Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

233. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, July 25, 1958—7 p.m.

272. Palace telephoned King Hussein wished see me immediately. On arrival found Prime Minister Rifai with King. Hussein opened conversation with statement Jordan in precarious position, almost completely surrounded by enemies, immediate action mandatory.

In light USG position re dispatch troops Jordan he had asked Rifai prepare alternate proposal which he would now present. Rifai began by saying both he and King realized request US/UK forces although justifiable had produced number unfavorable repercussions:

(A) Widespread public resentment so-called “reoccupation”.

(B) Insistence by British their patrols be fully armed resulting creation Cyprus climate.

(C) Radio Cairo/Damascus charge Hussein asked British protect him from his own people.

(D) Jordan Army morale seriously undermined as presence British troops considered reflection ability national army protect its King.

I pointed out it was these same reasons which caused my government doubt wisdom sending US troops Jordan plus fact heavy concentration US land/sea/air power Lebanon area made any external aggression against Jordan virtually impossible. Rifai said main concern Hussein/himself was not external aggression but internal security which although now satisfactory might change under Nasser’s heavy propaganda attack aided by money agents infiltrated from UAR. Rifai explained Nasser knows street mobs by themselves cannot effect successful coup, must have cooperation army/security forces. While majority Jordan Army loyal there are some dissident elements particularly among company grade officers. Hussein/RIFAI greatest fear is occasion when army may be ordered fire on mob and refuse. When this happens government is finished, chaos results, army junta favorable Nasser will take over. Even if internal security maintained Jordan is now embattled island Nasser sea, cannot stand idly by permit Iraq/Syria particularly latter consolidate position. [51/2 lines of source text not declassified]

In order achieve foregoing objectives at same time clear country foreign troops Rifai with Hussein’s blessing submitted following proposal which King said he wished me transmit as formal request my government soonest.

(A) USG provide necessary funds raise two additional brigades recruited from tribes loyal King. Rifai estimates cost approximately $8 million.

(B) USG and HKJ enter into mutual defense agreement under which Jordan Army would be re-equipped (particularly armored brigade), supplied technical other military assistance under supervision MAAG/Jordan.

(C) Since Baghdad Pact finished as effective “northern-tier defense arrangement” new regional defense organization comprised Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, US, UK, France, West Germany, Greece, Libya, Italy to be known as METO shall be established.

Hussein outlined advantages plan saying two new brigades recruited among loyal tribesmen would strengthen internal security force to point where foreign troops would not be required and British brigade could be permitted depart. Expansion Jordan Army would make substantial contribution its morale, same time afford economic benefits by creating employment nomadic tribesmen hard hit by this year’s drought.

A US/HKJ defense treaty would have tremendous psychological effect by demonstrating to people Jordan US determination stand with Jordan against enemies which surround it. Creation MAAG/Jordan would permit American military come, be seen but in role partners working within framework Jordanian defense establishment not as “occupying force”.

Creation Middle East regional defense organization would permit grouping Arab as well non-Arab states which would have benefit pooling military potential major powers free world with strategic geography Middle East.

Hussein asked my opinion proposal. I replied expansion army meet country’s internal security requirements instead relying foreign troops had considerable merit as did idea US/HKJ mutual defense treaty including establishment a MAAG Jordan. Re regional grouping METO it involved wide-range political/economic as well as military considerations which I did not feel competent comment on although basic concept well illustrated in similar organizations such as SEATO.

I took opportunity in line increasing number of countries granting recognition new Iraqi Republic sound out Hussein/RIFAI their reaction should US in company other free nations feel obliged follow similar policy on grounds we better able serve legitimate interests our friends if we enjoy diplomatic relations new government. [31/2 lines of source text not declassified]

As I was about leave Rifai said wished make point re Khrushchev’s proposed summit meeting Security Council which heads of state including those Middle East would attend. Rifai requested I inform my Government King Hussein would insist on attending any such meeting in order to properly present his country’s case before Security Council.

Comment: I know from earlier conversations Rifai that he/Hussein/Talhuni have made painful reappraisal HKJ policy requesting foreign troops. Proposal advanced by Hussein/RIFAI my opinion holds certain advantages USG on assumption we wish retain Jordan as free-world fortress in Middle East at least until situation clarifies extent longer range policy objectives can be determined. No doubt it will cost us considerable amount money but at least under proposed set-up we would be in position know exact status Jordan security forces with additional advantage exercise some direct supervision over military assistance we provide. My opinion by refusing be pushed into dispatching US “occupation” troops we have gained opportunity establish MAAG/Jordan something which heretofore has been dismissed by HKJ as impossibility. In view Iraq toward which Jordan has in past looked for military support vis-à-vis Israelis now “on other side”. Expansion Jordan Army by two brigades does not seem unreasonable. Furthermore it can be used as device reassure Israel which has taken position it must strengthen its own security forces due to encirclement by Nasser, since two additional brigades in light present conditions cannot be construed as posing military threat Israel. Plan has further advantage of having Jordan as far as internal security concerned defended by Jordanians rather than ourselves or British. [21/2 lines of source text not declassified]²

Wright

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–2558. Top Secret; Niact.
2. The Department responded on July 26, in telegram 306 to Amman: “Inform King we have received his proposals and are studying them. They obviously raise a number of very important considerations and serious problems. As soon as we have completed formulation definitive views we will convey them to King. Meanwhile, in these critical days we would like to reiterate our support for Jordan and His Majesty.” (Ibid.) Wright reported, in telegram 307 from Amman, July 28, that he conveyed the Department’s response to Hussein and Rifai, who expressed appreciation but hoped for a prompt, favorable reply. Hussein was especially anxious to proceed with recruitment of the two additional brigades to bring the army up to full strength and permit the withdrawal of the British troops. (Ibid., 785.00/7–2858) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.