Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, July 31, 1958—9 p.m.

869. I called this afternoon on General Chehab to express my congratulations on his election as President.² I made it clear this was a courtesy visit as I had no wish to talk shop; but Chehab was clearly eager to do precisely that. He made following points:

1. General has been under very intense pressure from various political elements including moderate groups as well as opposition for an immediate public declaration calling on US forces to withdraw from Lebanon. Chehab said he refused to issue such a statement. He did wonder, however, if it might not be possible for United States (and he hinted a statement would have greater impact coming from President Eisenhower) to make declaration indicating that with improved security situation in Lebanon, it would presently be possible to re-embark our troops.³

2. Chehab indicated he was also under great pressure from opposition for immediate departure from Lebanon of President Chamoun. I recalled to Chehab his consistent attitude that Chamoun should finish out his constitutional term of office and indicated we had taken a similar line discussion with the press. I also made point which I thought would not be lost on a new President-elect that it would be a bad precedent for Chamoun or any other constitutionally elected Chief of State to be compelled to resign before end of term. Chehab agreed but expressed suggestion that possibly Chamoun might wish to make a trip abroad while still remaining legal President of Lebanon until September 23. He said “he had heard it said” that possibly Chamoun might be invited to the United States. I indicated I had no knowledge of such a proposal.

3. In any event it was clear that Chehab has made up his mind Sami Solh government must go. He said vote in Parliament this morning indicated that Cabinet itself was split right down the middle. Following this morning’s elections, he found it difficult to believe that present government could effectively continue in office. At one point General hinted that possibly if Sami Bey should depart from Lebanon, it might be a sufficient sop to opposition to enable him to resist demands for Chamoun’s departure.

4. On formation of a new Cabinet, Chehab indicated his preference for workmanlike group of technicians but admitted he would presently run into difficulty with professional politicians and people with their own axes to grind. He likewise expressed doubt that it would be easy for Chamoun to contemplate participation in a new government of various opposition members who Chehab thought might usefully serve in new Cabinet.

5. On opposition demand for general elections, I was relieved to find Chehab still firmly of opinion that it would be disastrous to dissolve Chamber and hold elections. He said with passions so heightened by recent events, it would be impossible to contemplate this possibility for a long time to come. I emphatically agreed.

6. General expressed hope US would be able to help Lebanon by financial and matérial assistance. He cited destruction of roads, bridges and buildings due to civil war and financial straits of GOL. On military account he hoped he could continue to look to US for supply of certain matériel. His only specific request, however, was that certain arms of French manufacture which were included in next year’s budget and which were essential to Lebanese TO and Es might possibly be purchased with US funds. Total amount was small, in neighborhood of between 3 and 4 million Lebanese pounds.

7. On over-all situation following election, Chehab said he expected civil war would rapidly peter out. He had some information indicating that Tripoli might open tomorrow. It would take a few days longer for resistance in the Basta to fade away, but was following example of General Eisenhower in leaving rear doors open for enemy to flee.

8. As for recrudescence of Syrian-Egyptian infiltration again in Lebanon, Chehab said he thought it would be some while before Nasser undertook any new adventures against this country. He had it from a number of Moslem sources that Nasser had been very much shaken by swift and effective American military intervention in Lebanon.

Comment:Chehab is exceedingly friendly and willing to use his prestige to insure most practical arrangement of future relations with United States. However, he will, as he indicated to Holloway, Murphy and me yesterday, feel compelled by public opinion as well as by his own military estimate of situation to ask for our withdrawal once it is clear military aspects of insurrection have been dealt with. I believe his suggestion for a voluntary statement on our part is evidence of his desire to accomplish our eventual withdrawal by most tactful means. I took pains to tell General this was already within framework of previously established US policy and cited statements of President Eisenhower and Ambassador Lodge in that regard. However, Chehab continues to feel some additional declaration from US would obviate necessity on his part for making a public request for our withdrawal.

Department will note Chamoun’s opinion on withdrawal set out Embtel 870.⁴ I am hopeful we may be able to conciliate opinions of President elect and Chamoun in order that our troops may remain here at least until end of summer. A carefully drafted statement possibly embodying Chamoun’s suggestion our forces would be expected to stay pending an international settlement for Lebanon might bridge gap between Chehab and Chamoun.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–3158. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Chehab was elected President of Lebanon by the Lebanese Parliament on July 31. He received 43 votes on the first ballot in the Chamber of Deputies, which was one short of the necessary 2/3 majority, and was elected on the second ballot with 48 votes to 7 for Raymond Edde. (Telegram 861 from Beirut, July 31; ibid.) President Eisenhower sent a personal message of congratulations to Chehab on July 31, noting his expectation that close and cordial relations would continue between the two countries. (Telegram 607 to Beirut; ibid., 783A.11/7–3158) McClintock reported on August 1 that Chehab was delighted with the message from Eisenhower, and referred in particular to Eisenhower’s statement that he could appreciate what it meant to step out of the military life into political office. (Telegram 892 from Beirut; ibid., 783A.11/8–158)
3. McClintock also reported, in telegram 867 from Beirut, July 31, that Chehab was opposed to any increase in the strength of the U.N. group in Lebanon, and anticipated requesting the departure of the observation group almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. (Ibid., 320.5783A/7–3158)
4. In telegram 870 from Beirut, July 31, McClintock reported that he had called on Chamoun after the election to express his admiration for Chamoun’s patriotism and ability to put the welfare of his country above personal and partisan interests. Chamoun said that the vote that morning had been taken “in an air of national mourning”, but he had convinced his supporters that there was no practical alternative to Chehab. McClintock gave Chamoun a summary of his earlier conversation with Chehab, and indicated that Chehab was under strong pressure to compel Chamoun to leave before September 23. McClintock suggested that Chamoun might best serve the country by heading a Lebanese delegation to the United Nations where the question of an international guarantee of Lebanon’s independence might be debated. McClintock noted that, to his surprise, Chamoun responded that he considered the suggestion a good one, provided that the representation of the participating states was at the chief of state level. (Ibid., 783A.00/7–3158; included in the microfiche supplement)