240. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
819. From Murphy for the Secretary. Yesterday we ran into a series of complicating developments which we are trying to resolve on the spot. As you undoubtedly know, there was an attempt at assassination of Prime Minister Solh yesterday a.m., he narrowly escaped death by a matter of seconds as a result of terrorist bomb attempt which killed six people. Naturally he was shaken and emotional. This has precipitated a crisis in the Lebanese Government which involves General Chehab.
For over a week Chamoun has been telling me that Chehab is really the only possible presidential successor, and day before yesterday he confirmed that he would support Chehab who had accepted to be a candidate. He implied that this was the government’s viewpoint.
On the other hand, after lunch yesterday, in a high state of emotion resulting from that morning’s attempt on his life, Solh in the presence of Holloway, McClintock, Adams and myself, poured out a stream of invective against Chehab. He said there would be a special meeting of the Cabinet yesterday afternoon which would result in Chehab’s dismissal and the dismissal of a number of officers on the General Staff. He blamed Chehab for the development of the crisis during the past months, calling him a traitor. He even became bitter in his reference to American forces standing near with folded arms and doing nothing. He wanted to know whether, as he said Chamoun had told him, the US had insisted that Chehab be the candidate and that we would accept nobody else.
As dispassionately as possible I told the Prime Minister that we regarded with amazement a situation where he as the responsible head of government over a period of months has been unable, according [Page 409] to his own admission, to effect dismissal of officers of the General Staff whom he has considered disloyal and ineffective throughout the period of the rebellion. According to his own statement, he and his government have been unable to dismiss the commanding general whom he considered disloyal. At the same time the President of the Republic has told us for days that Chehab is the only possible candidate for the presidency. According to Solh’s own admission, his government has authority over only a fraction of the territory of the country—perhaps as little as a third of the area. He now addresses the question of us whether, if his government acts to remove General Chehab and members of the General Staff and there is a violent reaction on the part of the Lebanese Army, we would defend the present government by attacking the Lebanese Army with our forces.
I emphasized that we had been if anything too careful to refrain from supporting one candidate as against another. Only in reply to Chamoun’s question did we indicate we would have no objection to Chehab as President. Chamoun had recommended it. This frankly is an impossible situation and I said I would give a negative answer to his question. In fact, I said as a personal opinion that we would prefer to remove our forces from the area.
Holloway agreed and informed Solh US forces would not be used as suggested by Solh.
McClintock traced the history of the development of the present situation and the reasons for the despatch of our forces to the Lebanon.
Solh emotionally said, “Very well, I will resign and leave the country.” We deprecated this but did not urge him not to resign.
Holloway and McClintock agree with me that present government does not possess adequate authority to govern. Prolongation of the political crisis will cause further deterioration and give encouragement to terrorism. In that case, some form of coup d’etat becomes increasingly probable. If that happens, a military group would probably spearhead it.
Thus we conclude that whatever safety there is for us in this precarious situation lies with Chehab and his military establishment such as it is.
We are informed by Solh that parliamentary election of a new President is impossible under these conditions. Yet postponement may produce chaos. Solh has espoused an early election before yesterday’s attempt on his life. Now he is in full cry against it and declares that loyal members of the Parliament will not attend.
[Page 410]For their part, opposition are not being helpful. They have issued a manifesto denouncing elections unless both Chamoun and Americans go. In this stormy situation I plan to see Chehab and possibly speaker of Parliament before leaving this afternoon for Amman.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–3058. Secret; Priority.↩