140. Memorandum of Conversation0
NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Istanbul, May 2–4, 1960
participants
- United States
- The Secretary
- Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
- United Kingdom
- Selwyn Lloyd
- Sir Anthony Rumbold
- France
- Couve de Murville
- M. Lucet
- Federal Republic of Germany
- Heinrich von Brentano
- Karl Carstens
SUBJECT
- Summit Purposes and Tactics
At Dr. von Brendan’s request, the four Foreign Ministers met with one adviser each (as above) in restricted session.
Dr. Von Brentano opened the discussion by saying that he had discussed with Chancellor Adenauer the paper entitled, “Our Summit Purposes”1 which Secretary Herter had sent privately to him, Selwyn Lloyd, and Couve de Murville about ten days ago. He said that this paper in certain respects had disturbed the Chancellor and himself. He said further that he agreed with the general introduction but felt that in two respects the paper disregarded the agreed conclusions of the Four Power Working Group.2
Dr. Von Brentano continued that his first point related to paragraphs 6 and 7. The Chancellor was concerned over the use of the phrase “to preserve the existing situation in Berlin for a period of time.” He felt that any interim agreement was dangerous unless it was explicitly stated that the period would run until the reunification of Germany. Dr. Von Brentano said that his second point related to paragraph 8 and the reference to using as a deterrent against Khrushchev taking a harsh line on Berlin a statement of our unwillingness to continue discussions on disarmament or otherwise consider that an atmosphere of détente was developing. He thought this was an inadequate deterrent to face Khrushchev with if he expressed his determination to take action to void our rights in Berlin or otherwise impair our position.
Dr. Von Brentano said that he had prepared a letter on these points3 to the Secretary which he hoped to have delivered today with carbon copies to Couve de Murville and Selwyn Lloyd.
The Secretary replied that on the first point he hoped that it would be possible for the four Ministers to discuss in the meeting today4 the very important question of the period which might be considered for a temporary arrangement on Berlin. This related to the question of what we regard as the best outcome of the Summit if Khrushchev presses us on Berlin. Should we seek to defer the matter to further negotiations at a lower level or should we seek agreement on a specific directive from the Heads of Government?
The Secretary said on the second point he thought there was a misunderstanding on the part of the Germans. Our paper only intended to [Page 361] say that, as a matter of tactics at the Summit, if in those discussions Khrushchev attempts to declare that our rights are invalid our reaction should be that under these circumstances it would be ridiculous to hold a discussion of disarmament at the Summit. This is a different matter from the question of our contingency planning which contemplates the use of force to maintain our position if the Soviets actually physically move against us in West Berlin.
Dr. Von Brentano agreed that the question of an interim agreement should be further discussed in the larger meeting to follow the present restricted meeting. He said that he believed all four agreed that an interim agreement was acceptable, along the lines of the July 28 Geneva proposal with some improvement, but that it was likewise recognized that the setting of any time limit for it short of enduring until reunification of Germany was very dangerous.
Mr. Lloyd said that he had not thought the U.S. paper on Summit purposes in any way altered the quadripartite paper on tactics which had been agreed on in Washington5 from which he then read relevant passages to which Von Brentano nodded agreement. Mr. Lloyd then noted that he understood the North Atlantic Council would be interested in discussing this question of an interim agreement.
The Secretary observed that Couve de Murville would recall that at the White House meeting with General de Gaulle6 it had been agreed that all subjects discussed at the Summit would be inter-locking and that there would be no agreement on any single item until the results of all the discussions were available for incorporation in a comprehensive communiqué.
Dr. Von Brentano then said that, if all agreed that the tactics paper still stood unmodified, then his fears on our Summit purposes paper disappeared.
This was confirmed, with the Secretary noting that our Summit purposes paper had been drafted several weeks ago primarily with a view to placing a positive cast on our approach to the Summit.
Couve de Murville then reverted to Dr. Von Brentano’s second point. He said that he had never assumed that direct action by Khrushchev against West Berlin would result only in our saying that “this spoils the detente.” (All agreed.)
Couve de Murville said that, on von Brendan’s first point, at Geneva the four Western Powers had agreed to the proposal of July 28 which was contemplated for a stated period of years provided that at the end of the period our rights remained unaffected. He asked if Dr. [Page 362] Von Brentano was now proposing that we could only agree to an interim agreement provided it lasted until the reunification of Germany.
Dr. Von Brentano said that it was theoretically possible to accept an interim arrangement for West Berlin for a stated period of years provided at the end of the period the status quo as to rights prevailed.
Mr. Lloyd noted that the Working Group supplemental report7 touched on this point and provided that our rights must remain unchanged at the end of the period.
The Secretary then suggested the use of the word “interim” in connection with an arrangement for Berlin was a bad one. “Temporary” might be better.
Mr. Couve de Murville suggested that we use the term “arrangement” to which all agreed.
Dr. Von Brentano then said he had one more question. He wanted to know if it was still intended as had been discussed at the Western Summit meeting in December to hold another Four Power Western Summit meeting in Paris in May.
M. Couve de Murville responded that this had been discussed in Washington and the thought was that, since the President will only arrive in Paris on the morning of May 15, it would be best to hold such a Four Power Western Summit meeting early in the afternoon of the 15th. He asked if this was generally agreeable. Mr. Lloyd confirmed that it would be, as did Dr. Von Brentano.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved in S on May 2. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 47 from Istanbul, May 1 at 11 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–160) The conversation took place at the German Consulate General.↩
- Document 133.↩
- See Document 111.↩
- A translation of this May 1 letter was transmitted to the Department of State in an unnumbered Secto airgram on May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–360)↩
- See Document 141.↩
- See Document 115.↩
- See Document 137.↩
- The Supplementary Working Group Report, dated April 21, included a 3-paragraph cover sheet, and drafts on 1) Possible Improvements in Western Proposals of July 28, 1959; 2) a Draft Directive and Declaration; 3) Essential Conditions for an Arrangement for West Berlin; 4) Solution “C”: London Working Group Report; and 5) Proposal for Reunification of Berlin. (Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany)↩