249. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State1
581. From Murphy. On my return from Jordan and Israel I have read carefully the several Deptels regarding UN activity and plans in Lebanon.
First of all I would like to stress that in my opinion actually there is no “friction” between UNOGIL, the Embassy and Admiral Holloway’s command. To the contrary it seems to me there is an admirable cordiality and mutual desire to work together. Naturally the initial shock to UNOGIL’s staff of the sudden arrival of a large US fighting force required adjustments both in operations and attitudes. All parties concerned deserve credit for intelligent cooperation. McClintock, Holloway, Galo Plaza, General Bull and their associates and I have enjoyed many contacts, daily discussed mutual problems frankly and have been, I think, mutually helpful. I hope Lodge will emphasize this to Hammarskjold and Bunche.
UNOGIL, I believe, is puzzled as to the future. Sometimes in this kind of situation there may be a tendency to develop unconsciously a vested interest, to institutionalize.
My own preliminary thinking, for what it is worth, would be in the direction of reduction rather than an increase in the personnel of UNOGIL.
My reasons are:
- (1)
- Belief that the new Lebanese Government will hope to develop its own control of the situation. There is certainly a fair prospect of its success. Newly elected President Chehab, I am sure, is determined to achieve control. If he succeeds, a large UN establishment in Lebanon would not only be unnecessary but unwelcome and controversial. The key to control, I think, is the ability of Chehab now to stimulate Lebanese armed forces and gendarmérie to act and to bring about a reconciliation of elements which will reduce opposition to government control. Lebanon control of its own destiny obviously should be promoted if it offers reasonable hope of success.
- (2)
- Lebanon is flooded with clandestine small arms and explosives. It continues afflicted by terrorists. This situation has arisen from both domestic and foreign causes. Its correction, I am convinced, can be best effected by GOL. Pernicious foreign interference can be reduced and eventually eliminated by determined GOL action coupled with a national union type of reconciliation. From my talks with [Page 424] principal opposition leaders I am convinced they intend to cooperate with Chehab. Already this morning there is news that Druze leader Jumblatt is requiring his followers to turn in their arms at Mouktara.
With development of cooperation of opposition leaders, effective police action, a system of rewards and penalties to suppress terrorism and collect arms and explosives, the reasons for a large UN establishment would begin to disappear. Clandestine and foreign radio agitation would be reduced. I think we should lend encouragement to GOL, giving it to understand that it has the primary responsibility to establish law and order. Such policy, I believe, will be far more palatable to the Lebanese. Proposal to establish a large UN force in itself is a declaration of lack of confidence in Lebanon’s ability to bear its proper responsibility. Chehab, I am sure, would like a chance to demonstrate ability to cope with the problem. With temporary presence here powerful US military force, we can encourage and support him to do so. Such support and encouragement are especially important in the initial stage until the authority of GOL in the country is reestablished. The beginning is the critical period. After that, Chehab’s authority will be more easily accepted by the disparate elements making up this complex little country.
So I come to the conclusion that with any luck it may be possible in the near future to not only withdraw US forces gradually but to avoid a heavy UN build-up. I am confident GOL would not desire presence of a more or less permanent and large UN contingent any more than it would wish indefinite continuance in Lebanon of US military forces.
I believe that Holloway and McClintock substantially share foregoing views. On return to Beirut and before departure I would like to supplement this with additional comment relating to form of guarantee of Lebanese independence and integrity.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Beirut and USUN.↩