Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, October 4, 1958—9 p.m.

1844. This evening Chehab confided to me his hope political crisis in Lebanon will find a solution in next two days.

President said idea of holding fast to Karami Cabinet until after vote of confidence was now “chambardee”. In other words, that too rigid objective had been upset by event. He had had a very long conversation yesterday with Gemayel who in turn had reported back to Chamoun; and today Gemayel had returned with proposals for a new slate. On Moslem side Chehab had likewise been busy; Karami was coming in a few minutes to discuss possible shifts in his government. Although Karami might have to accept some names submitted by Chamoun, there would be others which Chamoun on his part must accept. I told President that Chamoun had sent a message to me this morning indicating he hoped to see me further to discuss political crisis. We agreed it would give Chamoun publicity if I should return to his mountain grandstand but Chehab asked that I send an emissary to counsel former President that in interest of Lebanon he must not be too intransigeant in squabble over names in next Ministry. I plan to undertake such a démarche with Chamoun tomorrow.

Chehab said situation had looked very ugly indeed last night but that there were “still a few common sense people left in Lebanon” and leaders on both sides, realizing country was speeding toward the brink, had imposed on more fanatic elements, both Christian and Moslem, and had dragged them back to their senses. Given this development and effective comportment of armed forces Chehab now believed an agreed solution would be found within next 48 hours. He said explicitly there would be a refashioning of Karami Cabinet and that vote of confidence must come after new Ministry had been announced and not before as he and Karami had at first hoped. As indicated in my preceding telegram,²Chehab thought a government would be formed and a vote of confidence given by Wednesday October 8. I told President there were two observations I was pleased to pass on from another General Officer. This morning General Adams had told me that Lebanese Army had done an absolutely topnotch professional job in restoring order in Beirut. I said that Adams, who is one of the most competent soldiers I know, was not a man given to gratuitous compliments. This touched Chehab very deeply as I knew it would. I then said General Adams had offered a suggestion which I thought had great merit; i.e., that at this critical juncture Lebanese people would probably react affirmatively to a nationwide broadcast by Chehab himself calling on all factions to transcend their differences for the good of the republic. I pointed out newspapers in Beirut are so violently partisan that no one can get an unbiased picture of what is going on whereas government radio is listened to by everyone. Chehab thought this a good idea and said he thought he might make such a broadcast once new government was formed and before parliamentary vote of confidence.

As a last item of business Tasked General if report were correct that Syrian Druzes who have been supporting Jumblatt were on point of mobilizing to return to Syria. Chehab said this was in fact true and they had turned their weapons in to Jumblatt. He thought it better however that no publicity attend the event but added significantly “Chamoun knows about it.”

My over-all impression from this conversation and other reports during day is that political abcess will shortly break and that the fever will commence to subside next week.³

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–458. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, and USUN.
2. Reference is to telegram 1843 from Beirut; see footnote 7, Document 343.
3. McClintock revised his prediction on October 6. In telegram 1862 from Beirut, McClintock noted that it appeared that progress toward a solution in Lebanon was moving more slowly than anticipated. The Phalange-inspired general strike continued into its thirteenth day, there were further incidents of kidnapping and murder, and barricades were beginning to appear on the main routes into and out of Beirut. McClintock stated that he had sent an intermediary to meet with Chamoun, and Chamoun had indicated his willingness to meet with Chehab to iron out a political settlement to the crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–658; included in the microfiche supplement)