJECT

• Foreign Ministers Meeting on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Additional Attendees Listed at Tab A¹
• U.S.
  • Secretary Herter
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Farley
• Canada
  • Secretary Green
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Ambassador Heeney
• Italy
  • Foreign Minister Segni
  • Ambassador Brosio
  • Ambassador Straneo
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Mr. Lucet
• U.K.
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Mr. Hainworth

Secretary Herter extended a welcome to the group and expressed the hope that today’s discussion would be worthwhile. He said that the agenda for the meeting was a nebulous one. We hoped to discuss the progress made to date at Geneva, to concert our assessment of the existing situation and discuss the moves we might make between now and the Summit. He assumed that all delegations had available the Five Power report² prepared by our Geneva delegations and that this could serve as the basis for the discussion. The first point to note was the sharp difference of opinion between the East and West on the manner of proceeding in negotiations. The Soviets were sticking so far on the need to agree on general principles³ at the outset. The Allies on the other hand consistently stressed the need to agree on first measures which could constitute a real beginning toward the ultimate goal. The Western powers have resisted seeking agreement on general principles which could be differently interpreted by the two sides since this would not represent any meaningful advance. We continue to hold that our plan represented the most practical approach, although we were willing to discuss any proposals presented. The Soviets have recently made a switch in tactics in suggesting adoption of the UN resolution⁴ as a basis for discussion: this is curious in view of the last paragraph of this resolution which speaks of agreement on specific measures toward the goal of complete and general disarmament. He felt that our own approach was precisely in accord with this paragraph. He suggested that we now discuss the position we had reached and any difference of opinion we might have on the assessment.

Mr. Couve de Murville agreed that our problem was to discuss whether we should seek among ourselves to redefine our general goals or to stick with the position we had taken until now. He had begun to wonder how we should orient the discussion in Geneva in the future. He himself agreed that all we could really hope to do is to define certain concrete practical steps which we can take now. We had not yet succeeded in making clear our own program of action and he hoped that the session today would result in some clarification of our ideas.

[2 paragraphs (1/2 page of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Lloyd said that four points had arisen in the discussion so far: (1) The wisdom of trying to put forward a Western counter-statement of principles; (2) Whether we should continue to concentrate attention on specific agreements which could be reached; (3) The suggestion that Hammarskjöld be invited to Geneva; and (4) What could the Summit accomplish on disarmament. He said that the British Delegation had prepared a paper relevant to the first two points. He felt strongly that we must not remain at a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We needed to introduce a reply to the Soviet paper on general principles. His own inclination was to put forward a statement which would deal both with general objectives and the specific matters on which we proposed immediate discussion. Secretary Herter said that the U.S. had been thinking along similar lines and had sent this morning to Geneva a proposed counter-statement of our own for comment by our delegation. (Tab B) Mr. Lloyd read the U.K. suggestion (Tab C). Secretary Herter said that this statement runs extraordinarily close to the one we ourselves had prepared. Regarding the suggestion of inviting the Secretary General, he agreed with the Italian view. He felt that it would only lead to confusion if the Secretary General addressed the meetings before the recess. He had been in touch with the Secretary General and was aware of his preoccupations. The U.S. side had been doing some work on this question and hoped to have a working paper that could be distributed to the other participants before the Istanbul meeting. He felt it was undesirable, however, to raise this matter in the negotiations at this time since it would make it more difficult for us to focus on the key issues we wished to highlight. He doubted that the Secretary General would be willing to discuss anything other than the general question of relationship between the IDO and the UN and it would not be productive to raise this matter in the negotiations now. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

M. Couve de Murville said that he felt the U.K. draft was a good one in principle. It placed emphasis on the practical steps on which agreement could now be reached. Although he did not feel that the Soviets were making a great impression on public opinion with their plan, he felt that we ourselves should pay more attention to this aspect. He approved of the first paragraph in the British paper as a simple, straight-forward and readily understandable statement of the Western objectives. He did not wish to get into a detailed discussion of the remainder of the paper and suggested that it should be turned over to the delegations in Geneva for study and advice. He felt that it was desirable to aim for a Western proposal which could be put forward at the Summit on certain specific measures which could be carried out immediately. He suggested that we obtain the views of the Geneva delegations on this matter as well. He did not feel capable of engaging in a detailed discussion of this matter and wished only to stress French emphasis on nuclear disarmament. We could not very well omit proposals on control of nuclear weapons from the first steps. He noted that this took a secondary place in the British paper.

