265. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
859. From Murphy. Upon my arrival in London Ambassador Whitney and I accompanied by Morris and Burdett proceeded immediately to Chequers for working tea followed by working dinner with Selwyn Lloyd. Lloyd had with him Ormsby-Gore, Hoyer Millar, Patrick Dean, William Hayter, Evelyn Shuckburgh, Michael Hadow and Denis Laskey. British representatives questioned me closely about my Middle East trip and I gave them full and frank account. In staff meeting atmosphere ideas were tossed out and examined. I have tried to indicate below trend of British thinking and matters over which they are particularly concerned. Lloyd and his advisers clearly are still in process of formulating their position and obviously most receptive to suggestions from us.
Lebanon—Lloyd stressed “it is desperately important” for US and UK to keep together on Lebanon and Jordan, not necessarily regarding type of solution but on timing. He said he was thinking of need to save Western face. We would look very foolish if six weeks after withdrawal US forces General Chehab chose to join UAR. Perhaps neutralization along Austrian lines would be good idea. In 1860 West intervened in Lebanon and many Lebanese especially Christians might feel much safer if there were some international arrangements now. International convention might be formulated to effect Lebanon would not join Western alliance of Baghdad Pact and also would refrain from [Page 452] joining any other grouping. This might be accomplished by treaty or through agreement of great powers and UAR. I said I thought this line not entirely foreign to thinking in some quarters in Lebanon. I apparently more optimistic than they re Chehab’s ability to bring about reconciliation and his determination maintain Lebanese independence. Lloyd said Nasser should be made to sign on dotted line while our troops are still in Lebanon and Jordan. (He repeated this several times.) Also we must think of Persian Gulf. Neutrality treaty might be good precedent for that area. Once Nasser had affixed his signature incentive for internal agitation to force Lebanon to join UAR would be largely removed. Hoyer Millar commented that Lebanese lacked guts to maintain neutrality on Swiss model. Therefore great powers should establish neutrality for Lebanon on Austrian model.
Jordan—Lloyd and his advisers admitted position Hussein’s government very shaky. Lloyd supposed UK would like to make Jordan “ward of UN” for lack of something better. Hammarskjold’s mind seemed to be working in that direction. Hoyer Millar reported British Ambassador in Amman has pointed out that UN force would not solve internal problem in Jordan, succeed in keeping King on throne or provide economic sustenance.
Lloyd emphasized desire of UK to remove troops from Jordan but also to leave something behind when they left. If Western response to request for help from small countries failed, West would have “had it” all over world. He compared decision faced with that confronted by UK in 1941 when HMG determined to go into Greece although decision was military nonsense. [21/2 lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Lloyd made clear he not interested in protecting West Bank from Israel for benefit of Nasser. William Hayter stated he convinced Israel would seize West Bank if Jordan collapsed. Lloyd and his other advisers did not dissent.
British representatives doubted Nasser in such circumstances would move militarily against Israel. Further they did not think USSR would back Nasser in military move against Israel.
Possibility of Jordan and Israel collaborating in development of waters of Jordan River suggested by Lloyd. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
[8 lines of source text not declassified] It would be terrific blow to West if two weeks after British troops withdrew Jordan joined UAR. In response to question from Ambassador Whitney, Lloyd said would be absolute disaster if US troops withdrew from Lebanon before there was some arrangement regarding Jordan. Attacks on British troops would immediately start and their position would be rendered untenable. Therefore, meanwhile important for US and UK to give appearance they intended to stay on in Jordan and Lebanon for ten years if [Page 453] need be. In this case Russians and Nasser would start working for something realistic. Lloyd had doubts about emphasis given to statements US prepared to leave Lebanon when requested by legitimate Lebanese Government.
Regarding Special General Assembly, Lloyd and his colleagues showed intense preoccupation that upcoming meeting provide “solution”, temporary at worse, for Jordan problem. Lloyd asserted “this is one time we really do want something out of UN”. He expressed opinion there was no chance of obtaining two-thirds vote if Western case is based on condemning interference by UAR. William Hayter pointed out only justification for requesting UN action was indirect aggression by UAR.
Ormsby-Gore remarked that if UN force for Jordan agreed to there might be temporary respite. Everyone would be somewhat hesitant over flouting UN authority. Lloyd added Hammarskjold is “redoubtable” figure and could be expected to work strongly to maintain UN authority in Jordan once it authorized by GA.
Regarding King Hussein’s request for two additional brigades, Lloyd said he inclined to respond favorably on theory that if something not done Jordan would collapse. He not satisfied Jordan inevitably would collapse since international stake in keeping country going so great there might be consensus this only course to pursue. Lloyd explained he did not have in mind providing fully equipped units, but rather form of subsidy to loyal Bedouin tribes, which perhaps could be organized into irregular force.
[Here follows discussion of Iraq, Egypt, Israel, the Persian Gulf, and Kuwait.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/8–1158. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris.↩