329. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1

970. In view distinct possibility King Hussein under pressure political/military/tribal groups hostile Prime Minister Rifai may attempt replace him as sop to opposition in hope buy time avoid coming grips basic problem Nasser brand Arab Nationalism, Embassy opinion some thought should be given possible courses action to be taken. I believe bellwether any such move will be indirect approach from King [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], or by court minister Hazza Majali now engaged power struggle with Rifai using his palace position as lever or from opposition leaders themselves. In any case all will be anxious ascertain probable USG attitude new government particularly with respect continuation/expansion our military/economic aid programs.

Country Team has repeatedly indicated any success of Rifai administration must move “left”. At moment only visible candidate would be collection “retreat politicians” having varying degrees leftist [Page 577] tendencies, none of whom have capacity satisfy inherent public desire broader base representative government or delay natural swing toward Nasser as only true symbol Arab Nationalism.

Real danger lies not in “devil we know but rather devil we don’t know”. Major task confronting mission Amman is to discover who is potential leader able bring fresh approach present routine cabinet reshuffles, equally important is to know his source of power and ideas for Jordan foreign policy. Under present circumstances wherein martial law has been in force a year and half new leader must either come from army or have substantial military support including tribal allegiances. Jordan cannot for long continue “imperialist island in Nasser sea,” must eventually work out accommodation its Arab neighbors all of which at moment are hostile in some degree. This process will require adjustment Jordan foreign policy which for last 18 months has not only been pro-West but more specifically pro-US especially under Rifai.

It would seem advisable USG should have definite policy re our relation any future HKJ Governments which may well run from caretaker type most likely succeed Rifai to extreme pro-Nasser Nationalist.

If USG decision is “business as usual policy” regardless political coloration new Jordanian Government and if such decision should ever become known Nasser and/or domestic opposition this could in itself set off chain reaction which with “UN presence office” Amman might well result in establishment government extreme nationalist type either through coup d’etat or less violent means without any apparent foreign intervention.

In view inevitability some kind change present government Embassy would appreciate indication Department’s thinking re this problem.

Wright
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/9–2458. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.