Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, June 18, 1958, 1 p.m.

7313. Paris Polto 4233.¹ I agree with reference telegram on desirability advance planning in case proposals now put to Greece and Turkey are not accepted at NAC meeting June 19.

British position at present is as follows:

1. United Kingdom intends to proceed insofar as possible with implementation of Cyprus proposal, regardless of whether Greek and Turkish acceptance obtained.

2. Prime Minister is committed to make statement June 19, and Gaitskell in House June 17 pointedly stated that he expected Prime Minister to do more than merely report on developments in NAC. Essential points in proposal have appeared in local press, and interested governments and public must realize newspaper articles are accurate.

3. United Kingdom remains ready to show considerable flexibility in modifying proposal while retaining essential elements.

4. In his letters to Menderes and Karamanlis, Macmillan said he was prepared to meet with them either separately or together. Menderes in reply agreed to meet either alone with Macmillan or with others. (Embassy telegram 7263).² While Karamanlis has delayed replying to Macmillan, Athens Embassy telegram 3567³ indicates Greeks might agree to separate discussions.

HMG delayed Parliamentary statement June 17 to provide Spaak and allies in NAC opportunity to use influence on Greece and Turkey to obtain their agreement to talks with British proposal “as basis for constructive discussion”. United Kingdom will consider NAC deliberations successful only if language such as that quoted or with similar purport is included in resolution or (less desirable) in consensus summation by Spaak.

Reference telegram appears to envisage, depending upon developments in NAC, necessity for high-level approach to United Kingdom requesting some or all of following:

1. Further postponement of formal announcement of proposal in Parliament.

2. Settling for NAC resolution which would call only for further discussions on Cyprus problem with omission (omission only incidental) reference to British proposal.

3. Holding in abeyance implementation proposal.

I do not believe approach along such lines would be successful or should be tried. There would be greatly increased danger of parliamentary reaction such as Lloyd wrongly predicted would occur June 17. British now have been negotiating for a long time with Greece and Turkey and are convinced that it is not possible to find plan which both willingly would accept. Watered down NAC resolution would amount to little more than GA resolution of February 1957.⁴ In effect it would mean abandonment of all the effort HMG has put into developing its present proposal and starting again on road which United Kingdom believes has no end.

Introduction of new factor, such as offered by United States to become open party to negotiations or by NATO to help seek substantive solution, would alter picture. However, we note press statements that Greek Government, and previously Turkish Government, decline to accept “NATO mediation” on Cyprus issue.

Under circumstances I recommend against asking United Kingdom to postpone again formal announcement of proposal. Instead I suggest urging HMG to make clear in Parliamentary statement that it is prepared to show flexibility in further discussions regarding proposal with Greeks and Turks, separately or together and with or without Cypriot participation.

With respect to NAC, ideal solution of course would be unanimous resolution calling for “constructive discussions” on basis of British proposal. I recognize Greece or Turkey may not accept such a resolution. In this eventuality I recommend against settling for broad, meaningless resolution just for sake of unanimity. Instead, Spaak might sum up results NAC’s efforts without resolution, along following lines:

1. There is unanimous agreement on need for further discussions between three allies directly concerned—United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey—either separately or together and either with or without Cypriot representatives.

2. NAC hopes these negotiations will be undertaken promptly.

3. It is consensus of NAC members not directly involved that United Kingdom proposal should form basis for constructive discussions.

Problem remains of what to say publicly regarding NAC deliberations to avoid indicating one or more members of Alliance isolated. HMG will be pressed on this point in Parliament. Least disadvantageous course might be for United Kingdom to say NAC has recommended further discussions on Cyprus; these will be undertaken; United Kingdom will use its Cyprus proposal as basis for discussion.

Whitney

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1858. Secret; Niact. Received at 11:10 a.m. Transmitted in two sections. Also sent to Paris for USRO and repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and Athens.
1. Polto 4233, June 17, urged that the British Government be encouraged to be flexible in adopting a “frame of reference” for negotiations and recommended seeking further delay in the parliamentary statement on Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–1758)
2. Dated June 16. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–1658)
3. Telegram 3567 was renumbered 3557, Document 234.
4. On February 26, 1957, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1013 (XI) calling for the resumption of negotiations leading to a “just solution” of the Cyprus dispute. For text of this resolution, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L172 (XI).