Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

251. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, August 3, 1958, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, August 3, 1958, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli Decision to Request US to Cease Overflights of Israel

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
• Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Israeli Minister
• The Secretary
• C—Mr. Reinhardt
• NEA—Mr. Rountree
• NE—Mr. Rockwell

Ambassador Eban and Mr. Herzog called at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary spoke strongly to them of the President’s and his shock upon learning that as soon as Israel received a Soviet protest concerning the US and UK overflights of Israel to Jordan, Israel was preparing to acquiesce to the Soviet request that the flights be stopped.² The Secretary said that it was particularly shocking that Israel would do this without any consultation with the US. We had believed that Israel fully agreed with the US and UK purpose in Lebanon and Jordan of showing the Soviets and Nasser there was a point beyond which they could not go. If Israel had now changed its mind, we would like to know. There were wide political implications in giving the USSR a sense of power in the Middle East by such subservient actions as Israel seemed prepared to take.³

Ambassador Eban said that Israel was deeply concerned over the malevolent power of the Soviet Union which could destroy Israel in five minutes. The Prime Minister’s decision was based on the belief that the additional British request for overflight permission involved the sending of additional troops into Jordan which were an added convenience but not crucial for the support of the British operation. Israel felt that by now the British should have been able to make other arrangements to get these forces into Jordan. Israel lacked a formal security guarantee from the US and felt itself in a most poignant position.

The Secretary stated that the Eisenhower Doctrine made clear that the US would come to the support of Israel should it be attacked by a Communist power. For future guidance we wanted to know whether Israel felt so menaced by the USSR that it would do whatever the Soviet Union requested.

The Ambassador said he would at once transmit the Secretary’s important observations to his government. Israeli general fortitude could not be questioned, he thought. The Secretary said he was sorry he had had to speak so bluntly, but important issues were at stake.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell. The source text indicates that the conversation took place at the Secretary’s residence on Sunday afternoon. A longer version of the conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 111, August 3. (Ibid., Central Files, 785.00/8–558; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. In telegram 137 from Tel Aviv, August 2, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Foreign Ministry had just delivered an urgent message from Prime Minister Ben Gurion to the effect that overflights of Israel by U.S. planes must stop immediately. The Foreign Ministry indicated that the same démarche was being made to the British Embassy. When Ambassador Lawson asked the basis of this urgent request, the Assistant Director General of the Foreign Ministry explained that Ben Gurion had been on the point of making the request because of political pressure when he received a Soviet protest note concerning the overflights. The Prime Minister felt that he could no longer submit the Israeli people to the risks involved in the overflights. (Department of State, 785.00/8–258; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Dulles had discussed the Israeli decision to halt the overflights with Eisenhower that morning. “I said that the broad implications of this were perhaps more serious than the immediate impact on UK forces in Jordan, although the latter was important. I noted that this might require the UK to send reinforcements via the Suez Canal, and that this in turn might raise serious problems.” (Memorandum of conversation with the President, August 3; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)
4. On August 5, the Israeli Government reversed itself and authorized the resumption of the U.S. airlift to Jordan. Israel asked only that the United States initiate consultations to find an agreed arrangement to bring the flights to an early conclusion. Ambassador Eban stressed, in conveying this message to the Department, that Prime Minister Ben Gurion did not want to leave the impression that Israel had bowed to Soviet pressure. Israel had not answered the Soviet note, and when it did, would reject the contention that U.S.–U.K. action in Lebanon and Jordan, and Israel’s cooperation with the overflights, were aggressive. (Telegram 119 to Tel Aviv, August 5; Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/8–558; included in the microfiche supplement)