Sig. Segni said that he accepted the proposal of Mr. Lloyd that a Western draft be developed. However, its text should be carefully worked out and studied. He also agreed that we should attempt at the Summit to reach some kind of detailed agreement and not just agreement on principles.

Secretary Herter agreed that the U.K. draft should be sent to Geneva for study by the delegations at once. He felt we should make every effort to get an agreed Western counter-statement before the recess. At the same time, we should press the Soviets on their indications of flexibility so that we could do as Italy suggested at the Summit. He thought that the British draft should be studied together with the U.S. draft which he said he would circulate at the present session. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Herter recalled Khrushchev’s statement at the UN about partial measures.⁵ He was convinced that the Russians know as well as we do that our approach is the more practical one. He felt that it was still possible that they would change their tactics before the recess. Mr. Lloyd said that he felt there was agreement that we should attempt to develop a Western counter-statement for tabling before the recess and that we would proceed to get the advice of our experts in Geneva on the contents of such a statement as well as on the specifics we might propose at the Summit. M. Couve de Murville said that he had received a proposed text from Moch of a similar statement which they would make available to the others as soon as possible.

Secretary Herter said that we would want to consider at the Istanbul meeting exactly what we should do at the Summit, in the light of whatever progress we are able to make in Geneva between now and then. Sig. Segni said that he would like to have another meeting of the five Foreign Ministers just before the Summit to consider the specific proposals which might be put forward there. If this were discussed at Istanbul, the danger of press leaks would be great. Therefore, he favored postponing final decisions until the last possible moment. Secretary Herter thought that this suggestion had merit but that the matter should be decided at Istanbul rather than now. He agreed that there was a great danger of any decisions worked out so far in advance becoming public property.

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Herter said he continued to doubt that this would serve a useful purpose. He said he wished to digress for a moment on a rather discouraging aspect of the arms control problem which had occurred to him in connection with the French emphasis on control of delivery systems. He said that he had consulted an experienced American Army engineering officer on the possibility of concealing as many as a hundred missiles in violation of an arms agreement. The officer had advised him that he could guarantee concealment and that the only risk he would run of detection would be if there were an informer. He felt that problems like this emphasized the need for an international body with sufficient strength of its own to make cheating on the part of a would-be violator unprofitable. Thus he felt that our stress on the need for peacekeeping institutions in the context of total disarmament was sound and must be maintained. Recapitulating the discussion so far, he said that it appeared to be agreed that we would instruct our delegations to develop a paper for tabling before the Summit so that the Russians would not have the last word. In response to Mr. Green’s suggestion that we concentrate on working out limited areas of possible agreement, Secretary Herter said that he felt that this had been our approach all along and that it continued to be a sound one.

Referring again to the question of the Secretary General, Mr. Lloyd said that he had discussed the problem in general terms with Hammarskjold last Sunday. The Secretary General was going to Geneva to the Law of the Sea Conference⁶ and had said that he would like to sit in on a session of the Ten Nation Committee. He had made no mention, however, of making a statement. Hammarskjold had said that it would be dangerous if the IDO developed without any connection with the UN. His own preference was for a close connection. However, all he wanted was assurance that the two bodies would not be completely independent. Lloyd had assured him that we foresaw that the IDO would be established “within the UN framework”. He had said frankly that he did not feel that we could agree on a specific subordinate relationship to the Security Council in view of the Soviet veto or to the General Assembly as presently constituted, where a two-thirds vote is required. This could be a matter of life and death and we could not submit to the arbitration of these bodies. It was clear that Hammarskjold had not thought the problem out himself and he had little to say about Lloyd’s observation. He felt, however, that Mr. Green had a sound fundamental point— that we must not let the Soviets get away with posing as champions of the UN.

