339. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
1773. Meeting outlined Embtel 17572 was on the whole a success, although at last minute Prime Minister Karame dropped out because of pressure put on him by unreconstructed rebels Saeb Salaam, Abdullah Yafi and Hussein Ouwini. Fact they exercised this pressure indicates importance they attached to formula for a political solution. All other leaders whose names were cited reference telegram were present at last night’s two-hour meeting with exception of Jumblat who had another engagement.
I invited each member of the group to have his say and found general agreement on proposed formula, although Gemayel did not wish to commit himself definitively at this first meeting. From a variety of sources I am convinced he did not dare commit loyalist side without permission of Chamoun, who is mastermind behind the present Christian strike. However, on departure his cousin Maurice Gemayel, who is a far sounder and more intelligent member of the Phalange, told me he was certain loyalists would agree. On opposition [Page 590] side, Foreign Minister Takla said he thought Karame and Moslems could be brought around by personal intervention of General Chehab. He begged me to see the President as soon as possible which I shall do this afternoon.3 I likewise intend to call on Patriarch Meouchi and plan to visit Chamoun by helicopter tomorrow.
Although these are somewhat unorthodox gyrations, if seen against background of traditional diplomacy, our intervention seems to be universally welcomed as a catalyst which may enable these warring factions to compose their differences.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–158. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, London, and USUN.↩
- Supra.↩
- McClintock reported, in telegram 1791 from Beirut, October 1, that he had discussed the meeting at the Embassy with Chehab and Chehab felt that the meeting had served a useful purpose as a catalyst for action among the Lebanese themselves. Chehab said that he was willing to grant two or three portfolios to Christian loyalists and was prepared to increase the number of seats in Parliament, but would only do so after the Karame government received a vote of confidence in Parliament. Chehab admitted that the Christian strike had effectively paralyzed business in Beirut, and was hopeful that negotiations would bring an end to it. To that end, Chehab welcomed the fact that McClintock was scheduled to see Chamoun on the following day. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–158; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- In telegram 1411 to Beirut, October 1, the Department noted that U.S. newspapers had given prominent play to the meeting arranged by McClintock in an effort to find a compromise settlement in Lebanon. The Department did not question the value of the effort but cautioned McClintock against making any further statements to the press concerning U.S. mediation efforts. “Reports of this nature provide Communists and other anti-American elements material for charging US meddling in GOL domestic politics.” (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–158)↩