Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

336. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, September 27, 1958—4 p.m.

1720. I called this morning on Foreign Minister Takla and left with him texts of proposed statements set out Deptels 1364 and 1365,²indicating Chehab had already given his consent to that contained in 1364.³Takla read English text attentively and said he was in complete agreement that it should be released to Secretary General and that he very much appreciated our courtesy in giving Lebanese Government a chance to comment. Re proposed communiqué suggested Deptel 1365, he said he wished to bring Prime Minister up to date on entire question of troop withdrawal and that he would wish to discuss this matter with me early next week. I indicated Chehab has expressed his preference for a unilateral communiqué coming from US.

Foreign Minister expressed great personal gratification that our relationship had been so cordial and so close that he could venture to count on my help in difficult days ahead. I said I was equally happy to work with Philippe Bey as an old friend and that, as he knew, we had very consistently indicated our desire to help Lebanon retain its integrity and independence.

Foreign Minister asked specifically if I could use my influence, particularly in the Christian community, in bringing people to a more moderate attitude of mind. He said regrettably Chamoun was maneuvering to bring about a state of disorder where he might once more dream of returning to presidential power. Other Christian political factions, particularly the Phalange and PPS, merely looked upon forthcoming parliamentary maneuvering as a means of getting once more “at the Cheese.” Where they were mistaken, said Takla, was in their belief there was still some cheese to nibble at. New government, he said, could at least point to personal probity of its Ministers. He cited by way of example a two-hour conversation he had with Phalange leaders yesterday afternoon which, after much palaver on principles and high-sounding aims, boiled down to fact they wanted one portfolio for their own party.

In a later call with Admiral Holloway on Prime Minister Karame in his capacity as President of Council and also Minister of Defense, Admiral Holloway and I told press we had come to pay our respects as US diplomatic and military representatives in Lebanon and that we wished to assure new Prime Minister of US desire to do everything possible to help Lebanon restore unity and peace as necessary conditions to primary objective of maintaining independence and integrity of the Republic.

Karame said he would like to repeat what he had told Murphy; namely, that he and his followers had never deviated from a firm friendship for the US. He hoped he could look for our assistance in helping him to achieve his policy of pacification, unification and preservation of the independence of Lebanon. Prime Minister was pleased when we indicated degree to which we and President Chehab were already in cordial agreement on proposed phased withdrawal of US Forces.

At request of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister I plan informally to have conversations with various political and religious leaders, indicating our hope that Lebanon will achieve a breathing spell and will be able to get rapidly back on the path toward unity and independence.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/9–2758. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, and USUN.
2. Telegram 1364 to Beirut, September 25, instructed McClintock to begin conversations with Chehab to obtain agreement to a joint U.S.-Lebanese communiqué regarding the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon. (Ibid., 783A.00/9–2458) Telegram 1365 to Beirut, September 25, transmitted the text of a statement of the U.S. position with regard to the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon which the Department proposed to provide to Hammarskjöld as the basis for that section of his September 29 report to the General Assembly which would deal with the question of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. McClintock was instructed to seek Chehab’s concurrence in providing the statement to Hammarskjöld. (Ibid., 783A.00/9–2558) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement. For text of the statement submitted to the Secretary-General on September 27, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 1049.
3. McClintock reported, in telegram 1709 from Beirut, September 26, that he had discussed telegrams 1364 and 1365 to Beirut with Chehab. The President had given his assent to the proposed communiqué, but reiterated his preference that it be a unilateral U.S. communiqué indicating close and cordial consultation with the Lebanese Government. He suggested that McClintock work out the final wording with Foreign Minister Takla. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/9–2658; included in the microfiche supplement)