Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

285. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 21, 1958¹

New York, August 21, 1958

SUBJECT

• Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Fawzi—Egyptian Foreign Minister
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge—U.S. Mission
• William M. Rountree—NEA

The Secretary said the primary reason he wanted to meet with Dr. Fawzi was to talk about Jordan. He said that if the Arab resolution² were passed, as he hoped it would be, it would involve extensive commitments regarding respect by the nations in the area for the independence and integrity of each other. The resolution would lead to an expectation throughout the world that the situation in the Near East would be greatly improved. If in these circumstances the situation in Jordan should soon explode, the good faith of certain countries would be called into question. He therefore welcomed an opportunity to talk about this with Dr. Fawzi on a friendly and intimate basis.

The Jordan Government wanted more in the way of financial and other commitments than we felt able to extend. They were thinking in terms of some 50 to 100 million dollars per year, over an extended period. On the other hand, if the situation in Jordan should be permitted to disintegrate, that would almost certainly bring about internal chaos giving rise to a real danger of renewed Arab/Israel hostilities. We, therefore, should find some basis for cooperation in deciding what should be done with respect to Jordan. If the UAR really wanted to take over Jordan, they could probably do so since the United States was not willing to go to all lengths, including a commitment for substantial financial assistance over an extended period of time, to keep Jordan out of UAR hands. One question was, however, what would happen to Jordan, including the many refugees there, if the present regime should be ousted and the UAR should not be in a position to assume the enormous financial responsibility for the country. That was apart from the question of the likely Israeli reaction to various contingencies.

Dr. Fawzi recalled that he had spoken briefly with Ambassador Lodge about this question, and that he had said the UAR was ready to keep an open mind regarding various alternatives. He could state that the UAR was willing to cooperate in a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Jordan. He thought the choice of Jordan’s future might well be between the Arab states assuming the burden for that country, or in continuing a situation in which Jordan would constitute an opening for intervention by foreign countries. The UAR itself would be very happy to see some close relationship between Jordan and Iraq.

The Secretary inquired whether Dr. Fawzi foresaw any possibility that King Hussein would accept an association with Iraq, to which Dr. Fawzi replied that “neither the bride nor the bridegroom would be eager, but perhaps they could be persuaded”.

The Secretary emphasized the need for bringing about in an orderly way whatever change was to be made, since a change through disorder would be extremely dangerous. Time, therefore, would be required. He would prefer that nothing be precipitated in Jordan but that it be held as at present for at least two or three months until things could be permitted to settle down. Whether or not this could be accomplished, the Secretary did not know.

Dr. Fawzi said that Mr. Murphy had told them in Cairo that he did not think Hussein would abdicate. He realized, of course, that that could not be taken as a last answer. If Hussein’s friends felt that he could be safe in Jordan, he might continue on there, but frankly Dr. Fawzi thought this doubtful. He considered it to be better advice to King Hussein that he continue his studies in England. In any event, however, the UAR would not resist his staying in Jordan.

The Secretary did not see a permanent future for Jordan as an independent nation. It had always been maintained by foreign contributions. There was, however, no easy alternative. It would be more logical from the political and economic viewpoints to bring about an association of Jordan with Iraq. He did not think that could be achieved at the moment without violence. Dr. Fawzi agreed and said there was no need to rush. Several months might be required to bring about an orderly transition. Meanwhile, the UAR would willingly accept appropriate UN arrangements.

The Secretary inquired whether Dr. Fawzi thought that, if the British should withdraw and the UN establish a presence in Jordan, King Hussein could stay on for a few months longer. Dr. Fawzi replied that he might be able to do so; the UAR would cooperate.

The Secretary observed that if Hussein should go and if an interim government should come in which was committed to the UAR, it would not be possible for the US to put up the money to maintain the Jordanian economy. Thus the inauguration of a new regime in Jordan would immediately precipitate that issue which we would not wish to arise right away. He said we would continue to support King Hussein for a few months longer, but if he should be overthrown by violence and a pro-Nasser regime installed, American public opinion would preclude any financial aid. That was another factor which rendered it highly desirable to bring about in an orderly way any change that might take place.

Dr. Fawzi said that these considerations were very much in his mind. If Hussein should be overthrown and the new regime should ask the UAR to take over financial responsibility, the UAR could not afford to do so. He was aware that there was a whole complex of problems including the question of who would care for the Palestinian refugees now in Jordan. It would be sensible to explore how far the Iraqis might be prepared to go back to the Arab Union concept. If UAR advice meant anything, they would certainly advise their friends in Jordan, particularly of Palestinian origin, to keep quiet for the time being. The Secretary said that we would continue to put up money in Jordan on a temporary basis. We should try to figure out together how there could be developed a satisfactory solution to the problem in order to give Jordan some basis for its existence other than foreign contribution, and how to bring about any changes that may be decided upon without precipitating an Arab-Israel war. He said the young King had shown great courage and determination, but he was now in a mood whereby it was hard to predict what action he might take. If he felt himself too hard-pressed, he might assume the attitude of Samson and endeavor to pull down the pillars, bringing about a collapse of the whole situation.

The Secretary concluded by saying he was worried about the Jordanian situation and hoped that Dr. Fawzi would seriously consider what might be done in the context of the problem as they had discussed it.

Dr. Fawzi seemed to welcome the discussion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/8–2158. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree. The source text indicates that the conversation took place in the U.N. building.
2. See Document 287.