Office of the Historian

231. Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of State’s Staff Assistant (Boster)1

Washington, July 25, 1958.

SUBJECT

  • Conversation between the Secretary and Prime Minister Macmillan regarding Summit Security Meeting

Prime Minister Macmillan telephoned the Secretary this afternoon with regard to the discussions about a possible meeting with the Soviets.2 He said that the French were being very difficult; that they seemed to be backing out and wanted to come back to the Geneva idea. He said he would like to try to calm the French by asking Couve de Murville to London on Saturday.

The Secretary said that our reply3 had been sent and that we had made some changes in it. He said he thought the French would be willing to go along if the arrangements for a meeting could be made in a little more measured way. He said he had talked with De Murville4 and that the French felt arrangements were being made with too great haste and were also worried that they might get into a discussion of the Algerian question. He thought also that General De Gaulle was probably averse to leaving France at the present time. If we could make arrangements for a meeting date two or three weeks hence, the Secretary thought it might be all right. The Secretary referred to the [Page 395] last paragraph of our letter to Khrushchev and said he thought the French would be willing to go along on this basis. He saw no reason why the French would not be willing to allow the Permanent Representatives in New York to work out the date, duration, agenda and other details of a meeting. This would not commit anyone to have a meeting. Mr. Macmillan said they agreed that the meeting had to be in the United Nations.

DEB
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/7–2558. Confidential; Eyes Only.↩
  2. The British Embassy also on July 25 conveyed Foreign Secretary Lloyd’s objections to certain passages in the proposed U.S. reply to Khrushchev. In essence, Lloyd suggested limiting the discussion as much as possible to Lebanon and Jordan in the hope of securing an agreement on those issues without broadening considerations beyond the possibility of agreement. (Letter from Hood to Dulles, July 25; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series, Lebanon 1958) Eisenhower discussed the British objections with Dulles, Herter, Reinhardt, Hagerty, and Goodpaster on July 25, and concluded that to limit the agenda to Lebanon and Jordan “would result in our appearing solely in a defensive role.” It would be better to discuss the entire range of problems in the Middle East, as well as the underlying causes of the problems. (Ibid.,Eisenhower Diaries; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  3. See supra.↩
  4. See Document 228.↩