Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

97. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 17, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Norstad Plan

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 96.]

During a conversation also dealing with other subjects covered in a separate memorandum,¹ Von Brentano raised the question of an inspection zone or zones which the President had discussed with the Chancellor at lunch on Tuesday.²Von Brentano said that he had been briefed on the 1957 disarmament discussions, and as he understood it there were four proposals under consideration relating to inspection zones: (a) the US had said it would be prepared, if the Soviet Union were willing to permit inspection in its own territory, to permit similar inspection in the US and Canada; (b) if this were not acceptable to the Soviets, then the US was prepared to set aside certain less extensive areas of the US, Alaska and the Soviet Union, for the same purpose; (c) a similar zone of inspection might be set aside in Europe stretching to the Urals and including all of Western Europe; (d) possibly a more limited zone of inspection in Western Europe could be discussed. A specific proposal on this was never actually made at the conference, but it had been thought that this might include an area within the longitude parallels 5°–35°.

As to the last of the foregoing proposals, Von Brentano continued, he was not competent to discuss the technical or military aspects, that is, whether the development of new weapons demanded a revised concept of the appropriate area to be involved. This was a matter for the experts. But other developments since 1957 had been such as to make some other delimitation of area desirable; at least the question should be raised. The doubts of the Federal Government did not proceed from false considerations of prestige, but it had to be said that his Government found the 5°-35° proposal very bad and distasteful. If you cut out a part of Free Europe, principally Germany, then he feared that a psychological development would begin which would nourish the neutralization of Germany. The public would think that an inspection zone proposal was the first step towards this objective. He did not believe it to be compatible with the NATO concept of equality, and it would lead to the disintegration of that organization. If one asked how this could be claimed relative to the introduction of technical measures alone, he could only reply that, if there were some NATO countries with such inspection measures and others without them, this would introduce an unhealthy element of discrimination. It would obviously have an effect on US troop deployment, or at least on the willingness of the US to keep the necessary equipment for its troops within the area. Therefore the Federal Government would strenuously object to such proposals and request that they not be tabled in the disarmament negotiations.

The Secretary said that it was not the intention to table such a proposal in the disarmament negotiations. We wanted to talk with the German authorities first. The President thought that such a proposal might be a test of Soviet good faith as to whether they were really willing to accept inspection. The question of specific areas to be involved could be discussed. The President was thinking of having this subject raised in the Four-Power Working Group and not in the disarmament group. We know, the Secretary continued, that the Federal Republic has always opposed carving out a special area to include the Federal Republic because of fear that it might lead to neutralization. The President was thinking that the Soviets probably would not accept such a proposal but it would be a good gesture, a sort of combination of the open sky proposals of 1955 supplemented by certain aspects of the 1957 proposals.

After noting that the 1957 proposals also envisaged certain measures of ground inspection, Von Brentano observed that such a proposal would set up a dangerous reaction if the area in question turned out to be nearly identical with the Federal Republic. The Soviets would reenter as inspectors. The West should do nothing to encourage neutralization sentiments in the Federal Republic. Any measure which discriminates against any member of the Alliance must also be avoided. These considerations were basic to the reaction of the Chancellor yesterday evening.³ If the Four-Power Working Group wants to consider such a proposal and discuss the pros and cons, this, of course, could be done, but he wanted the Secretary to know the reasons why the Federal Government would not accept such a proposal and would insist on extending the area involved. To speak very frankly, Von Brentano added, we all know that thoughts of this kind and some going even farther are entertained in certain British circles. Such thoughts would find further nourishment in this proposal. He was not speaking of his good friend Selwyn Lloyd, but of certain other British leaders. The Federal Government considered it as highly dangerous to seek to ease tensions through such measures which would lead not to relaxation but rather to heightened tension.

The Secretary commented that relief of tension was not the most important aspect. Our objectives related to surprise attack and the defense of Europe. We had no fixed ideas as to the area to be involved and certainly no discrimination against the Federal Republic was intended. We would like to find out how, from the viewpoint of military judgment, such a proposal would benefit the West. The best man to provide such a judgment would be General Norstad. Von Brentano agreed that it would be a good thing to get his views, since no one else’s views could be more pertinent. The Secretary repeated that we would like to get from General Norstad a military appraisal of the value of such a zone. Von Brentano said that, if such an appraisal were obtained, the military authorities of the Federal Republic would have a basis on which to provide their own comments. The Secretary noted that Norstad would presumably consult fully with them.

Von Brentano observed that the danger is that should the fact of such discussions become public the result would inevitably be dangerous speculation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to avoid leaks in democracies. In his own experience if he had a very secret paper and left it lying open unmarked on his desk no one would be interested. However, if a paper were marked Secret it was bound to leak out. It would be very bad, he reiterated, if it leaked out that such a proposal were being discussed. The Secretary commented that we have a saying that if you want something to leak you should mark it Secret.

This was a matter, he continued, which the President wanted to have discussed, and we ought to move ahead with it quickly. We could see value in such a proposal not in the disarmament conference but possibly at the Summit. It might in this context provide an acid test as to whether the Soviets mean what they are saying.

Mr. Kohler raised the question in connection with procedure whether it would not be better, before discussion in the Four-Power Group, to ask Norstad for his views. This would put us in a better position to consider the matter quadripartitely. Von Brentano agreed. Mr. Merchant commented that certainly Norstad would not recommend anything which would have the effect of weakening NATO. Von Brentano said he would ask General Heusinger for his views. Mr. Kohler suggested that we raise the matter privately with the British and French and, if they likewise agreed, then Norstad could be asked for his views. Von Brentano said that there was no need for formal discussions. When Norstad was asked we could at the same time suggest that he obtain the views of his closest collaborators, i.e., the French, British and Germans. Mr. Kohler noted that this would, of course, all be without any commitment on anyone’s part.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on March 25.
1. Document 96.
2. See Document 90.
3. See Document 94.