Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, February 18, 1960—4 p.m.

789. Deptel 619.² Message re UAR report of Israel mobilization conveyed Foreign Minister noon today by Counselor who acted in my unavoidable absence (due birth of daughter).

Mrs. Meir grateful for first part of message, but annoyed by use of word both in reference to our belief both sides should continue show restraint, et cetera. She loudly asserted that Israel refused to be put in same category as Nasser and bitterly resented our equalization of the two sides. There are not two sides that have been failing to show restraint, she said, but only one. She added, it is Nasser who makes speeches threatening to destroy Tel Aviv and not Ben-Gurion threatening Cairo. She added that Nasser was now going up and down Syria making unrestrained speeches.

Counselor pointed out that message did not mention “equalization” but was rather designed to further restraint and cooperation with UNTSO. Foreign Minister insisted that regardless of our intention, Nasser would treat this as equalization, and she would not be surprised if Nasser took this message as basis for new broadcasts stating that United States “warned” Israel. Mrs. Meir further remarked that she regretted that we had not been “willing to be critical of Nasser”.

She expressed a certain amount of disappointment over results of United Nations action by referring to reports of yesterday’s ISMAC meeting and to Inge Toft affair, and drew from her desk letter of October 7, 1959, from Hammarskjold in which she said he stated that Inge Toft if unloaded can go anywhere any time. She said Secretary General had also written he believed Egypt’s position was such that cargo of the ship could not be confiscated.

Mrs. Meir sarcastically scoffed at reports of mobilization and said we could see for ourselves what that amounted to.

Comment: Embassy has no present indications of mobilization after considerable reconnaissance which is continuing. Military Attachés estimate major Israeli military action on Syrian border, requiring several brigades and airborne preparations, would be observable. Politically Embassy believes Israel most unlikely to take any major action now, partly in light of Arab League meeting and principally because security of Israel not presently threatened. Moreover Israel doubtless still cherishes some hope of assistance in obtaining defensive arms from western friends.

Reid

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/2–1860. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Cairo and USUN.
2. On February 17, the Embassy in Cairo reported that Nasser had requested any information available to the Embassy concerning Israeli mobilization and preparation for aggressive action. (Telegram 2557; ibid., 684A.86B/2–1760) Telegram 619 to Tel Aviv, February 17, reported this approach, noted that the Embassy in Cairo had been instructed to tell Nasser that the United States had no reason to believe Israel was contemplating such actions, and instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv to say the United States believed both sides should continue to show restraint in actions and public statements on Palestine. (Ibid.)