Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

BeirutJuly 24, 1958—7 p.m.

674. Chamoun requested Under Secretary Murphy and me to call at noon today. Murphy described his recent conversations with leaders of all shades of opinion. Purpose of visit from Chamoun’s point of view was to sound out his latest idea on presidential elections. President said that following Chehab’s social meeting with Holloway’s staff described Embtel 651,² General had spent some hours with him in a frank discussion of what to do next both politically and militarily.

Chamoun explained his thought by saying re all candidates now under discussion as potential presidential timber, they suffered from fundamental risk of not having army support during very delicate days ahead for Lebanon. He had previously urged Chehab to accept presidency under circumstances when Chehab was much more popular than today. Now, however, especially among Christian community, Chehab’s stock had fallen to a new low. On Moslem side also, Chehab’s admission of US landing force had decreased his popularity. Notwithstanding, Chamoun thought Chehab would still be best president for Lebanon because he could insure military support for which another president might have to go begging. Chamoun seemed sincere in stating his concern was for long-range future of Lebanon rather than for immediate local political advantage.

From these considerations President thought only way to rehabilitate Chehab’s reputation was for him promptly to win some military success either in the Basta or in the Chouf. President reverted to idea he had suggested to Admiral Holloway on Monday (Embtel 568)³ for US forces to be deployed near Syrian frontier, thus releasing sufficient troops of Lebanese Army for a decisive action. He proposed an immediate meeting between ourselves, Admiral Holloway and General Chehab to discuss possibilities.

Murphy pointed out we were not canvassing for any particular candidate so long as Lebanon could find itself a president and end its protracted crisis. However, there were persuasive arguments as President had outlined and certainly we would have no objection to Chehab if his number should come up. We had been considerably encouraged by degree of progress made in collaboration between Chehab and his staff with Admiral Holloway and his entourage.

On question of Chehab’s staff, Chamoun said he was well aware of possibility that if Chehab became president he might promote Colonel Salem, present Chief of Staff, to position of Commander-in-Chief. Chamoun’s antidote for this would be to arrange, once Chehab were president-elect, to appoint a completely new Commander-in-Chief with Chehab’s acquiescence, the new commander to clean out old staff and set up more reliable one.

We are not immediately acceding to Chamoun’s suggestion because we wish to try out his proposal on Admiral Holloway. Off-hand our judgment is that following warnings to opposition outlined Embtel 649⁴ and 657,⁵ situation in Basta should be sufficiently quiet for Chehab to be able to deploy forces either to compress Basta or to attack in Chouf. However, on eve of elections we are inclined to doubt political wisdom of latter course. McClintock cannot resist feeling Chamoun wants still that “military victory” for which he has unsuccessfully clamored throughout 21/2 months of civil war.

Subsequently to dictation of foregoing, I have consulted with my French and British colleagues. We agree on following points:

1. It would be a capital mistake to undertake military operation against Jumblat in the Chouf since this is unnecessary from military point of view, would be counter-productive in arousing enmity of Druzes, and in any case is needless since once a new president is elected, we are confident Jumblat will speedily make his peace.

2. Ambassadors feel it is necessary to take measures to neutralize or if necessary reduce the Basta. Yesterday there was a brisk fire fight around British Embassy residence while my French colleague was lunching with my British colleague. Firing did not subside until 6 p.m. We all concur, however, that Chehab has sufficient military resources, backstopped by presence of American forces, to accomplish neutralization of the Basta.

3. British and French Ambassadors concur in Murphy’s idea there is much political benefit to be gained from suspension of military curfew in Beirut. All three Ambassadors feel it would be highly useful if curfew could be lifted on day Parliament meets for presidential elections provided Basta situation has previously been dealt with.

4. All three Ambassadors concur (more in sorrow than in anger) that given list of possible presidential candidates, Chamoun’s analysis is right: That Chehab by and large would be best president in light of unsavory alternatives if he is not chosen. One more argument favoring Chehab is that he alone among candidates would be immune from charge of being imposed on Lebanon by American bayonets.⁶

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2458. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Dated July 24. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Document 207.
4. In telegram 649 from Beirut, July 24, McClintock reported that Murphy had indicated to opposition leader Abdullah Yafi that U.S. military forces in Lebanon were seriously concerned about the security threat posed by insurrectionists in the Basta. McClintock noted that Yafi was visibly shaken when Murphy told him that the destruction of the Basta could be accomplished in a matter of seconds by the forces assembled in Beirut. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2458; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. See footnote 3, Document 227.

6. In telegram 487 to Beirut, July 25, the Department responded as follows:

   • “Our preliminary reactions to this very helpful telegram are as follows:
   • “1. We do not believe US forces should in present circumstances be deployed near Syrian frontier.
   • “2. Agree would be unwise move against Jumblat in present circumstances.
   • “3. Action against Basta should preferably be confined to neutralization.
   • “4. Chehab seems to us acceptable as President if he has reasonably wide backing, and in these circumstances would be willing if necessary help persuade him accept.” (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2458)