104. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

514. I called with Senators Gore and McGee on Ben Gurion afternoon November 22 in Jerusalem. Senator Gore expressed hopeful view in light his talks Beirut, Cairo and Amman that some progress might be made on refugee question. He commented favorably on Ben Gurion’s recent London Times interview on general disarmament and non-aggression pacts: Ben Gurion made following points:

1.
He tended to credit what Senators Gore and McGee had heard in Lebanon and Jordan, but he had reason doubt as to sincerity of Nasser’s statements. Ben Gurion referred to Robert Anderson’s secret mission as special envoy several years ago and commented that Nasser changed his initial position in later talks, and that he sometimes told different visitors different things.
2.
Refugees had been used as political weapon. He could understand Nasser and Arabs fighting the Jews whom they perhaps considered foreigners but non-humanitarian treatment Arab refugee did not admit of same explanation as refugees were their own people.
3.

An understanding of beginning of problem was important as this a “moral question.” Here, Ben Gurion referred to offer of Haganah in early hostilities end of mandatory period to Arabs of Haifa to remain provided their arms turned in. Many, he said, were inclined to accept and stay, but Mufti ordered them to leave and that this pattern repeated in Tiberias, Sfad, and Jaffa.

The Arabs had assumed that the Jews could be easily defeated, that they could occupy all Palestine and then do with the Jews as Hitler had done.

Also, it should be remembered that some 130,000 Jews, after 2500 years, had been forced to leave Iraq while still others … many in ill-health … had to leave Yemen, Morocco and other countries.2

4.
[1½ lines of source text not declassified] Ben Gurion referred to fact Egyptian officers captured in Sinai insulted when told stay in same compound enlisted men and eat same food. This contrasted with respect and friendship between Israeli officers and men. Further, some UAR officers now heading business concerns not wholly honest as they shipping out monies to banks in Switzerland.
5.
Little hope for peace until democratic government formed in Cairo responsive to people and interested in raising living standards of Fellahin which now $60 to $70 a year with some 70% diseased. If Nasser spent a fraction of money on Fellahin that did on arms and propaganda, future could be different.
6.
Refugee settlement could best be effected in Syria and Iraq as Egypt overpopulated and as Arabs not pioneers who would reclaim desert. Hence, necessary for them to be settled in fertile lands.

Senators Gore and McGee, returning to point, said nonetheless some hope refugee settlement; that after much talk Nasser had agreed to consider solution refugee question separately. Both Senators stressed psychological aspect of question and that “principle of repatriation” very important. Here, they said, recognition of plight of refugees and moral responsibility must be recognized by Israel by at least “token repatriation”. Senators Gore and McGee then said a first step by Israel was necessary to break the log jam. Ben Gurion asked what that would be. Senator Gore replied that a beginning could be made through talks via the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the United Nations, or other avenues looking to progress on eventual solution of refugee question on basis of resettlement and repatriation.

Ben Gurion said while not overly hopeful, he fully willing to cooperate on separate consideration of settlement refugee question. He said he would consider doing this through Palestine Conciliation Commission, the United Nations, or the US Government. Ben Gurion added United Nations difficult due to Soviets and that he would prefer [Page 231] to work not through committee but through US Government. However, he willing to work “directly or indirectly” if something could be done.

Comment: Ben Gurion took careful notes and he admitted there could be change in Nasser’s view as reported by Senators. By implication he indicated preference for solution through avenues of quiet diplomacy. Senators Gore and McGee said they would make confidential report, undertaken at request Senator Fulbright, to Foreign Relations Committee, Department of State, the President, and the United Nations.

Reid
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884.411/11–2359. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Amman, Beirut, and Cairo.
  2. Ellipses in the source text.