44. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Coming Summit Talks
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Sol Rae, Canadian Chargé d’Affaires
- Mr. J.S. Nutt, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. Foy D. Kohler, BNA
- Mr. K.A. Byrns, BNA
The Canadians asked that Mr. Kohler fill them in on the preparations for the summit meeting.
Mr. Kohler said that we were a little unhappy about the reports from the other Western nations that they are not being consulted about what is going on in connection with the coming summit meeting. We seek to allay this feeling. We are most anxious to consult, but at the moment there is little to consult about. The Secretary has had one meeting with the Ambassadors of the other three countries1 (the “Steering Group”), but actually they have not as yet got their teeth into the subject. The discussions have been mostly procedural. After a comparison of schedules, it has become apparent that there are only two dates suitable for a summit meeting. The first one of these would be in the middle of April, which in a way is unfortunate, as April 17, Easter, falls in this period. As far as this date is concerned, the best that can be figured out is for the Foreign Ministers to spend a long Easter week-end in Paris, finalizing the preparations for the summit meeting. The final session of the NATO Council will probably then fall on April 18 or 19, and then, adding one day for consultation of the heads of the Western governments, the summit meeting with Russia would start about April 20–21. This makes a tight schedule for the President, as he must be back in Washington on April 27 to meet the King of Nepal.
Mr. Kohler said that the other possible date for a meeting would be sometime in the first half of May. We think this is too close to the President’s visit to Russia. We believe there should be a more “decent” interval between the summit meeting, and the President’s visit, so probably April is a firm date.
We do not want to repeat the Geneva type of discussion, and we therefore plan to leave West Germany out, which she is willing to accept [Page 116] in order to keep out the East Germans, and of course it depends on the plans of the other side, the USSR.
The setting of the date for the summit meeting gave us a problem, too, because deGaulle was supposed to come here in April. We suggested to him that he come earlier. He said, however, that this would be inconvenient, but that it would be entirely satisfactory to him to come at some much later time.
The U.S. concept of the summit is that it would be almost an agendaless meeting. The British share our view. The French are more formalistic, but have no instructions. This type of meeting would require some very simple formula, like saying that the four heads of government will meet to find solutions to problems. It is natural that Berlin and Germany should be an agenda item. Germany has wanted to soft-pedal this, saying this item should be secondary, but Khrushchev is coming to the meeting to push for a peace treaty. This answers the German question and means that the Berlin and German item will certainly be on the agenda. If Khrushchev comes with the Russian peace proposals, this automatically means that we come forward with ours also, and this in turn automatically puts Berlin and Germany on the agenda. Essentially, this does not require any preparation to speak of. We have been through this for months and, although it will be necessary to review our position, it is doubtful that there will be much change. It is premature to make this review at this time, and almost impossible to prepare a fall-back position, because as soon as a fall-back position is prepared it leaks, and thereupon immediately becomes no longer a fall-back position.
Mr. Kohler continued by saying that a tough question to place on the agenda for the summit discussions is disarmament. It has been our concept that the summit might be our kick-off place for this topic, but there would not be enough time at the summit to get far with it, as it is a very complex subject. After agreeing in principle with our allies, we would table our own disarmament proposals. These should be broad and profound and discuss the general principles. Delay in the summit date beyond that originally envisioned has raised a question in connection with disarmament. We cannot start working in the Ten-Power Group until the middle of March. It will be quite a hassle to get the U.S. position between AEC, Defense, and State, and then for us to get a position with the other countries will also be difficult. We do not see how this could be accomplished before March 17, but that of course is a month before the summit date. We do not know, however, whether to go ahead with the Ten-Power Group or postpone until May. Moch2 of [Page 117] France wants to go ahead. The Italians do also. Italy probably does not want the disarmament subject to go to the summit where she will not be present. The British felt at first pressure to go ahead, but as yet they have no instructions. We are a little torn about the question of going ahead or delaying, as we think the discussions coming shortly on the heels of or at the same time as the summit meeting put us in the peculiar position of talking disarmament in two places at one time. Mr. Kohler said we would welcome the Canadians’ views.
Mr. Rae replied that as far as Canada’s position is concerned, they would like to give it a bit of thought. If you leave the meeting over until after the summit, until May, that is pretty late.
Mr. Kohler said there is also the psychological aspect. You open up your Ten-Power disarmament discussions with the U.S. submitting broad proposals and then turn around and go to the summit and the Ten-Power Group has already stolen the thunder. We don’t want to scoop the summit. The French have thought of two possible agenda items—non-interference in internal affairs and aid to underdeveloped countries. The French have no instructions on their position. The big problem, however, is the relationship of the disarmament group to the summit group.
Mr. Rae said that there seems to him to still be a need for having consultations. Canada hopes that there will be a stage where the Western summit powers will be still formulating their problems and where Canada and the other NATO countries could step in early enough to be of some help, and also to get the pattern of their thinking. It would be helpful if Canada and the others could come in at an early stage. Mr. Kohler assured him that it is our firm intention before we go to the summit to get the ideas of Canada and the other Western nations.
Mr. Rae said maybe the countries have read more into the meeting of the “Steering Group” than there really is. Mr. Kohler agreed with this, saying that the fact is we have loads of time. The December 19 date is not of much importance now, as it was thought that the summit meeting would be in the latter part of February, but now that it is moved back to April we have sufficient time. Mr. Rae believed that even so, it would be helpful for the Council to get some ideas of our thinking.
Mr. Kohler agreed that the U.S. would feed anything meaningful into the Council. However, we believe that there will be nothing much of substance. We see the results of the four-power discussions as being merely one paper containing (1) procedure, (2) broad analysis of the Soviet intentions, (3) the Berlin and German problem (about which positions have already been prepared), and (4) disarmament.
Mr. Rae asked if Mr. Kohler could say that there is no real change in position on the Berlin and West German problem and Mr. Kohler said [Page 118] that there was no change. We would table our proposals as a counter to Khrushchev’s peace proposal. In fact, the four powers have not reviewed the Berlin and German proposals, and see no need to do so. We think, however, that the disarmament talks may lead to some more refined proposals which could be woven into the Western peace plan, but we can do this by December 19. Mr. Rae asked if the North Atlantic Council could do anything to help. Mr. Kohler said probably not. Britain is now re-examining disarmament proposals. We have the Coolidge group. We hope there is still reliance on our 1957 proposals. Perhaps we could sort of back into this problem by having NATO examine and discuss the Khrushchev proposals, but there is little that can be done. Mr. Rae said his Government thought one of the problems that could be dealt with profitably in the North Atlantic Council would be the nature and scope of the summit meeting. Mr. Kohler said we have gone about as far as we can go at present, as the French lack instructions. We are becalmed. Mr. Rae then asked whether the North Atlantic Council could not add the summit conference as one of the items for its agenda. Mr. Kohler agreed that the Council could.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/11–2759. Secret. Drafted by Byrns and initialed by Kohler.↩
- See Document 40.↩
- Jules Moch, French Representative at the U.N. Ten-Nation Disarmament Commission.↩