Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

242. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, July 30, 1958—9 p.m.

836. Amman for Murphy. Malik asked me to see him this evening prior to final Cabinet session at 6 p.m. to go over latest developments on tomorrow’s elections. Malik said he wished to communicate following account of today’s events at palace:

1. Chamoun had spent part of morning with a large group of loyal deputies. He found great disagreement among them and opposition to his proposal that Chehab be elected president. Effect of yesterday’s dynamite attempt on Prime Minister was everywhere apparent. At last President told deputies that if they did not accept his advice meet tomorrow and elect Chehab, he would himself resign his office. Shaken by this ultimatum, deputies apparently agreed with great reluctance to follow President’s bidding.

2. Chehab, with whom Malik had a brief conversation, indicated he was now ready to accept the presidency but hoped for as large a vote as possible as easing way for re-establishing national unity. He also said he thought Sami Solh Cabinet should resign to be replaced by a government of “technicians”.

3. While Chehab was talking to Malik, Sami Solh arrived at palace and raised a fearful scene in adjoining hall, screaming at top of his voice that Chehab was a coward, weakling and imbecile, whom he would in no circumstances accept as president of Lebanon. With some difficulty Prime Minister was quieted down and hustled off to a tense Cabinet meeting which lasted for two hours.

4. At meeting of government attended by Chamoun, Malik said wide dissatisfaction was displayed toward American attitude. It was apparently believed we had sat by with folded arms while situation in Lebanon had deteriorated; and that we were pushing Chehab as a candidate. Chamoun complained according to Malik Americans were letting it be known that Chehab was his (Chamoun’s) candidate. Upshot of meeting was general agreement best solution would be to press for a military solution of rebellion with all possible means. This would, in Malik’s words, mean “maximum cooperation on all sides including the American.”

Malik said he had been requested by Cabinet to get my reaction. I pointed out notion of Chehab candidacy was one which President Chamoun had volunteered to Murphy and me. At no time have we indicated a preference for any candidate although we did honestly feel that Lebanon’s political agony would not be eased by letting the present situation drag on and possibly deteriorate. I also recalled a condition of our forces landing here was that Lebanon army would continue to fight and that there be fullest cooperation between Lebanon armed forces and our own. I added that we were perfectly confident of our ability to assist Lebanon to maintain its integrity and independence; but for US forces to be involved in a civil war while Lebanon forces were not fighting was a matter calling for very serious consideration. I then pointed out that in all objectivity situation of Lebanon Government had not changed since insurrection commenced on May 8: The government was powerless to enforce its decisions. It depended for its instrument of force upon the Lebanon military and General Chehab.

I was then asked to confer with Chamoun in Malik’s company. I found President affable and relaxed in contrast to his Foreign Minister. In fact for first time in all these months I had impression I was now speaking to Chamoun when he had at last reached “the moment of truth.”

Chamoun said more for Malik’s benefit than mine that there was no other candidate than Chehab if only because he controlled the armed forces. President said he was not bluffing when he had threatened his resignation to the deputies. He still thought it best to hold elections tomorrow and for Chehab to be elected. He did not, however, wish to dismiss Sami Solh at once but would prefer to have some days elapse before a way out was found for the Prime Minister.

Malik at this point said to President that he completely concurred in my analysis: That throughout the rebellion Lebanon Government had in fact been impotent. Their fate depended on General Chehab and he had not wished to carry out dictates given him.

He exclaimed, “we are confronted by a coup d’etat a la Libanaise; Chehab has contrived to take power.” To this Chamoun dissented saying that Chehab had not planned events but they had developed of their own momentum. He said wryly, “this all began ten years ago when we isolated the army to keep it out of politics. It became a state to itself and it is now coming into constitutional power.”

Malik expressed worriment over foreign policies which Chehab might follow. I said in my judgment climate of international opinion was now propitious for Lebanon to be given some sort of international guarantee which would settle the course of its foreign policy advantageously to Lebanon. I thought President Chamoun could play a useful role in few months remaining before end of his term in expediting events toward some form of international guarantee which might save Lebanon not only from its enemies but—perhaps more difficult—from the Lebanese themselves.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–3058. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Amman.