Secretary Herter asked whether there were any other matters which ought to be discussed. The present group was to meet again Sunday, May 1, in Istanbul, and would have another report from the delegations in Geneva at that time. Mr. Lloyd raised the question of a press line. Secretary Herter read a suggested draft prepared by the Canadians. After an exchange of views, a statement was agreed on the basis of the Canadian draft (Tab D).⁷

Tab B⁸

DRAFT FIVE-POWER PAPER ON DISARMAMENT

The Five Western Powers,

Believing that measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time,

Believing that the Ten-Nation Committee should, through mutual consultations, explore avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitations and reduction of all types of arms and armed forces as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations,

Propose that early agreement be reached on the implementation of the following measures under appropriate international control:

(1) Prohibition against placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, as an initial step toward insuring the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only;

(2) Prior notification of proposed launching of missiles as an immediate step to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation;

(3) Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses, in order to halt the further increase and to begin the reduction of present stocks of nuclear weapons as an initial step toward the final elimination of these weapons;

(4) Establishment of initial force level ceilings of 2.5 million for the US and USSR, and of force level ceilings for all militarily-significant nations to go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of further force level ceilings of 2.1 million for the US and USSR, as an initial step toward the reduction of national arms forces to levels required for internal security and the fulfillment of UN charter obligations;

(5) Deposit of agreed quantities and types of modern armaments in internationally-supervised storage depots, as an initial step toward the final reduction of armaments to the level required for international security and the fulfillment of UN charter obligations;

(6) Establishment of appropriate measures to give participating states greater protection against surprise attack, as an initial step toward the achievement of an open world in which all nations are safeguarded against surprise attack.

Tab C⁹

DISARMAMENT “PRINCIPLES” TO BE PUT FORWARD BY THE WESTERN POWERS AT THE SUMMIT

1. The final goal is general and complete international disarmament, covering all States and all types of forces and weapons, to the levels required by internal security and fulfillment of obligations under the United Nations Charter; and the maintenance, by international machinery, of international law and order in a disarmed world.

2. The disarmament process must:

(a) be balanced and comprehensive so that no country or group of countries obtains, at any stage, a significant military advantage;

(b) give equal security to all; so that international confidence is progressively increased;

(c) be effectively controlled throughout, to ensure that disarmament obligations are carried out and that there is no evasion.

For the carrying out of this process thorough preparatory work is required, and international control machinery must be established to function as disarmament measures are put into force.

3. For obvious practical reasons disarmament must take place by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible; but no fixed timetable for the whole process can be laid down in advance.

4. Immediate detailed consideration should be given to:

(a) reductions of the armed forces and armaments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and certain other States, together with the associated measures of control, to which the States represented on the 10-Nation Committee might agree at once, pending the negotiation of general disarmament measures affecting other States;

(b) the establishment of a ban, with appropriate controls, on the stationing of weapons in orbit or in outer space.

5. Preparations for the further measures of disarmament should also begin immediately. Special attention should be paid to the particular problems of agreeing upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the transfer, under control, of fissionable material from military to peaceful uses, and to the control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Consideration should be given, in addition, to interim measures to give States better protection against surprise attack and increase international confidence during the early stages of general disarmament.

6. The disarmament process must be started as soon as possible, in order to build up international confidence, and provide experience of the technical and practical problems of international disarmament and control.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1360. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers, initialed by Merchant, and approved in M on April 16 and S on April 21. The conversation took place in the Conference Suite at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue.
1. Not printed.
2. Document 112.
3. For text of the Soviet proposal on the principles for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on April 8, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 79–80.
4. For text of the U.N. resolution of November 20, 1959, on general and complete disarmament, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 1281.
5. For text of Khrushchev’s speech to the United Nations on September 18, 1959, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1452–1460.
6. Reference is to the Law of the Sea Conference March 17–April 26, 1960.
7. Not printed. For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 400.
8. confidential.
9. Confidential.