Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, October 9, 1958—10 a.m.

1895. As indicated Embtel 1891,² I saw Chehab last night at Junieh. He went over political crisis in great detail and seemed obviously happy to have a friend to confide in who had no personal interest in current intrigues.

Chehab said that after consultation with leaders of the Basta Karami had been “très chic” and had offered his resignation. Sticking point, as we have previously reported, was whether vote of confidence in Karami Cabinet should be taken before or after broadening of that government. Neither side would back down and, in consequence, general had now decided it was necessary to form another type of government.

Chehab has in mind a “neutral” cabinet made up largely of military officers with a leavening of experienced civilians. He said, for example, that the most important posts of Foreign and Economic Affairs and Finance would be intrusted to Takla. Prime Minister would be either Nazim Akkari Sunni Moslem Chef de Cabinet at Prime Minister’s office, an old wheelhorse in the Civil Service who once held Prime Ministership for three days in 1952, or Achmed Daouk, longtime Ambassador in Paris, also a Sunni Moslem who has a good reputation and is regarded as completely non-partisan.

Chehab said Gemayel had been extremely conciliatory and sincerely anxious to put an end to strike. Had he to deal only between Karami and Gemayel, crisis would have ended some days ago. However, President put his finger on Chamoun as being the dominant influence on so-called loyalist side and said he was more concerned with Chamoun’s attitude than he was with that of Moslem leaders. Chehab asked me if I could see Chamoun urgently this morning to endeavor to secure former President’s assurances he would not sabotage this last minute attempt to form a care-taker government which could at least reestablish order and permit Lebanon to start long road back toward reconstruction. I said I would do what I could.³

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–958. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Rome, and USUN.
2. In telegram 1891 from Beirut, October 8, the Embassy reported on the continuing impasse in the political crisis. As the Embassy saw it, the stumbling block to settlement was the inability to agree whether the reconstitution of the cabinet should take place before or after the vote of confidence in the Parliament. (Ibid., 783A.00/10–858; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. McClintock reported in telegram 1900 from Beirut, October 9, that he had visited Chamoun and had outlined Chehab’s formula for a new government. Chamoun objected to the inclusion of military officers in such a government, and observed that Takla could hardly be regarded as a neutral. Chamoun reiterated his willingness to support a “really neutral” government. McClintock reported his conversation with Chamoun to Chehab, who was in the latter stages of formulating his military-civilian cabinet. McClintock discussed the makeup of the cabinet with Chehab and concluded that it was probable that a new cabinet would be announced shortly and parliament convened thereafter, unless Chamoun sabotaged the effort. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–958; included in the microfiche supplement)